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Will Your Veil Be Pierced?  How Strong Is 
Your Entity’s Liability Shield? — Piercing 
the Veil, Alter Ego, Ego, and Other Bases for 
Holding an Owner Liable for Debts of an 
Entity 
 
Allen Sparkman 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Courts, commentators, and attorneys describe corporations and limited 
liability companies as limited liability entities, but limited liability is not 
always the end result.  While debts of a separate legal entity ordinarily 
would not be considered those of the owners1 even if the statutes applicable 
to these entities did not contain limitations on the owners of the entities,2 
exceptions exist.  For example, courts developed piercing the veil in 
corporate cases over a century ago as an equitable remedy to prevent 
perceived misuses of the corporate form.3  In the corporate context, courts 
 
    Sparkman + Foote LLP, Houston, TX and Denver, Colo., © The Author October 19, 2015.  
The author thanks Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., of Burns, Figa & Wills, P.C., in Denver, Colorado, for his 
helpful and thoughtful comments.  Any mistakes are of course the responsibility of the author. 
1.   BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES G. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 16-17 (4th ed. 2013). 
2.  See, e.g., 6 DEL. CODE § 18-303: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited 
liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations 
and liabilities of the limited liability company, and no member or manager of a limited liability 
company shall be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the limited liability 
company solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of the limited liability company. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, under a limited liability 
company agreement or under another agreement, a member or manager may agree to be obligated 
personally for any or all of the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company. 
3.  See United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co, 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) 
(“A corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the 
contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify 
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of 
persons.”).  A notable early veil-piercing case arose in Berkey v. Third Ave. Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 
155 N.E. 58 (1926).  Plaintiff was injured on a street car operated by Forty-Second Street Railway Co., 
but she sued Third Avenue Railway Co., which owned substantially all of the stock of Forty-Second 
Street Railway Co. Although the court declined to pierce the corporate veil of Forty-Second Street 
Railway Co., which had its own bank accounts and employees as well as assets in excess of its 
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may pierce the veil where a subsidiary corporation is merely an alter ego or 
agent of the corporate parent, where the corporation is merely the alter ego 
of the shareholder, or where the corporate shield is being used to defraud 
creditors.4 
An owner of an entity may also incur direct liability for debts of the 
entity or otherwise become liable on grounds other than veil piercing or 
alter ego.  These grounds, which will be discussed later in this Article, 
include acting in the name of an unformed entity,5 acting for an undisclosed 
principal,6 liability to return improper distributions,7 liability for unpaid 
employment taxes,8 liability under other federal and state statutes,9 and 
liability for one’s own actions and the actions of agents.10 
The author was prompted to write this Article in part by his 
experiences as an expert witness in veil-piercing cases.  The author’s 
research did not find any analysis of veil-piercing cases that appeared 
aimed at assisting practicing attorneys who needed a resource to help them 
 
liabilities, Judge Cardozo (who wrote the opinion) stated “[w]e say at times that the corporate entity 
will be ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary which is 
characterized as an ‘alias’ or a ‘dummy.’” 155 N.E. at 61.  Senter Construction Company, Inc. v. Deka 
Investments, LLC, 2013 WL 3272487 at *7 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2013) (“The doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil is an equitable remedy that permits a court to impose liability on an individual or entity 
that uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct that individual’s or entity’s business.”). 
4.  Great Neck Plaza v. Le Peep Rests., 37 P.3d 485, 490 (Colo. App. 2001).  See also Fish v. 
East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940).  In determining whether the subsidiary was an alter ego or a mere 
instrumentality, FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, LIABILITY OF A 
PARENT FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY (Chicago, Callahan & Company 1931) listed eleven 
factors that should be assessed: 
(a) Does the parent own all or most of stock of the subsidiary? 
(b) Do the parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers? 
(c) Does the parent corporation finance the subsidiary? 
(d) Did the parent corporation subscribe to all of the capital stock of the subsidiary or 
otherwise cause its incorporation? 
(e) Does the subsidiary have grossly inadequate capital? 
(f) Does the parent pay the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary? 
(g) Does the subsidiary do no business except with the parent or does the subsidiary 
have no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent? 
(h) Is the subsidiary described by the parent (in papers of statements) as a department 
or division of the parent or is the business or financial responsibility of the 
subsidiary referred to as the parent corporation’s own? 
(i) Does the parent use the property of the subsidiary as its own? 
(j) Do the directors or executives fail to act independently in the interest of the 
subsidiary, and do they instead take orders from the parent, and act in the parent’s 
interest? 
(k) Are the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary not observed? 
5.  See infra notes 632-38 and accompanying text. 
6.  See infra notes 639–54 and accompanying text. 
7.  See infra notes 632–38 and accompanying text.  
8.  See infra notes 672–85 and accompanying text. 
9.  See infra notes 687–88 and accompanying text.  
10.  See infra notes 687–97 and accompanying text. 
 
  
Spring 2016 WILL YOUR VEIL BE PIERCED? 351 
advise clients on how to avoid being subject to a successful veil-piercing 
claim or who needed a resource to help them pursue or oppose a veil-
piercing claim.11  This Article draws from materials prepared for a program 
presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Business Law Section of the 
American Bar Association.  The program was titled “Piercing the 
Unincorporated Veil” and was sponsored by the Committee on LLCs, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities.  The program was chaired by 
Professor Stephen B. Presser of the Northwestern University College of 
Law, and the additional panelists were Elizabeth S. Fenton12 and Thomas E. 
Rutledge.13  The program materials included a 100 plus page summary of 
LLC veil-piercing cases prepared by Professor Elizabeth Miller of Baylor 
University School of Law from her comprehensive summaries of LLC 
cases that she has prepared for many years. 
This Article focuses on limited liability companies.  This Article also 
discusses corporate cases to an extent because courts developed the veil-
piercing and alter ego doctrines in corporate cases and much of the 
reasoning in corporate veil piercing and alter-ego cases will be applicable 
to limited liability companies as well.  Veil piercing claims also arise in 
what are known as reverse veil piercing cases.  This Article discusses 
reverse veil-piercing cases after discussing traditional veil-piercing.14 
 
II.  VEIL PIERCING IN GENERAL 
 
Some commentators have asserted that veil piercing “seems to happen 
freakishly.  Like lighting, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”15  Indeed, 
Stephen Bainbridge thought veil piercing as applied by the courts to be so 
“rare, unprincipled, and arbitrary” that it should not be applied to LLCs and 
 
11.  In the course of working on this Article, the author found an excellent recent article reporting 
on the use of modern quantitative machine learning methods to analyze the full text of 9,380 judicial 
veil-piercing opinions.  Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real 
Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014). Macey and Mitts will 
doubtless be cited in many briefs in veil-piercing cases in the future and will be referred to in this 
Article at several points. 
12.  Ms. Fenton practices law with Saul Ewing LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. 
13.  Mr. Rutledge practices law with Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC in Louisville, Kentucky. 
14.  See infra notes 601-32 and accompanying text. 
15.  Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).  Macey and Mitts state: “Large swaths of veil-piercing doctrine make no sense 
and do not promote any sensible policy goals such as limiting opportunistic risk-taking.”  Macey & 
Mitts, supra note 11, at 106.  As to how veil-piercing doctrine is applied in practice, however, Macy 
and Mitts assert that “judges have in fact decided veil-piercing cases in a highly-disciplined and 
structured way when one analyzes the actual outcomes of the cases in isolation from the reasoning 
displayed in the decisions themselves.”  Id. 
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should be abolished in the corporate context.16  Although Professor 
Bainbridge presented cogent arguments, he faced a Sisyphean task in 
attempting to dissuade courts from extending veil-piercing to LLCs — 
even more so was his attempt to see veil-piercing abolished in the corporate 
context.  More recently, Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts17 have argued 
that their analysis shows that, although the rationales stated by courts in 
veil-piercing cases may be confusing and contradictory,18 the actual results 
can be classified into three categories of cases that they believe are 
appropriate for veil-piercing.  Macey and Mitts argue that their analysis 
shows that whatever rationale may have been stated in opinions, “the entire 
universe of piercing cases can be explained as judicial efforts to remedy 
one”19 of three problems: 
 
 Courts pierce the corporate veil “to bring corporate 
actors’ behavior into conformity with a particular 
statutory scheme;”20 
 Courts “also pierce to remedy what appears to be 
fraudulent conduct that does not satisfy the strict 
elements of common law fraud;”21 
 The third ground on which courts pierce the corporate 
veil is “the promotion of what” Macey and Mitts term 
“accepted bankruptcy values.”22 
 
Macey and Mitts further state: 
 
[W]e believe that our taxonomy can produce a coherent 
account of veil-piercing cases, and are thus more optimistic 
than Stephen Bainbridge, who famously called for the 
abolishment of the doctrine.  Unlike Bainbridge, we believe 
that there are strong public policy rationales for retaining 
veil piercing in certain situations.  We hesitate to conclude 
that a century of jurisprudence represents a colossal mistake 
 
16.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 ILL. L. REV. 77, 78 (2005) 
(hereafter “Bainbridge LLCs”) and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. LAW 
479 (2001) (hereafter, “Bainbridge Corporations”). 
17.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11. 
18.  Id. at 100 (“[W]e argue that there is a rational structure to the doctrine of corporate veil 
piercing not only in theory, but in practice as well.  Our idea is that, despite the fact that courts are 
inarticulate to the point of incoherence in their reasoning in particular ‘piercing’ cases, a rational 
taxonomy can be derived from this morass.”). 
19.  Id. at 101. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
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on the part of the courts in all 50 states.  Rather, we suggest 
that three public policy rationales provide a systematic 
justification of veil piercing and that courts regularly decide 
in accordance with these rationales, even if they do not say 
so expressly.23 
 
This Article posits that case analysis shows that, although veil piercing 
may be rare and severe, as Macey and Mitts argue,24 there are principles 
that are, or should be, applied by courts in these cases. 
Veil piercing should be rare because limited liability and the 
separateness of entities and their owners are intended purposes of corporate 
and limited liability company statutes.  An observation by an early 
corporate commentator is equally applicable to corporations and limited 
liability companies today: 
 
The policy of our law to-day sanctions incorporation with 
the consequent immunity from individual liability.  It 
follows that no fraud is committed in incorporating for the 
precise purpose of avoiding and escaping personal 
responsibility.  Indeed, that is exactly why most people 
incorporate, and those dealing with corporations know, or at 
least are presumed to know, the law in this regard.25 
 
Veil-piercing may be severe, as in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Bronson Partners, LLC,26 which held the defendants jointly and severally 
liable for $1,942,325 in restitution and Martin v. Freeman27 and Axtmann v. 
Chillemi,28 which are opinions standing for the dubious proposition that an 
entity’s capitalization must at all times be sufficient to allow the entity to 
respond to large claims that could not have been reasonably foreseen when 
the entity was formed. 
As this Article discusses above and in its analysis of cases below, veil-
piercing claims succeed when the entity is nothing more than the alter ego 
 
23.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 113. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED 
CORPORATE PROBLEMS 18 (1927). 
26.  Federal Trade Commission v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Conn. 2009), 
discussed infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.  See also United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 
768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text (holding a parent 
corporation liable for a $4,787,604.20 debt of its subsidiary). 
27.  Martin v. Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182 (Colo. App. 2012), discussed infra notes 272-80 and 
accompanying text. 
28.  Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 2007), discussed infra notes 312-29 and 
accompanying text. 
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of the owner and has been wrongfully used to the detriment of third parties.  
However, a person who establishes an entity and respects its existence may 
properly use the entity to protect the founder from personal liability from 
the entity’s obligations and, in some cases, accomplish a purpose that the 
person could not achieve individually.  Courts recognize that someone who 
forms a limited liability company to avoid personal liability is pursuing a 
legitimate business goal29 and that a person who creates a limited liability 
company to minimize tax liability is not pursuing a nefarious purpose but is 
taking advantage of legally available tax planning opportunities to lower 
the person’s tax liability.30 
On the other hand, an entity will be ignored if it is a sham formed for 
the fraudulent and illegal purpose of evading a judgment creditor.31 
Several federal tax benefits are available to corporations but not to 
other entities.32  Wormser33 described an interesting 1908 case, People’s 
Pleasure Park v. Rohlede,34 in which a creative attorney used a corporation 
to avoid racially motivated deed restrictions: 
 
In People’s Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohlede, a large tract of 
land was divided up into a number of lots, each deed of a lot 
containing a covenant providing that title to the real estate 
should never pass into a person or persons of African 
descent or into a colored person or persons. Thereafter, a 
corporation was organized “composed exclusively of 
negroes.” It took title to a number of the lots and proposed to 
establish an elaborate amusement park for colored people. 
The corporation knew, when it purchased the land, of the 
title restriction. Suit was brought in equity by an owner of 
other [adjoining] lots to have the deed to the corporation 
cancelled and set aside. The court rendered judgment for the 
 
29.  See, e.g., MFP Eagle Highlands, LLC v. Am. Health Network of Ind., LLC, No. 1:07-cv-
0424-DFH-WGH, 2009 WL 77679, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2009). 
30.  Thomas v. Bridges, 120 So.3d 338, 342 (La. App. 2013).  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, 
at 129. 
31.  See, e.g., Devan Lowe, Inc. v. Stephens, 842 So.2d 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (Commission 
based salesman for auto dealership formed LLC and requested that dealership begin paying 
commissions to the LLC.  The testimony in the case did not show any reason for forming the LLC other 
than to attempt to avoid a garnishment action filed against the dealership with respect to the salesman’s 
commissions.).  See also Macey & Mitts, supra note 12-25 and cases discussed infra notes 336-71 and 
accompanying text.  
32.  For example, only C corporations may have tax-favored medical reimbursement plans (I.R.C. 
§ 105 (2014)) or provide tax-free group life insurance (I.R.C. § 79 (2012)).  Only corporations (C and 
S) may engage in tax-free reorganizations under I.R.C. § 368. 
33.  See WORMSER, supra note 25, at 26–27. 
34.  People’s Pleasure Park v. Rohlede, 109 Va. 439, 61 S.E. 794 (1908) aff’d on reh’g, 109 Va. 
439, 63 S.E. 981 (1909). 
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corporation, holding that though all its members were 
negroes, yet the corporation was a legal personality entirely 
separate, apart and distinct from its stockholders, and that 
therefore the covenant was not breached. The court said, in 
effect, that the corporation was not colored, because it “is a 
person which exists in contemplation of law only, and not 
physically.” 
 
In addition to the case law and statutory provisions determining when 
veil-piercing is appropriate, this Article also looks at issues that do not 
appear to have been addressed much in the existing literature: (1) what 
state’s law should apply to a veil-piercing claim and what effect, if any, 
does a contractual choice of law provision have on this analysis and (2) 
does imposition of the veil-piercing remedy depend on the existence of a 
causal relationship between the harm allegedly suffered by the plaintiff and 
the actions, or failure to act, that forms the basis for treating an entity as the 
alter ego of its shareholders or members?  These issues are discussed 
below.35 
 
III.  FACTORS IMPORTANT IN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VEIL-
PIERCING/ALTER-EGO CASES 
 
The cases discussed in this Article teach that the veil of a limited 
liability company may be pierced in unusual circumstances if: 
 
(i) the owners of the LLC dominate the LLC to such an extent that 
there is no meaningful separation between the LLC and its owners; 
(ii) the funds of the LLC and its owners are commingled to such a 
degree that it is not possible to determine what funds belong to which 
person; and 
(iii) the owners favor themselves over third-party creditors when 
causing the LLC to make payments.36 
 
The first two factors often accompany poor recordkeeping.  If one 
person dominates an entity and doesn’t have to seek approval of others, or 
ignores a requirement to seek approval,37 he or she is probably not inclined 
to be concerned about recordkeeping.  A person who fails to maintain 
accurate and separate financial records is more likely to fail to pay much 
 
35.  See infra notes 458-600 and accompanying text. 
36.  Liability is sometimes imposed on nonowners. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.  
37.  See Tzovolos v. Wiseman,51 Conn. Supp. 532 (2007) aff’d, 300 Conn. 247 (2011), discussed 
infra notes 205-26 and accompanying text. 
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attention to properly documenting decisions of the LLC’s owners or 
managers.  Another factor in some cases that is usually related to the 
owners improperly favoring themselves over third-party creditors is often 
described as inadequate capitalization.38  Note, also, that Macey and Mitts 
argue that, no matter what factors a court may discuss, all cases approving 
veil piercing may be classified in one of three categories.39  Several of the 
cases discussed in this Article are relevant to more than one factor and are 
discussed under each relevant factor with cross-references. 
In all cases, the factors determined to be present must have led to the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff.40  Moreover, to hold a particular owner of an 
entity liable under a veil-piercing claim, the owner must have participated 
in or had knowledge of the conditions that established the factor justifying 
veil-piercing.  Provosty v. ARC Construction, LLC41 arose out of the 
following facts: Following Hurricane Katrina, in December 2006, Henry 
and Gloria Provosty entered into a construction contract with ARC 
Construction LLC (“ARC-LA”).  ARC-LA was a Louisiana LLC formed to 
do construction work in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina.  ARC-LA had 
four members: (1) American Restoration Contractors, LLC, a Missouri 
LLC (“ARC-MO”), the members of which were Hyun Sung, Christopher P. 
Schmitt, Jamey Schmitt, and Richard Drevet; (2) Icehouse Capital 
Management, LLC; (3) Errol Glasser; and (4) Kestenbaum & Associates, 
LLC (“Kestenbaum”).  The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
piercing the veil of ARC-LA and imposing personal liability on its 
members other than Glasser and Kestenbaum.  The court responded to 
plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in not imposing liability on 
Glasser and Kestenbaum as follows: 
 
Plaintiffs contend that the jury found that this was a closely 
held corporation42 and that all of the members either 
committed the fraud or knew of the other members’ fraud.  
While such a contention is a possibility, Glasser was not 
found liable for fraud and further operates over a thousand 
 
38.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 128, 139, 148. 
39.  See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
40.  See cases cited infra notes 499-600 and accompanying text. 
41.  Provosty v. ARC Construction, LLC, 119 So.3d 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013). 
42.  Unfortunately, this use of the term “corporation” in reference to a limited liability company is 
too frequent in judicial opinions and even among practitioners, especially among attorneys who pursue 
and defend cases against limited liability companies.  An LLC is not a “corporation” no matter how 
many corporate characteristics it may have.  The distinction is important because, for example, 
corporate laws impose formalities that LLC statutes do not.  Accordingly, a court that does not fully 
appreciate that it is dealing with an unincorporated entity such as an LLC may apply an erroneous 
analysis.  For a particularly egregious instance, see Adams v. McFadden, 296 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App. 
2009), discussed infra notes 605-07 and accompanying text. 
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miles away in New York.  To assume that the jury found that 
Glasser knew of the fraud is speculative at best.43 
 
The court further stated as to Glasser: 
 
There is no doubt in this Court’s mind that the jury found 
that Christopher Schmitt, Jamey Schmitt, Richard Drevet, 
Matt LaMora, and IceHouse Capital, LLC through its 
Managing Member Marc Winthrop were heavily involved in 
ARC-LA’s shell game and in defrauding their customers and 
that this alone warrants the piercing of the corporate veil.  
But based upon the initial investment of $500,000 by the 
New York members, no evidence that Glasser deliberately 
took money from ARC-LA, and no evidence introduced 
concerning what initial capital would be required to start up 
ARC-LA, there is no way reasonable minds from the Jury 
could have determined that Glasser undercapitalized ARC-
LA.44 
 
Also see Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead,45 holding that the imposition 
of personal liability on a member of an LLC requires “a finding that [the 
member] . . . personally engaged in certain conduct, such as fraud or 
misrepresentation.”46 
In Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC47 the accountant for the 
defendant LLC had evidently made several misrepresentations to the 
plaintiff, but plaintiff “presented no evidence to demonstrate that any of the 
individual defendants personally participated or cooperated in any of [the 
accountant’s] representations or that they directed [the accountant] to make 
such representations with the intent to mislead [plaintiff].”48 
Provosty and Sun Nurseries appear to be cases that Macey and Mitts 
would classify as cases properly decided because there was no frustration 
of reasonable creditor expectations — the creditors did not deal with the 
 
43.  Provosty, 119 So.3d at 34.   
44.  Provosty, 119 So.3d at 36. 
45.  Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead, 748 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. App. 2013) 
46.  Id. at 574.  See also infra notes 598-600 and accompanying text, where an additional quote 
from the court’s opinion explains this quote by adding that an actual fraud by the member is not 
required; “[r]ather, the requisite element for piercing the corporate veil under the instrumentality rule 
requires a finding that the individual member used his control over the entity ‘to commit fraud or 
wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust 
act in contravention of [the] plaintiffs’ legal rights[.]’  Id. at 575, citing Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 
450, 454, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (1958) (emphasis in original). 
47.  Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC,  730 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. App. 2012). 
48.  Id. at 838. 
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passive investors, and the passive investors were not shown to have any 
knowledge of or participation in the misdeeds.49 
Smith v. Teel50 denied plaintiff’s attempt to pierce the veil of Kongo’s 
L.L.C. (“Kongo’s”), which operated a bar in Norman, Oklahoma.  Plaintiff 
sought to impose personal liability on Stephen G. Teel and Jay Williams, 
the members and managers of Kongo’s, for a wrongful death claim based 
on the death of plaintiff’s spouse in a car accident when their car was hit 
from behind by a car driven by Regina Bedell immediately after she had 
been drinking at Kongo’s for almost seven hours.  The court held that Teel 
and Williams were not liable because plaintiff had not presented any 
evidence that either personally sold or served alcohol to Bedell, had 
knowledge that any Kongo’s employees had served alcohol to a noticeably 
intoxicated person, or was even present on the night in question.51 
Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC52 involved a former 
hotel employee who sued his former employer, Wilsonville Holiday 
Partners, LLC (“Wilsonville”), the hotel’s manager, Lockhart Investments, 
LLC (“Lockhart Investments”), and his supervisor on several employment-
related claims.53  Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Lockhart 
Investments on his unlawful discrimination claim and obtained a judgment 
at trial against Wilsonville on his wrongful discharge claim.54  After the 
trial, plaintiff tried to enforce his default judgment against Lockhart 
Investments, but learned that Lockhart Investments had not been named on 
the liability policy covering the hotel and could not pay the judgment.55  
Plaintiff then tried to hold Patrick Lockhart (“Lockhart”), “Lockhart 
Investments’s principal,”56 personally liable for the default judgment 
against Lockhart.  In response to plaintiff’s veil-piercing claim, the court 
stated: 
 
[P]laintiff does not allege that Lockhart Investments was 
under capitalized.  Instead, plaintiff alleges that Lockhart 
 
49.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123 (“It is true that creditors are often harmed when a firm 
is insufficiently capitalized, but in the contractual setting, this risk can be expressly allocated to the 
corporations’ principals by obtaining a personal guarantee of the debt.  Protecting creditors in the 
contractual setting thus turns on preventing misrepresentations regarding shareholder involvement.”). 
50.  Smith v. Teel, 175 P.3d 960 (Ok. Civ. App. 2007). 
51.  Id. at 965–66. This case appears to fail under Macey and Mitt’s rubric of cases involving 
attempts to bring corporate actors’ behavior into conformity with a particular statutory scheme. Macey 
& Mitts, supra note 11 at 4.  In Smith v. Teel, however, because the individual defendants were not 
present and did not personally participate in the violation of liquor laws, the purpose of the liquor law 
would not have been served by imposing personal liability on them. 
52.  Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC, 190 P.3d 480 (Or. App. 2008). 
53.  Id. at 483. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
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acted improperly by failing to take a variety of actions-such 
as insisting that Lockhart Investments be listed as a named 
insured, inspecting the insurance policy and certificate of 
insurance, or insisting that the company’s omission be 
corrected-that would have ensured that Lockhart Investments 
was listed on the hotel’s insurance policy, and that 
Lockhart’s “failure to act as alleged” harmed plaintiff.  
Although plaintiff’s allegations might allow an inference that 
Lockhart followed poor business practices, those allegations 
do not allow an inference that Lockhart’s conduct was 
“dishonest or deceitful” or intended to harm a third party.  
For that reason, the alleged conduct was not sufficiently 
improper to justify piercing the corporate veil to hold 
Lockhart personally liable for the default judgment against 
Lockhart Investments.  The trial court did not err in 
dismissing that claim for failure to state a claim.57 
 
 Handam could be viewed as a case in which the court was saying that 
it did not need to protect the plaintiff from Lockhart’s actions because 
those actions were not motivated by a bad motive and were not 
misrepresentations made by the defendant to the plaintiff.58  It also appears 
from the opinion in Handam that the plaintiff may have been harmed by 
poor pleading.59 
In answering a certified question from a trial court asking whether 
“West Virginia’s version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act    
. . . . affords complete protection to members of a limited liability 
company,” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Kubican v. 
The Tavern, LLC60 said no, the veil of an LLC may be pierced in 
appropriate circumstances.  In Kubican, plaintiff sued The Tavern, LLC, 
d/b/a Bubba’s Bar and Grill (“Bubba’s”) and asserted a veil-piercing claim 
against the two individual members of Bubba’s for damages suffered in an 
altercation that allegedly took place at Bubba’s.61  The court’s opinion 
provides a comprehensive review of much of the jurisprudence and legal 
commentary in the LLC veil-piercing context, and adopts the following test 
for West Virginia: 
 
 
57.  Handam, 190 P.3d at 484. 
58.  Accord Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123–30. 
59.  Handam, 190 P.3d at 484–87 (discussing that the plaintiff’s claim that Wilsonville was 
contractually liable for the judgment against Lockhart Investments was barred by claim preclusion). 
60.  Kubican v. The Tavern, LLC, 752 S.E.2d 299 (W.Va. 2013). 
61.  Id. at 302. 
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[T]o pierce the veil of a limited liability company in order to 
impose personal liability on its member(s) or manager(s), it 
must be established that (1) there exists such unity of interest 
and ownership that the separate personalities of the business 
and of the individual member(s) or managers(s) no longer 
exist and (2) fraud, injustice or an inequitable result would 
occur if the veil is not pierced.  This is a fact driven analysis 
that must be applied on a case-by case basis, and, pursuant to 
W.Va. Code § 31B-3-303(b), the failure of a limited liability 
company to observe the usual company formalities or 
requirements relating to the exercise of its company powers 
or management of its business may not be a ground for 
imposing personal liability on the member(s) or manager(s) 
of the company.62 
 
The test adopted by the court in Kubican appears to anticipate Macey 
and Mitts, at least with respect to when it is appropriate to protect 
involuntary creditors.63 
A plaintiff’s claim will fail if the veil-piercing allegations are not 
supported by any evidence showing that the defendant owner made 
improper payments to himself, commingled funds, or failed to maintain 
separate financial records and that these actions harmed the plaintiff.64 
 
A.  IMPOSING ALTER EGO LIABILITY ON NONOWNERS 
 
In McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger,65 Manitoba Investment 
Advisors, Inc. (“Manitoba”), a Wyoming corporation,66 entered into a 
commercial triple-net lease with McCallum Family L.L.C. (“McCallum”) 
of real property in Grand Junction, Colorado, from which Manitoba ran a 
mobile home sales operation.  Manitoba did not pay property taxes as 
required by the lease for 2003, 2004, and part of 2005.  It vacated the 
property seven months before the end of the lease term, defaulting on the 
 
62.  Kubican, 752 S.E.2d at 313. 
63.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 42, stating: “It is in these [tort] cases that undercapitalization 
seems to arise as the sole explanation for piercing the veil and holding shareholders individually 
accountable for the corporation’s tort liability.  However, a careful look at these situations shows that 
this generally only occurs when courts seek to discourage inadequate oversight or other forms of 
negligent management of the corporation.  As such conduct can impose inefficient harms on third 
parties, courts’ intervention can be understood under a rationale analogous to preventing the “mistaken” 
extension of credit in a broader sense, i.e., the negligent infliction of involuntary harm.” 
64.  See, e.g., Bonner v. Brunson, 585 S.E.2d 917, 920 (Ga. App. 2003). 
65.  McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009). 
66.  The court’s opinion applies Colorado law with no discussion of Manitoba being a Wyoming 
corporation. 
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remaining rent.  McCallum obtained a judgment against Manitoba for 
$76,224.67 
The Colorado Court of Appeals imposed alter ego liability on Marc 
Winger, who was not a shareholder, director, or officer of Manitoba.  
However, he was married to one fifty percent shareholder who was a 
director and officer of Manitoba and was the son of the other fifty percent 
shareholder, who was also a director and officer.  The evidence showed 
that Winger dominated Manitoba and used corporate funds to pay his 
personal expenses as well as personal expenses of the two shareholders.68  
The court then stated its conclusion that Manitoba had been harmed by 
Winger’s actions, noting that to impose alter ego liability, Winger’s actions 
must have, and did, abuse the corporate form “to defeat the rightful claims 
of creditors.”69  There is no additional requirement that Winger’s actions 
have been “specifically directed at the plaintiff-creditor.”70 
In Sheffield Services Company v. Trowbridge,71 Charles A. 
Trowbridge was a co-manager (but not himself a member) of Colfax 
Industrial, LLC (“Colfax”) and Villas Ventures, LLC (“Villas”).  Each of 
Colfax and Villas owned residential lots in a subdivision in Broomfield, 
Colorado that it intended to develop.  Colfax entered into a subdivision 
agreement requiring it and Villas to complete specific landscaping and 
infrastructure improvements to receive the necessary building permits.  
When the work was not completed, the City of Broomfield declared a 
default.  Later, Trowbridge, on behalf of Colfax and Villas, entered into 
contracts with Sheffield Services Company, LLC (“Sheffield”) to sell 
Sheffield the lots owned by Colfax and Villas.  Colfax and Villas remained 
liable for completing the subdivision agreement requirements.  Prior to 
closing the sales contracts, Sheffield was aware that the subdivision 
agreement requirements had not been satisfied.  After the Villas sale to 
Sheffield closed but before the closing of the Colfax sale to Sheffield, 
Trowbridge received a letter from the City of Broomfield stating that it 
would withhold building permits if the requirements of the subdivision 
agreement were not satisfied.  Trowbridge did not disclose this letter to 
Sheffield before Sheffield closed on the property with Colfax; Trowbridge 
also did not disclose to Sheffield the continuing failure to satisfy the 
 
67.  McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 72. 
68.  McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 77. 
69.  For an article critical of the reasoning applied by some courts in veil-piercing cases, see 
Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., Piercing the Veil of an LLC or a Corporation, 39 THE COLO. LAW., no. 8, 71 
(Aug. 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207735. 
70.  McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 78 (emphasis in original). 
71.  Sheffield Services Company v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714 (Colo. App. 2009), overruled in 
part, Weinstein v. Colburne Foodbotics, Inc., 302 P.3d 263, 269 (Colo. 2013).  Weinstein is an 
important decision regarding improper distributions. See infra notes 662–674 and accompanying text. 
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requirements of the subdivision agreement. 
The court first discussed and then held that the provisions of veil 
piercing of the Colorado LLC Act72 did not preclude applying the common 
law veil piercing doctrine to a manager of a Colorado LLC.  The court then 
discussed cases from other jurisdictions applying veil-piercing to corporate 
officers and directors of corporations and concluded that “no reason exists 
in law or equity for treating an LLC differently from a corporation when 
considering whether to disregard the legal entity.”73  In concluding that the 
veil-piercing claim against Trowbridge should be remanded to the trial 
court for further determination, the court noted: 
 
Here, the trial court found, with record support, that (1) the 
complicated, interrelated and commingled financial 
circumstances of Trowbridge and his various business 
entities were intended to frustrate the entities’ creditors; (2) 
Trowbridge’s overall conduct resulted in a clear financial 
benefit to him, which was not properly documented because 
of his elaborate scheme of concealment; and (3) Trowbridge 
engaged in various transactions and complicit conduct that 
disregarded the separate LLC entities, intending to keep the 
“ambulance chasers” from identifying and reaching the 
LLCs’ members’ assets at the time of liquidation and 
provide him and one LLC member “plausible deniability” to 
insulate preferential distributions to another member.74 
 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has also applied veil-piercing 
liability to non-shareholders and nonmembers.  In Equity Trust Company v. 
Cole,75 the court considered veil-piercing claims against several individuals 
arising out of a massive fraudulent real estate investment scheme.  The 
individuals argued that they should not be held personally liable because 
they were not shareholders or members of the defendant entities.  As the 
court explained, however: 
 
 
72.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107(1) (2015).  “In any case in which a party seeks to hold the 
members of a limited liability company personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of the 
limited liability company, the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions and 
circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado law.”  
See also Lidstone, supra note 69. 
73.  Sheffield Services Co., 211 P.3d at 721 (citing Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 
323, 327, 329 (Wyo. 2002) and Roth v. Voodoo BBQ, LLC, 964 So.2d 1095, 1097 n. 3 (La. Ct. App. 
2007)).  The opinion in Sheffield does not explain why the plaintiff did not also assert a veil-piercing 
claim against Trowbridge’s co-manager, Roy W. Mason. 
74.  Sheffield Services Co., 211 P.3d at 722. 
75.  Equity Trust Company v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
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[M]uch of the evidence suggests that the Thompsons did 
maintain an ownership interest in the entities.  But whether a 
party holds an ownership interest in the entity is not 
dispositive.  Veil piercing is an equitable remedy, and courts 
are to consider “reality and not form” in determining a 
party’s involvement in a corporate enterprise.  If veil 
piercing were solely dependent on a party’s ownership 
interest in an entity, unscrupulous parties could avoid 
personal liability under the doctrine by simply acting in a 
capacity that does not involve ownership.  Because veil 
piercing is grounded in equity and intended to prevent abuse 
of corporate protections, we hold that a district court may 
pierce the corporate veil to impose personal liability against 
any party who disregards the corporate form, regardless of 
whether the party holds an ownership interest in the entity.76 
 
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding 
that the veil of Toure, Ltd. (“Toure”), an Illinois corporation, should be 
pierced and four of its directors held personally liable for 
misrepresentations made to Mobridge Community Industries, Inc, (“MCI”) 
in connection with the sale by MCI to Toure of personal property and 
equipment located in a plastics plant in Mobridge, South Dakota.77  
Mobridge held the four individual directors liable under a veil-piercing 
theory with no indication that they were or were not also shareholders.78  
Macey and Mitts note that, “like many veil-piercing cases, the Mobridge 
court emphasized the relative undercapitalization of Toure in light of the 
contractual activity to be undertaken.”79  But, Macey and Mills state: 
 
[T]his case demonstrates precisely what we have argued 
throughout this Article: rather than serving as an 
independent justification for piercing the veil, 
undercapitalization serves to buttress one or more of the 
three primary rationales for disregarding the corporate form 
that we have identified.  In Mobridge, the court imposed 
liability on the four directors because they misrepresented 
Toure’s capitalization in order to obtain credit from MCI.  
The court refers specifically to the directors’ “false 
representations” regarding their “financial ability to carry out 
 
76.  Equity Trust Company, 766 N.W.2d at 339–40. (emphasis added). 
77.  Mobridge Cmty. Indus., Inc. v. Toure, Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1978). 
78.  Id. at 132. 
79.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 125. 
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the agreement.”  Undercapitalization in this setting, then, 
constituted the factual representation that was falsely 
conveyed to the contractual counterparty in exchange for an 
extension of credit.  It did not serve as an independent 
justification for the veil-piercing decision.80 
 
McCallum, Sheffield, Equity Trust, and Mobridge stand for the 
proposition that those in control of an entity, whatever their formal titles 
and status, may be held liable under a veil-piercing claim whether the claim 
arises out of “preventing fraud or something like it”81 or “avoiding fraud or 
misrepresentation by shareholders trying to obtain credit.”82 
 
B.  VEIL PIERCING IS AN EQUITABLE REMEDY83 
 
The person seeking to pierce the veil of an entity may be denied if that 
person has unclean hands.  For example, in Tom Thumb Food Markets, Inc. 
v. TLH Properties, LLC,84 the court denied Tom Thumb’s attempt to pierce 
the veil of its LLC landlord in part because Tom Thumb had contributed to 
the failure to obtain the lease it sought by ignoring requests from the LLC 
and its bank for financial information from Tom Thumb.  A different but 
similar application of this doctrine arose in Truckstop.Net, L.L.C. v. Sprint 
Communications Company, L.P.85  In that case, the court denied Sprint’s 
motion to amend its counterclaim to pierce the veil of the defendant LLC 
and hold its members personally liable because Sprint knew of the LLC’s 
financial condition and that its investors were refusing to bail it out long 
before it sought, without good cause for the delay, to amend its pleadings. 
D’Elia v. Rice Development, Inc.86 denied plaintiff’s veil-piercing 
claim because the plaintiff had encouraged the defendant’s behavior.  As 
stated by the court: 
 
Here, the trial court, in declining to pierce the corporate veil, 
relied on evidence that Mr. d’Elia and the Trust encouraged, 
participated, and sanctioned the informal business activities 
 
80.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 125 (emphasis added). 
81.  Id. at 109 (internal quotations omitted). 
82.  Id. at 102, 113. 
83.  See generally id.  As Bainbridge LLCs, supra note 16, at 79, and supra note 14 (collecting 
cases) note, the cases differ on whether veil piercing is an equitable remedy with no right to a jury or a 
legal doctrine where there would be a right to a jury. 
84.  Tom Thumb Food Markets, Inc. v. TLH Properties, LLC, No. C9-98-1277, 1999 WL 31168 
(Minn. App. Jan. 26, 1999). 
85.  Truckstop.Net, L.L.C. v. Sprint Communications Company, L.P., Nos. CV-04-561-S-NRS, 
CV-05-138-S-NRS, 2007 WL 2480001 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2007). 
86.  D’Elia v. Rice Development, Inc., 147 P.3d 515 (Utah App. 2006). 
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that the Trust now claims justify disregard for the corporate 
entity.  In reaching its decision, the trial court also relied on 
evidence that Defendants did not siphon funds.  The record 
reveals that substantial evidence exists to support the trial 
court’s decision not to pierce the corporate veil.87 
First, the record demonstrates that Rice Inc. and Rice 
LLC appropriately followed certain internal corporate 
formalities.  Second, with regard to Defendants’ failure to 
follow certain other corporate formalities, the record reveals 
that Mr. d’Elia and the Trust were not only complicit, but at 
times promoted and engaged, themselves, in the informal, 
and arguably lax, business practices that the Trust argues 
render Mr. Rice liable.  Finally, the record indicates that 
although Mr. Rice received distributions from Rice Inc. and 
Rice LLC, these distributions were not inappropriate since 
the parties made no agreement that Mr. Rice should forego 
all remuneration, such as a salary, and risk his own personal 
wealth in the wake of the Cherry Hills and Bridlevale 
projects.88 
 
In other words, D’Elia tells us that a creditor’s complicit actions with 
respect to an entity may preclude any relief for the creditor under a veil-
piercing claim.89 
 
C.  TORT LIABILITY VERSUS CONTRACT LIABILITY 
 
Courts may apply a veil piercing analysis differently for contract 
liability versus tort liability.  Where a plaintiff enters into a contract 
knowing that it is dealing with an entity and fails to ensure that the entity is 
adequately capitalized to carry out its contractual obligations, the plaintiff 
may be precluded from asserting a veil-piercing claim.90  In White v. 
Winchester Land Development Corporation,91 two individuals, who were 
husband and wife, signed promissory notes payable to The Winchester 
Bank on behalf of The White House, Inc.  The court discussed the factors 
that would support the bank’s attempt to pierce the veil of The White 
 
87.  D’Elia, 147 P.3d at 523. 
88.  Id. 
89.  If, as Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 5 argue, one of three policy justifications for veil 
piercing is protecting creditors from owner misrepresentations, it is consistent with that policy to deny 
any relief to a creditor who is complicit in the defendant’s actions. 
90.  See Marina, LLC v. Burton, No. CA 97-1013, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 441 (Ark. Ct. App. 
May 6, 1998). 
91.  White v. Winchester Land Development Corporation, 584 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. App. 1979). 
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House Inc. and found most were not supported by the record.  The court 
stated that the factor of undercapitalization was “somewhat more 
problematic,”92 but noted that Kentucky law did not require any minimum 
paid-in capital before a corporation commenced business and that, more 
significantly, the policy behind the undercapitalization factor is the 
protection of “innocent third parties who had no way of knowing that they 
were dealing with an impecunious entity.”93  The court then said “in the 
instant case, the bank cannot be heard to complain that The White House, 
Inc. was undercapitalized because the bank had knowledge of the financial 
status of the corporation and could have protected itself.”94 
Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC95 is another case standing for the 
proposition that an experienced business person who contracts with an LLC 
may face difficulties attempting to establish a viable veil-piercing claim 
against the owner of the LLC.  In Serio, Baystate Properties, LLC, “an 
established building contractor who understood it was dealing with another 
LLC”96 contracted with Serio Investments, LLC (“Serio Investments”) to 
build houses on two lots.  Vincent Serio was the sole member and manager 
of Serio Investments.  Serio obtained a waiver from Baystate of any claims 
of personal liability.  The court stated: 
 
Baystate, also a limited liability company, contracted 
with Serio Investments, a valid, subsisting limited liability 
company at the time of the transaction.  While Serio 
Investments might have been inadequately capitalized, often 
times possessing just around $100 in cash in its account, 
there is no evidence that Baystate entered into the 
Agreement depending on Serio to fund its contracts from his 
personal account or that Baystate took reasonable steps to 
assure the availability of adequate funding.  Based on 
Wenzel’s testimony, Baystate was aware that the lots were in 
Serio’s name prior to entering the Agreement.  Even though 
an escrow account that was provided for in the Agreement 
was not established, there was no evidence that Baystate 
ever challenged or questioned the failure to establish a 
funded escrow account.97 
 
 
92.  White, 584 S.W.2d at 62.  
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 63.  See also Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 133. 
95.  Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 60 A.3d 475 (Md. App. 2013). 
96.  Id. at 489. 
97.  Id. at 488–89. 
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Serio made it clear in the beginning that Serio 
Investments was Baystate’s contractual partner for funding 
the project.  The Agreement and each addendum continued 
to identify “Serio Investments” as Baystate’s contractual 
partner and were signed by Serio as the “Managing 
Member.”  During their course of business, the parties also 
executed a document stating that Wenzel and Serio were not 
to be held liable for any obligations of their respective 
limited liability companies.  Serio Investments made 
payments to Baystate consistent with its obligations under 
the contract for six months.  All payments made to Baystate 
under the contract were either with checks issued from Serio 
Investments’ corporate account, signed by Serio as the 
“Managing Member,” or with cashier checks funded by 
Serio Investments.  Moreover, the transfers of money by 
Serio to Serio Investments were supported by Confessed 
Judgment Promissory Notes indicating the payments were 
loans and not a simple commingling of funds.98 
In sum, Serio Investments fulfilled the contract with 
Baystate until, as Serio testified, the collapse of the housing 
market caused problems.  Baystate was an established 
building contractor who understood and agreed that it was 
doing business with another limited liability company, as 
reflected in the Agreement, later addenda, and their 
continuing course of business.  Under these circumstances, 
we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
finding Serio personally liable for the obligations of Serio 
Investments.99 
 
Based on the facts that Baystate clearly knew it was dealing with an 
LLC, that Baystate took no steps to ensure that Serio Investments had 
adequate funding, and that the parties executed an agreement stating that 
the individual members and managers of Serio Investments and Baystate 
were not to be held liable for any obligations of their respective LLCs, the 
appellate court rejected Baystate’s veil-piercing claim despite the trial 
court’s holding that the veil should be pierced because Serio Investments 
misled Baystate regarding the sale of the homes and failed to establish an 
escrow agreement as called for by the contract. 
 
 
98.  Serio, 60 A.3d at 489. 
99.  Id. 
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In Restaurant of Hattiesburg, LLC v. Hotel & Restaurant Supply, 
Inc.,100 plaintiff Hotel & Restaurant Supply, Inc. (“HRS”) Restaurant of 
Hattiesburg, LLC (“RHLLC”), its two members, and a separate commonly 
owned LLC seeking to impose liability on the individual members and the 
related LLC for a debt of RHLLC.101  The Mississippi Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgement in favor of HRS.  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court held that the three prong test adopted by 
the Mississippi Supreme Court for piercing the veil of a corporation102 
would also apply to LLCs. 
Advanced Telephone Systems, Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile 
Radio, LLC103 denied plaintiff’s attempt to pierce the veil of an LLC where 
the plaintiff knew it was dealing with an LLC that would not have 
significant assets unless it closed a pending deal with a third party.  The 
court stated that the plaintiff “now asks the court to provide guarantees 
after-the-fact.”104 
Also see Shook v. Walden,105 which explains the policy behind the 
amendments Texas made to the veil-piercing provision of its entity statutes: 
 
The basic notion was that contract claimants, unlike most 
third parties suing in tort, had voluntarily chosen to deal with 
the corporation and, “[a]bsent some deception or fraud,” 
would have had the opportunity to apportion, through 
negotiated contract terms, the risk that the entity would be 
unable to meet its obligations.106 
 
Gray v. Shaw107 denied the plaintiffs’ argument that the veil of several 
LLCs they had dealt with in a mortgage assistance effort should be pierced, 
 
100.  Restaurant of Hattiesburg, LLC v. Hotel & Restaurant Supply, Inc., 84 So.3d 32 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
101.  Id. at 35. 
102.  Id. (citing Gray v. Edgewater Landing, Inc., 541 So.2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989)) (holding 
that for a court to disregard the corporate entity and expose shareholders to liability, the complaining 
party must show:  “(a) some frustration of contractual expectations regarding the party to whom he 
looked for performance; (b) the flagrant disregard of corporate formalities by the defendant corporation 
and its principals; [and](c) a demonstration of fraud or other equivalent misfeasance on the part of the 
corporate shareholder”). 
103.  Advanced Telephone Systems, Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile Radio, LLC, 846 A.2d 
1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
104.  Id. at 1281. 
105.  Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App. 2012), also discussed infra notes 528-530 and 
accompanying text. 
106.  Id. at 620. See discussion of Lucas v. Texas Industries, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984); 
SSP Partners v. Gladstone Invs. (USA) Corp., 75 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008); and the Texas statutory 
changes, infra notes 113-20, 378-93 and accompanying text. 
107.  Gray v. Shaw, 2007 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
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in part because the plaintiffs did not assert “that they were unaware that 
they were dealing with LLCs rather than individuals.”108  The plaintiffs also 
did not present any evidence that the LLCs had failed to follow appropriate 
legal formalities or that they had commingled their finances with those of 
their members.109 
The results in Serio, Advanced Telephone Systems, and Gray appear 
consistent with the argument of Macey and Mitts that one of the three 
appropriate reasons to pierce the veil is to protect creditors by preventing 
misrepresentations regarding owner involvement.110  That is, although the 
opinions in these three cases mention, e.g., undercapitalization, each case 
appears to turn on the fact that the plaintiff knew he was dealing with an 
entity and was not misled as to the entity’s owner’s involvement. 
Macey and Mitts note that previous commentators reached 
contradictory and unclear results in attempting to determine whether veil 
piercing/alter ego liability was more likely to be imposed in tort cases than 
contract cases.111  The research undertaken for this Article found few cases 
that note whether a tort analysis or a contract analysis is being applied.  
Often, of course, a veil-piercing/alter-ego case may partake of both.112 
One case that does distinguish tort from contract is Lucas v. Texas 
Industries, Inc.113  In that case, the plaintiff sought to hold a corporation 
liable for the tort of a subsidiary.  The Texas Supreme Court noted that: 
 
Generally, a court will not disregard the corporate fiction 
and hold a corporation liable for the obligations of its 
subsidiary except where it appears the corporate entity of the 
subsidiary is being used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, to 
avoid liability, to avoid the effect of a statute, or in other 
exceptional circumstances.114 
 
However, the court went on to say that “the type of proof needed to 
satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in an alter ego case varies depending on 
whether the underlying cause of action is for breach of contract or tort” and 
that, in a tort case, “it is not necessary to find an intent to defraud. 
Generally, in a tort case, the financial strength or weakness of the corporate 
 
108.  Gray, 2007 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *31–32. 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. at *30. 
111.  Macey & Mitts supra note 11, at 110. 
112.  See David v. Glemby Co., 717 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), infra notes 185-187 for a case 
that arguably involves a mixed tort/breach of contract situation. 
113.  Lucas v. Texas Industries, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984). 
114.  Id. at 374. 
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tortfeasor is an important consideration.”115 
It is unclear whether the view Lucas expressed with respect to tort 
cases survived the amendments to Texas law limiting when alter ego/veil-
piercing liability could be imposed.116  At least one commentator has 
asserted the following with respect to SSP Partners v. Gladstone 
Investments (USA) Corporation:117 
 
SSP rejects the business enterprise liability theory, and 
adopts the approach taken by the Legislature in TBCA 
article 2.21 as the embodiment of public policy in Texas.  
Additionally, because it was a pure products liability case, 
SSP should be interpreted as applying the public policy of 
TBCA article 2.21 to all tort cases, not just those arising out 
of contracts.  SSP is now the definitive statement of the 
Texas law of veil piercing for all cases, whether arising out 
of contracts, torts or otherwise.118 
 
The problem with the assertion that “SSP is now the definitive 
statement of the Texas law of veil piercing for all cases” is that SSP is not a 
veil-piercing case.  Indeed, the court in SSP noted that plaintiff did not 
“contend that liability should be imposed on Gladstone USA by 
disregarding its structure as a separate corporation — that is, by piercing 
the corporate veil or holding it to be the alter ego of Gladstone Hong 
Kong.”119  As no alter ego/veil-piercing claim was before the court for 
decision, the statements in SSP about when alter ego/veil-piercing liability 
may be imposed are dicta.  Whether the rule of TBOC § 21.223(2) as made 
applicable to LLCs by TBOC § 101.002 that shareholders and members 
will not be liable for any contractual obligation of the entity unless the 
shareholder or member “caused the corporation [or LLC] to be used for the 
purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee 
 
115.  Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at 375 (noting the policy that “an inadequately capitalized corporation in 
a risky business in effect transfers the risk of loss to innocent members of the general public” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
116.  As discussed in Shook v. Walden, infra notes 528-530 and accompanying text, the Texas 
legislature amended the Texas statutes to limit application of alter-ego/veil-piercing claims.  Article 
2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act was amended, and, as carried forward in Texas Business 
Organizations Code § 21.223, provides that a shareholder may not be held liable for any contractual 
obligation of the corporation on the basis that the shareholder is or was the alter ego of the corporation 
or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, or 
for any obligation of the corporation on the basis that the corporation failed to observe any corporate 
formality.  Texas Business Organizations Code § 101.002 makes § 21.223 applicable to LLCs. 
117.  SSP Partners v. Gladstone Investments (USA) Corporation, 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008). 
118.  BYRON F. EGAN, CHOICE OF ENTITY DECISION TREE 81–82 (2015), 
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/2054.pdf. 
119.  SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 451. 
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primarily for the direct personal benefit of the” shareholder or member will 
be applied in tort cases remains for further development.120 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized a different analysis 
in a tort case.  United States of America v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.121 arose 
out of fraudulent misrepresentations made by two individuals and Jon-T 
Farms, Inc. (“Farms”) to obtain agricultural subsidies under the Upland 
Cotton Program.122  The individuals and Farms had previously been 
convicted of criminal violations in connection with these 
misrepresentations.123  The government then brought a civil action to 
recover the erroneously paid subsidies and obtained summary judgment 
based on the criminal convictions.124  In this case, the government sought to 
hold the Farms’ parent, Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. (“Chemicals”) liable on the 
ground that Farms was its alter ego.125 
The court noted that it had recently held that fraud was an essential 
element of an alter ego finding in a contract case,126 “[h]owever, we do not 
require a finding of fraud in tort cases.”127  The court then stated: 
 
The reason for this distinction is clear.  In a contract case, 
the creditor has willingly transacted business with the 
subsidiary.  If the creditor wants to be able to hold the parent 
liable for the subsidiary’s debts, it can contract for this.  
Unless the subsidiary misrepresents its financial condition to 
the creditor, the creditor should be bound by its decision to 
deal with the subsidiary; it should not be able to complain 
later that the subsidiary is unsound.  In a tort case, by 
contrast, the creditor has not voluntarily chosen to deal with 
the subsidiary; instead, the creditor relationship is forced 
upon it.  Thus, the question of whether the creditor relied on 
misrepresentations by the subsidiary is irrelevant.  Where a 
parent establishes a subsidiary, undercapitalizes it, and 
dominates it to such an extent that the subsidiary is a mere 
conduit for the parent’s business, then the parent should not 
be able to shift the risk of loss due to the subsidiary’s 
 
120.  See infra notes 378-93 and accompanying text.  
121.  United States of America v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985). 
122.  Id. at 688. The Upland Cotton Price Support Program is codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1444(e). 
123.  Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 688. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 689. 
126.  Id. at 692 (citing Edwards Co. v. Monogram Industries, 730 F.2d 977, 980-81 (5th Cir. 
1984) (en banc)). 
127.  Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 692. 
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tortious acts to innocent third parties.128 
 
The court affirmed the district court’s holding that Chemicals 
“exercised total domination and control over” Farms and that, consequently 
Farms was the alter ego of Chemicals.  The district court entered judgment 
against Chemicals in the amount of $4,787,604.20.129  Chemicals argued 
that Farms should not be considered undercapitalized because it had 
“virtually unlimited access to credit in the form of loans from its parent, 
Chemicals.”130  The court responded: 
 
In our view, Chemicals’ argument misses the point.  The 
underlying question is whether Farms was an economically 
viable, independent entity or whether it operated merely as 
the adjunct or alter ego of Chemicals.  The fact that Farms 
continually had net operating losses and survived due to 
massive and ongoing transfusions from Chemicals does not 
indicate that Farms ever stood on its own two feet.  Quite the 
contrary; it reinforces the district court’s conclusion that 
Farms did not have any separate financial existence.131 
 
The court then stated that the district court’s finding that there 
had been commingling of the funds of Chemicals and Farms and 
addressed Chemicals’ argument that there was no comingling 
because records were kept of each advance made by Chemicals to 
Farms: 
 
[W]e agree with the district court that these records did not 
reflect the true economic realities and that the officers and 
directors treated the two corporations as one corporate 
enterprise.  Chemicals admits that no collateral was posted 
for the “loans” it made to Farms and does not contest that 
Farms paid no interest on the loans.  While we do not 
denigrate careful recordkeeping of corporate transactions, we 
do not regard mere records as a philosophers’ stone capable 
of transmuting alter egos into distinct corporations.  Records 
are primarily a memorialization of economic reality, not 
 
128.  Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 693 (citations omitted).  
129.  Id. at 689. 
130.  Id. at 694. 
131.  Id. 
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constitutive of that reality.132 
 
The court concluded by noting all of the evidence that Chemicals 
provided substantial loans to Farms (at one time, $7,000,000) and that 
Chemicals provided all the employees and equipment for Farms’ 
operations.  “Indeed, Chemicals, while disputing that it exercised day-to-
day control over Farms or participated in Farms’ crimes, admits that ‘[t]he 
evidence in this case is mainly to the effect that Chemicals controlled or 
dominated Farms.’”133 
Unfortunately, the court also found it necessary to note that 
“Chemicals and Farms filed consolidated financial statements and tax 
returns.”134 
Macey and Mitts discuss Jon-T Chemicals and state: 
 
In explaining its decision to pierce the corporate veil, the 
Fifth Circuit emphasized that while “in contract cases, fraud 
is an essential element of an alter ego finding . . . we do not 
require a finding of fraud in tort cases, particularly where the 
subsidiary is undercapitalized.”  But as with Minton, the 
court’s rhetorical emphasis on undercapitalization belies the 
true rationale for holding the parent responsible. 
The court’s justification makes it clear: To mention just 
some of the evidence supporting the district court’s alter ego 
holding, all of the directors and officers of Farms served as 
directors and officers of Chemicals; Farms was wholly 
owned by Chemicals; Chemicals paid many of the bills, 
invoices, and expenses of Farms; it covered Farms’s 
overdrafts; it made substantial loans to Farms (at one time 
amounting to $7 million) without corporate resolutions 
authorizing the loans and without demanding any collateral 
or interest; Chemicals and Farms filed consolidated financial 
statements and tax returns; Farms used the offices and 
computer of Chemicals without paying any rent; the salary 
of Farms’s one regular employee was paid by Chemicals; 
and employees of Chemicals performed services for Farms 
without charging for their time.  Chemicals also advanced 
money and provided services on an informal basis to the 
joint ventures. 
 
132.  Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 694. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id.  See infra notes 404-28 and accompanying text. 
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The emphasized text suggests that what was really 
motivating the court’s holding was the concern that the 
casual manner in which the parent-subsidiary relationship 
was managed increased the likelihood that the subsidiary 
would impose inefficient harms on third parties.  As with 
Minton, the judicial search for the “legitimacy” of the 
subsidiary’s corporate existence finds its expression in 
specific actions of insufficient oversight that instrumentally 
justify piercing the corporate veil.  The “alter ego” finding is 
not a metaphysical recognition of a unified parent subsidiary 
identity but rather a rhetorical device that courts employ to 
justify discouraging management of the corporation that is 
likely to be socially harmful.135 
 
It is unclear why Macey and Mitts assert “that what was really 
motivating the court’s holding was the concern that the casual manner in 
which the parent-subsidiary relationship was managed increased the 
likelihood that the subsidiary would impose inefficient harms on third 
parties.”136  The court was not dealing with an increased likelihood that 
harm would be imposed on a third party.  The third party in Jon-T 
Chemicals, the federal government, had suffered concrete harm of 
$4,787,604.20.137  Indeed, in response to Chemicals’ argument that Farms 
was not undercapitalized, the court stated: “Our short answer to this is that 
if Farms had unlimited access to the coffers of Chemicals, this access 
should have been sufficient to pay involuntary creditors who were 
prejudiced by the limited funds in Farms’s own coffers.”138  
Perhaps Jon-T Chemicals is better viewed as a case in which the court 
in fact expressed its true rationale, namely, that a parent corporation may 
escape the tort liability of a subsidiary where the parent by its actions 
demonstrates an almost total disregard of the separateness of its subsidiary.  
It also appears that Jon-T Chemicals could be appropriately classified as a 
case in which veil piercing was appropriate because it was necessary to 
carry out the purposes of a statute, i.e., the Upland Cotton Price Support 
Program.139 
 
 
 
 
135.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 130. 
136.  Id. at 129–130. 
137.  Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 689. 
138.  Id. at 694. 
139.  Supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 129–30. 
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D.  SINGLE-MEMBER LLCS 
 
Many if not most of the cases discussed in this Article involve single-
member LLCs.  Although a single member is not necessarily evidence of 
the LLC being the alter ego of the single member, single member or 
closely held membership may raise a red flag in many situations, and many 
may think that single member LLCs are more subject to potential abuse.  If 
the single member completely disregards the separateness of the LLC, a 
court will treat the LLC as a sham or alter ego of the member.140 
In a case where the plaintiff pled only conclusory arguments for 
piercing the veil of a single member LLC, the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim and noted that “Single-shareholder corporations and limited liability 
companies are not de facto illegal or inherently a sham.”141 
Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelly & Sons Company142 
provides a good analysis of piercing the veil of a single member LLC under 
Texas law and illustrates that the separate existence of a single-member 
LLC that is properly maintained and used will be respected.  Jesse R. 
Marion (“Marion”) formed Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC 
(“Metroplex”) as a Texas LLC.  In May 2008, Metroplex entered into a 
mail processing agreement with Bowne & Co. (“Bowne”), which was 
acquired in 2010 by RR Donnelly & Sons Co (“Donnelly”).143  The mail 
processing agreement was for a five-year term and required Bowne to pay 
Metroplex a minimum of $50,000 per month regardless of the amount of 
mail Bowne had.144  The mail processing agreement also required Bowne to 
deposit a certain amount of money with Metroplex.145  Metroplex needed 
additional equipment to process the amount of mail expected under the 
mail processing agreement with Bowne.  Metroplex entered into a separate 
 
140.  See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Westview Carlton Grp., LLC, 950 A.2d 522, 
527 (Conn. App. 2008).  The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the LLC’s veil should be 
pierced to hold the single member personally liable for the LLC’s unpaid electric bills.  The LLC had 
no registered agent, filed no annual reports with the Secretary of State, failed to maintain any business 
records for its property, failed to file any tax returns for the years involved, and was undercapitalized. 
Finally, when the LLC sold its property, the member rather than the creditor was the beneficiary of the 
proceeds.  Although the court in Connecticut Light & Power cited a list of all possible veil-piercing 
factors, the case appears to be one that, in the parlance of Macey and Mitts, turns on the necessity to 
protect creditors against misrepresentations about owner involvement.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, 
at 141. 
141.  Smith v. Shining Rock Golf Cmty., LLC., No. 20061510B, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 222, 
at *7 (Mass. Super. June 20, 2007).  Macey and Mitts do not discuss many LLC cases and discuss a 
single-shareholder corporation in only one instance.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 115–16.   
142.  Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC v. RR Donnelly & Sons Company, 410 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. 
App. 2013). 
143.  Id. at 893–94. 
144.  Id. at 893. 
145.  The amount of the deposit was to be determined by Metroplex alone! 
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agreement with an affiliate of Bowne to purchase additional mail sorting 
equipment for $1,000,000.146  Metroplex could not obtain financing to 
purchase the additional equipment, and Marion borrowed $750,000 
personally, secured by the equipment, and added $250,000 of his own 
money.147  Marion leased the equipment to Bowne for a three-year term.148 
In the fall of 2008, Bowne lost one of its major customers, and the 
amount of mail being processed for Bowne by Metroplex declined from 
approximately 10,000,000 pieces per month to less than 3,000,000 per 
month.149  By that time, Metroplex was no longer using one of the pieces of 
equipment purchased by Marion.  Metroplex sold the unused equipment to 
a third party, which wired its payment to Metroplex’s operating account.  
Metroplex then used the sale proceeds to make a payment to Marion’s bank 
to reduce the principal amount of Marion’s personal loan as required by the 
security agreement.150 
In October 2008, Bowne determined that a substantial amount of the 
money it had on deposit with Metroplex had not been properly segregated 
to postage, and it requested a refund of $586,000 from the remaining 
$700,000 balance.151  Bowne did not have a right to a refund under the 
terms of the mail processing agreement, but Metroplex voluntarily returned 
$200,000 of the deposit.152  On January 13, 2009, Bowne notified 
Metroplex that it would not pay any further invoices unless it received the 
remaining $386,000 of its requested refund.  Less than two weeks later, 
Metroplex notified Bowne that it was ceasing operations.153  Bowne again 
requested its refund and was told that no funds were available. 
On January 23, 2009, Bowne sued Metroplex seeking return of the 
money it had on deposit and alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and 
conversion.  Bowne later added various tort claims and added Marion, 
individually, as a defendant.  Metroplex asserted various counterclaims, 
including breach of contract and promissory estoppel.154 
The jury found that Metroplex failed to comply with the agreement 
and Bowne did not fail to comply with the agreement.  The trial court 
entered judgment ordering Donnelly recover damages of $40,391.28 in  
 
 
 
146.  Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC, 410 S.W.3d at 893. 
147.  Id. at 894. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. 
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actual damages and $538,358.32 in attorney fees from Metrolpex and 
Marion.155 
On appeal, the court concluded that “Donnelly produced no evidence 
that Marin operated Metroplex in a manner that would allow the trial court 
to render judgment against him individually in this case.”156  The court then 
pointed out that the applicable Texas “statutory protections afforded to 
members and managers of an LLC give way only when a plaintiff can show 
that the LLC was used for the purpose of perpetrating, and did perpetrate, 
an actual fraud for the member or manager’s direct personal benefit.”157 
Further, “Evidence that a company was used as an alter ego does not, by 
itself, create an issue regarding whether it was used to commit an actual 
fraud on the plaintiff for the defendant’s personal benefit.”158 
The court then responded in detail to Donnelly’s arguments that three 
actions by Marion demonstrated actual fraud: 
 
Donnelley points to three actions by Marion that it 
argues demonstrate the type of dishonesty encompassed by 
the concept of actual fraud. First, Donnelley points to 
Marion’s use of the money wired to Metroplex from the sale 
of the sorting machine to pay off a portion of his personal 
loan. Although Donnelley characterizes this transaction as a 
fraudulent diversion of corporate assets for personal benefit, 
the evidence adduced at trial shows there was nothing 
dishonest about the use of the sale proceeds.  It is undisputed 
that Marion took out a personal loan of $750,000 to purchase 
sorting equipment to be used by Metroplex.  It is also 
undisputed that the sorting equipment was used as security 
for the loan and the security agreement required all proceeds 
from any sale of the equipment to be used first to pay off the 
loan.  Finally, it is undisputed that Marion sold one of the 
pieces of equipment after Metroplex no longer had a use for 
it.  Marion then applied the proceeds to reduce the balance of 
the loan as required by the security agreement. Marion’s 
creation and use of a single-member limited liability 
company, as statutorily authorized by the legislature, 
combined with an ordinary personal loan to purchase 
equipment for the company’s use secured by that equipment, 
amounts to no evidence of a fraud even in combination with 
 
155.  Metroplex Mailing Services, LLC, 410 S.W.3d at 894. 
156.  Id. at 896. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. at 896–97 (citing Shaw v. Maddox, 73 S.W.3d 472, 481 (Tex. App. 2002)). 
  
378 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
the other facts of this case.  Donnelley relies on the fact that 
the bill of sale for the purchase of the sorting equipment 
shows Metroplex as the purchaser rather than Marion. Based 
on this, Donnelley argues that Marion sold equipment owned 
by Metroplex to satisfy his personal debts.  Donnelley 
presented no evidence, however, that Marion ever concealed 
the fact that the equipment was purchased with money from 
a personal loan and that the equipment was used as security 
for the loan.  Nor is there any evidence that Marion 
represented that the equipment would be a gift to Metroplex.  
The evidence in fact contains a lease agreement between 
Marion and Metroplex for Metroplex’s use of the machinery.  
The bill of sale showing Metroplex as the purchaser of the 
equipment, at most, might be some evidence that Marion 
treated the company as his alter ego. It does not, however, 
show that Marion committed a fraud on Bowne or 
Donnelley.159 
Second, Donnelley contends that Metroplex used some 
of Bowne’s postage deposit as operating funds in violation 
of the agreement and without disclosing this fact to Bowne.  
Even assuming the evidence shows this was the case, there is 
no evidence that this action resulted in any direct personal 
benefit to Marion.  Donnelley speculates that the use of 
Bowne’s deposit as operating funds “obviated the need for 
Marion to contribute additional capital and/or take on 
additional personal debt to keep Metroplex afloat.”  But 
Donnelley cites no evidence to support this contention.  
Indeed, the evidence shows that Metroplex’s company 
agreement with Marion did not require him to contribute any 
capital other than his original contribution.  Nor was he 
required to take on any personal debt.  Because there is no 
evidence to show that the alleged misuse of the postage 
deposit resulted in any direct benefit to Marion, it cannot be 
used as the basis for holding him personally liable for the 
company’s debts.160 
Finally, Donnelley argues Marion committed an act of 
fraud by shutting down Metroplex’s operations in the face of 
Bowne’s demand for the return of its deposit.  The evidence 
does not show, however, that Marion closed the company to 
 
159.  Metroplex Mailing Servs., 410 S.W.3d at 897 (emphasis added). 
160.  Id. at 879–98 (emphasis added). 
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avoid returning a deposit that Donnelley concedes Metroplex 
had no obligation to return at the time of Bowne’s demand.  
All the evidence shows that Metroplex ceased operations 
because of declining business.  To the extent Donnelley 
suggests Marion fraudulently placed some of Metroplex’s 
assets out of the reach of its postclosing creditors by 
pledging them as security for his personal loan, the evidence 
conclusively shows that Marion’s personal loan was 
obtained to purchase those assets for Metroplex’s use.  As 
stated above, there is nothing in the record to suggest the 
assets were gifted to the company by Marion or that the 
transaction was concealed in any way.  Furthermore, as with 
the alleged misuse of the deposit money, Donnelley 
presented no evidence that Marion obtained any direct 
personal benefit from the closing of the company as required 
to pierce the corporate veil.161 
 
In a pyrrhic victory for Donnelly, the court affirmed the award of 
actual damages and attorneys’ fees against Metroplex, which was defunct 
and had no funds.  The court’s statements quoted above indicate that this 
was another case where the court found no owner misrepresentations from 
which the plaintiff needed protection.162 
 
E.  DOMINATION AND CONTROL/LACK OF SEPARATENESS 
 
In a detailed Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision discussing the 
piercing of a veil of a single-member Delaware LLC,163 the plaintiffs 
sought to hold the member liable for breach of contract by the LLC on the 
basis that the member was the LLC’s alter ego.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the member on the ground that the plaintiffs 
had not set forth sufficient evidence to pierce the veil of the LLC.  In 
reaching its conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to summary 
judgment, the court examined the evidence that the LLC and its sole 
member operated as a single entity and found that the evidence, viewed 
most favorably to the plaintiffs, showed: 
 
(1) Lack of corporate formalities: Although corporate veil-piercing 
principles are generally applicable to an LLC, somewhat less emphasis 
 
161.  Metroplex Mailing Servs., 410 S.W.3d at 898. 
162.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 114. 
163.  NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’n, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008).     
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should be placed on whether the LLC observed internal formalities in an 
alter ego analysis of an LLC.  However, if two entities with common 
ownership “failed to follow legal formalities when contracting with each 
other, it would be tantamount to declaring that they are indeed one in the 
same.”164 
(2) Inadequate capitalization: The LLC was started with a 
capitalization of no more than $20,100, then it proceeded to invest millions 
of dollars supplied by its member,165 
(3) Treating the LLC’s funds as if it were the member’s: The member 
put money into the LLC as needed and took money out as the member 
needed it.166 
(4) Lack of financial segregation with other entities: The LLC had 
only one officer other than its member, and the officer was paid by the 
member or one of his corporations. The LLC shared space with other 
companies owned by the member and shared employees with the member 
or other companies owned by the member.167 
(5) Lack of independent decision-making: The member formed the 
LLC to be used as an investment vehicle for him to make investments, and 
the ultimate decisions were always made by the member.168 
(6) Personal use of LLC funds: The court reviewed evidence relating 
to financial transactions involving the LLC, including —  
 a. The LLC made transfers to the member or third-parties on his 
behalf in connection with living expenses.169 
 b. The individual in charge of the LLC’s financial records testified 
that the member made the decision to treat moneys deposited into the LLC 
as loans so that the member could make withdrawals as he needed money 
without having to pay taxes on the money withdrawn.170 
 c. The loans were not evidenced by written agreements, and there 
were no set repayment programs or terms.171 
 d. The member decided when to put money in or take money out of 
the LLC.172 
 
The Second Circuit concluded that this evidence was ample to permit 
a reasonable fact-finder to find that the member completely dominated the 
 
164.  NetJets Aviation, Inc., LLC, 537 F.3d at 178. 
165.  Id. at 179. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. at 179–80. 
169.  Id. at 180. 
170.  NetJets Aviation, Inc., LLC, 537 F.3d at 182. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. at 180. 
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LLC and treated its bank account as one of his pockets.173 
The court found evidence of injustice in an affidavit submitted by the 
member to counter the plaintiffs’ contention that the LLC was 
undercapitalized.  The affidavit stated that the member did not intend for 
the monies paid to the LLC to be treated as loans and that such payments 
were in fact capital contributions.  In testimony, the individual in charge of 
the LLC’s books stated that the member instructed him to treat the 
payments as loans so that the member could take money out of the LLC 
without tax consequences.174 
The court pointed out that the member’s withdrawals of money from 
the LLC would be properly characterized as distributions if the payments to 
the LLC were capital contributions and that distributions to the member 
may well have violated the prohibition on distributions under the Delaware 
LLC statute given that the LLC had ceased operating and was unable to pay 
its debt to the plaintiffs.  The court stated that a fact-finder could infer that 
the member’s payments to the LLC were deliberately mischaracterized as 
loans to mask the fact that the member was making withdrawals prohibited 
by law.175  The court also stated that a reasonable fact-finder could find that 
the member operated the LLC in his own self-interest in a manner that 
unfairly disregarded the rights of the LLC’s creditors given various 
payments and withdrawals on the member’s behalf at a time when the LLC 
was unable to pay its debt to the plaintiffs and evidence that the member 
withdrew more money from the LLC than he put in.176  The court 
concluded by finding that neither the LLC member nor the plaintiffs were 
entitled to summary judgment on the veil piercing claim.177 
McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger,178 Sheffield Services Company v. 
Trowbridge,179 Equity Trust Company v. Cole,180 and Mobridge Community 
Industries, Inc. v. Toure,181 discussed previously,182 stand for the 
proposition that if those actually in control of an entity dominate it to the 
detriment of third parties, whatever their formal titles and status, they may 
be held liable under a veil-piercing claim whether the claim arises out of 
“preventing fraud or something like it”183 or “avoiding fraud or 
 
173.  NetJets Aviation, Inc., LLC, 537 F.3d at 182. 
174.  Id.  For more discussion of this case, see infra notes 427-28. 
175.  Id. at 183. 
176.  Id. at 184. This may have been the court’s real justification even though it discussed a 
laundry list of factors.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 107. 
177.  Id. at 184. 
178.  McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 2009). 
179.  Sheffield Services Company v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 74 (Colo. App. 2009). 
180.  Equity Trust Company v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. App. 2009). 
181.  Mobridge Community Industries, Inc. v. Toure, 273 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1978).  
182.  Supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.  
183.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 107.  
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misrepresentation by shareholders trying to obtain credit.”184 
In David v. Glemby Co.,185 plaintiff contracted separately with 
defendants Glemby Co. (“Glemby”) and its ninety eight% subsidiary Hair 
Programming, Inc. (“HPI”) to license plaintiff’s brand name and operate 
hair salons in the United States under plaintiff’s brand name.  When HPI 
failed to perform under the contract, plaintiff sued Glemby as well, 
claiming that HPI’s veil should be pierced because the two corporations 
acted as one entity in the transaction.  The district court denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the veil-piercing claim, holding that a jury 
could reasonably find that HPI’s corporate form should be disregarded and 
liability imposed on Glemby.  Although the court discussed the traditional 
elements of veil-piercing, e.g., failure to observe formalities, it did so in the 
context of implied and express representations by Glemby that it would 
perform HPI’s duties under the contract: 
 
Letters apparently written on behalf of HPI appeared on 
Glemby letterhead and referred ambiguously to “our 
obligation.”  . . . David had no reason to believe HPI’s 
function was to avoid liability for Glemby, especially in light 
of David’s allegations that “Glemby promised Mr. David 
that it would take all steps necessary to see that Hair 
Programming performed the obligations stated in the Market 
Development Agreement, which Hair Programming signed, 
on instructions from Glemby.”186 
 
Macey and Mitts analyze this case as follows: 
 
It is apparent that the failure to observe corporate formalities 
distinguishing Glemby from HPI justifies disregarding HPI’s 
corporate form because Glemby implicitly misled David into 
extending credit on the basis of Glemby’s involvement as 
well as HPI.  Such misleading conduct does not rise to the 
level of common law fraud — indeed, there is no specific 
false statement — but justifies the imposition of liability 
because the extension of credit on the basis of a mistake 
regarding the involvement of the parent is inefficient.187 
 
 
 
184.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 102, 113. 
185.  David v. Glemby Co., 717 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  
186.  David, 717 F. Supp. at 167–68. 
187.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 125 (emphasis added).  
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In Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Westview Carlton 
Group, LLC,188 the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the 
LLC’s veil should be pierced to hold the single member personally liable 
for the LLC’s unpaid electric bills.  The LLC had no registered agent, filed 
no annual reports with the Secretary of State, failed to maintain any 
business records for its property, failed to file any tax returns for the years 
involved,189 and was undercapitalized.  Finally, when the LLC sold its 
property, the member rather than the creditor was the beneficiary of the 
proceeds.190  Although the court in Connecticut Light and Power cited a list 
of all possible veil-piercing factors,191 the case appears to be one that, in the 
parlance of Macey and Mitts,192 turns on the necessity to protect creditors 
against misrepresentations about owner involvement.193 
Double G.G. Leasing, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London194 
pierced the veil of a single-member LLC to require the member to comply 
with the LLC’s insurer’s demand for information.  Double G.G. Leasing, 
LLC (“Leasing) purchased property for $550,000 on which was situated a 
vacant, two-family residential structure.  Leasing obtained an insurance 
policy from defendant that insured Leasing against, inter alia, physical loss 
or damage to the property by fire for the period from March 19, 2005, to 
September 19, 2005.  On April 24, 2005, less than five weeks after the 
beginning of the policy period, the building on the property was destroyed 
by fires of incendiary origin that were ignited at two separate locations at 
the rear of the building with the use of flammable liquid accelerant.195  
With respect to the grounds for piercing the veil of Leasing, the trial court 
stated: 
 
The plaintiff admits that “Double G.G. is owned and 
controlled by Carl Glatzel, Jr.”  A document submitted by 
the plaintiff in opposition to the motion reflects that Glatzel 
is the only principal of the company.  It is apparent that he 
 
188.  Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Westview Carlton Group, LLC, 950 A.2d 522 
(Conn. App. 2008).  
189.  As a single-member LLC, Westview Carlton Group, LLC was not required to file federal 
income tax returns.  There is no indication in the opinion that the LLC had elected to be treated as an 
association taxable as a corporation, which would have required it to file tax returns, notwithstanding 
the court’s reference to the LLC’s sole member as the LLC’s “sole shareholder.”  Connecticut Light and 
Power Company, 950 A.2d at 523.  Also see cases discussed infra notes 404-28 and accompanying text 
under Tax Status as a Factor in Veil-Piercing.  
190.  Connecticut Light & Power Co., 950 A.2d at 527.  
191.  Id. 
192.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123.  
193.  Connecticut Light & Power Co., 950 A.2d at 525–26.  
194.  Double G.G. Leasing, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, No. AANCV075003003, 
2008 WL 2345205 (Conn. Super. May 16, 2008), aff’d 978 A.2d 83 (Conn. App. 2009).  
195.  Id. at *1. 
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maintained no company books but, rather, ran the affairs of 
this relatively passive real estate investment out of his 
pocket.  That, alone, might not be sufficient to pierce the 
corporate veil.  However, that he conveyed the company to 
Glatzel, Sr. (unbeknownst at the time to Glatzel, Sr.) for 
such purely personal reasons, continued to run its affairs, and 
then re-conveyed the company back to himself when 
circumstances suited him reflects a unity of interest and 
ownership between Glatzel and the company and a complete 
lack of independence of the latter. In such circumstances 
adherence to the fiction of a separate company identity 
would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting 
Glatzel to escape obligations assumed by the LLC pursuant 
to an insurance policy of which he, Glatzel, was the ultimate 
and lone beneficiary.  Quite clearly, there was such a unity 
of interest and ownership between Glatzel and the plaintiff 
that the plaintiff never was an independent entity.  
Adherence to the fiction of separate identity would serve 
only to defeat justice and equity by permitting Glatzel and 
the LLC to escape the “duties in the event of loss or 
damage” under the policy.  Under the identity theory, the 
court pierces the plaintiff’s company veil and holds that the 
“duties in the event of loss or damage” imposed under Part B 
of the insurance policy are imposed on Glatzel as well as the 
plaintiff insured.196 
 
Double G.G. Leasing indicates that an owner’s actions may necessitate 
protecting a creditor’s right to information. 
Double Constr. Co. v. Advanced Home Builders, LLC197 involved 
egregious misuse of an LLC and a corporation and questionable conduct by 
the defendants’ attorney.  Double Construction Company, LLC (“Double 
C”) sued Advanced Home Builders, LLC (“Advanced”), Creative Building 
Corporation, (“Creative”), Robert A. Chiulli, Sr. (“Robert”), and Laura 
Chiulli (“Laura”).  Plaintiff sought money damages for the breach of a 
contract for work performed at defendants’ request on a subdivision 
development in Rocky Hill, Connecticut, for which plaintiff had not been 
paid.  Plaintiff Double C also sought to impose personal liability on the 
individual defendants on the ground that the individual defendants were the 
 
196.  Double G.G. Leasing, LLC, 2008 WL 2345205 at *8. 
197.  Double Constr. Co. v. Advanced Home Builders, LLC, No. CV65003609, 2008 WL 
4050864 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2008).  
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alter egos of Advanced and Creative. 
Both Robert and Laura198 testified that the plaintiff had not performed 
much of the work it claimed to have done.  Plaintiff’s owner, Chris Chiulli 
(“Chris”) submitted daily time reports to show that the work had been 
done.  Despite a “vigorous cross-examination,” defendants could not 
invalidate these reports.  In addition, the Town of Rocky Hill’s engineers 
approved the work that plaintiff had done.  Moreover, defendants did not 
submit any bills or other documents from other contractors to show that the 
work plaintiff did had to be redone or corrected.199 
The court then described the actions of Robert and his attorney, James 
Ripper: 
 
What the Court finds particularly troubling are the actions of 
Attorney James Ripper and Robert.  The paving contractor who 
paved the roadways which were prepared by the plaintiff was 
J.S.L. Asphalt, Inc. of Westfield, Massachusetts.  Ken Begin of that 
company testified that he insisted when his proposal was accepted 
for the final paving of the roads, etc. that he had had difficulty in 
the past in being paid by Robert so he insisted on a letter from 
Attorney Ripper who was to hold monies in escrow to cover the 
bid proposal.  This . . . reads, in pertinent part: “This office is 
holding the funds in excess of $80,000.00 which covers your bid 
proposal of $59,540.00 and estimated additional work.  This 
escrow is to be disbursed as directed by the Town of Rocky Hill 
Engineer as work is completed on the Old Dividend Road 
subdivision.”  The letter is dated October 18, 2005.  According to 
Mr. Begin, whom the Court believes, when he sought payment 
from Attorney Ripper, Attorney Ripper refused to pay him money 
out of the escrow account stating that Robert had instructed 
Attorney Ripper not to pay J.S.L. out of the escrow even though 
the Town of Rocky Hill Engineer had advised Attorney Ripper that 
the work to be done by J.S.L. had been satisfactorily completed.  
Not only is this an apparent conflict of interest on the part of 
Attorney Ripper who generally represents the defendants, but 
based upon this letter of October 18, 2005, Robert had no right to 
refuse payment.200 
 
 
198.  The court noted that Laura’s testimony was, at times, hesitant and contradictory.  She 
admitted that she had little experience developing a subdivision, and the court concluded that she was 
often repeating what she had been told by Robert.  Double Constr. Co., 2008 WL 4050864 at *2.  
199.  Id. 
200.  Id. 
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Although the plaintiff did not receive a similar letter from 
Attorney Ripper, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Attorney Ripper 
dated January 16, 2005, . . . setting forth that Attorney Ripper had 
guaranteed immediate payment of the work to be done by the 
plaintiff upon approval by the Town Engineer of the work and 
invoice.  The plaintiff, through Chris, states, in pertinent part, as 
follows: “After having this discussion with you, and agreeing to do 
the work based on our discussion, you can only imagine my 
surprise that you are now refusing to release the funds because 
Robert Chiulli is disputing invoices previously paid by other funds 
which have nothing to do with this work.  I find myself in a 
precarious situation begging for payment months after completion 
of work and Town Engineer approval from the very Attorney who 
guaranteed me immediate payment.”  The Court has no doubt that 
Attorney Ripper made this commitment based upon Chris’ 
testimony and that the only response Attorney Ripper gave him 
was “I don’t see it the way you do,” and based upon the fact that 
the same situation took place with J.S.L. as previously 
mentioned.201 
 
With respect to Robert’s and Laura’s personal liability under 
plaintiff’s veil-piercing claim, the court discussed the three-part test 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut for piercing the veil under 
the instrumentality rule and stated:202 
 
The Court finds that, under the totality of the evidence, 
all three elements have been proven by clear, unequivocal, 
precise and convincing evidence: 
(1) Robert and Laura Chiulli conspired to and did 
exercise complete domination of the defendant LLC with 
respect to finances, policy and business practice with respect 
to the defendant LLC’s relationship and transactions with the 
plaintiff so that the defendant corporations as to such 
transactions had at the time no separate mind will or 
existence of its own. 
(2) Robert and Laura Chiulli conspired to and did use 
such control to commit a wrong (i.e. not pay the monies due 
to the plaintiff), to perpetrate a violation of a positive legal 
duty (breaching the contract with the plaintiff) which was in 
 
201.  Double Constr. Co., 2008 WL 4050864 at *3. 
202.  Id. at *4. 
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contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and 
(3) The control and breach of contract and the aforesaid 
duties proximately caused, actually solely caused, the unjust 
loss or injury complained of; i.e. non-payment of a fair and 
reasonable value of the plaintiff’s services and breach of the 
contract and agreements with the plaintiff. 
Additionally, Robert and Laura Chiulli were the alter 
egos of the defendant corporations and are, therefore, 
personally liable.203 
 
Double Constr. Co. and Tzovolos, below, are cases that appear similar 
to a case that Macey and Mitts cite for “piercing the corporate veil in a 
setting similar to common law fraud.”204 
Tzovolos v. Wiseman205 involved piercing the veil of several 
commonly owned LLCs and corporations to facilitate the plaintiff’s ability 
to collect a judgment of $12,700 for the value of restaurant equipment that 
the defendants had wrongfully taken plus $39,640 in punitive damages and 
attorney fees.  Plaintiffs sold kitchen equipment to Seawind, LLC 
(“Seawind”) and Scott Wiseman (“Wiseman”).206  Plaintiffs perfected a 
purchase money security interest in the equipment.  Plaintiffs also sued 
Robert Hartmann, Sr. (“Hartman, Sr.”), Jason R. Hartman, Robert 
Hartmann, Jr. (“Hartmann, Jr.”), Jason Roberts, Inc. (“JRInc.”), Jason 
Robert’s Concrete (“JRCLLC”), and Alpert Realty, LLC (“Alpert”).207  
Wiseman leased business premises for the restaurant from Alpert.208  
Shortly after purchasing the restaurant equipment, Wiseman, as a209 
member of Seawind, entered into an operating agreement for Seawind with 
Hartman, Sr., Jason R. Hartmann, and Hartmann, Jr. as additional 
members.210 
The court noted that courts had looked at ten factors in determining 
whether an entity is dominated or controlled for purposes of the 
instrumentality test and then analyzed the defendants’ conduct under each 
factor: 
 
 
203.  Double Constr. Co., 2008 WL 4050864 at *4. 
204.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 124 (discussing Mobridge Cmty. Indus., Inc. v. Toure, 
Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1978)).  Mobridge Community Industries, Inc. is discussed in this Article in 
supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.  
205.  Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 16 A.3d 819 (Conn. Super. 2007), aff’d 12 A.3d 563 (Conn. 2011).  
206.  Id. at 825.  
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. at 830. 
209.  So described by the court.  Id.  There is no indication in the opinion that Seawind initially 
had any members other than Wiseman.  
210.  Id. 
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The Hartmann sons elected not to testify.  The evidence 
has demonstrated that Hartmann, Sr., owns and manages 
several LLCs, or corporations, several of which have been 
involved in the transactions that form the basis of the present 
case.  He and his sons have utilized the corporate entities and 
LLCs in furtherance of their business goals.  The facts of the 
present case satisfy several of the above elements, indicating 
that the corporate veil of each of the Hartmann LLCs should 
not be left intact to shield Hartmann and his sons from 
personal liability as a result of their conduct.211 
The evidence establishes a lack of corporate formalities, 
thus satisfying the first element.  Pursuant to the operating 
agreement of Seawind, “[a]ny transactions between the 
[c]ompany and [m]embers or their affiliates not specified in 
this [a]greement shall require the approval of a majority vote 
of the [p]articipating [p]ercentage.”  Hartmann, Sr., 
consistently ignored this provision while transacting 
business between Seawind and his various LLCs as the 
evidence fails to establish any record of adherence to the 
majority vote provision.212 
 
Note that the lack of formalities that the court is discussing in the 
immediately preceding quotation is not simply a failure to keep good 
minutes, but is the disregard of a requirement of the operating agreement 
that imposed a special approval requirement for transactions between the 
LLC and its members or their affiliates.  As the requirements of the 
operating agreement were not followed, the transactions in question were 
not validly authorized.  If a legal opinion had been required for some 
reason, at a minimum, the opinion giver likely would have required cleanup 
of these approvals.  The actions taken without the approval required by the 
Seawind operating agreement included a $100,000 note from Seawind to 
JRCLLC213 and changing the statutory agent for Seawind,214 
 
Regarding the fourth and fifth factors, Hartmann, Sr., 
has created and/or controlled several LLCs in the pursuit of 
business opportunities.  Hartmann, Sr., as of August, 2003, 
was active in the operation of Seawind. Hartmann, Sr., was a 
comanager of Seawind, was designated the tax manager and 
 
211.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 840. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. at 831. 
214.  Id. 
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was responsible for keeping the books.  He also owned and 
controlled JR Inc. and JRC LLC.  JRC LLC was formed in 
October of 2003, and although it is headed by Hartmann, 
Sr.’s wife, Hartmann, Sr., testified that the nominal 
involvement of his wife in the business venture was so that 
JRC LLC might qualify for “minority owned” business 
contracts.  In addition to sharing the same core set of 
principal officers, the principal office of each of these LLCs 
was designated as the same address, in Milford, thus 
satisfying the fifth factor.215 
The interplay of the numerous LLCs also demonstrates 
the satisfaction of the seventh and eighth factors.  While the 
involvement of multiple LLCs controlled by Hartmann does 
not in and of itself establish grounds for the piercing of the 
corporate veil; the conduct in fact of the LLCs indicate a 
lack of separate identities.  The evidence indicates that the 
individual LLCs were used interchangeably by Hartmann, 
Sr., as need arose and even Hartmann, Sr., failed to 
differentiate between the individual entities while 
conducting his business.216 
The seventh factor, a lack of arm’s-length dealing, is 
demonstrated by the billing for the Seawind renovation 
project, which was handled in a confusing and misleading 
manner.  The exhibits offered at trial had numerous invoices 
that were identical except for the fact that one was issued by 
JR Inc. and another was issued by JRC LLC.  There were no 
independent accounting controls between Seawind as the 
debtor, and JR Inc. or JRC LLC as the contractors.  All of 
the entities were served by the same bookkeeper who also 
was a bookkeeper for Real Estate Plus, Inc. Furthermore, 
each of the entities was represented by a single law firm, 
Shepro, even when they had conflicting interests and when 
at least one, Seawind, was insolvent.217 
The eighth factor is satisfied through evidence that the 
finances and obligations of JR Inc. and JRC LLC were 
constantly shifting between the two entities.  Hartmann, Sr., 
used his position in Seawind, and a threat to withhold wages 
from Wiseman, as a means of securing a $100,000 
 
215.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 831. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. at 840–41. 
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promissory note and a security interest from Seawind to 
another of his entities, JRC LLC.  The consideration for the 
note was claimed to be the renovations performed at Selden 
Street.  These same renovations, however, were later claimed 
to have been performed by another of his corporate entities, 
JR Inc., when JR Inc. asserted a mechanic’s lien of $139,000 
against Alpert, the landlord.  Hartmann, Sr., has taken 
contradictory positions with regard to who did the work.218 
Given the evidence, the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that Hartmann, Sr., and sons exercised 
dominion and control over JR Inc., JRC LLC, and Seawind.  
The facts of this case establish that Hartmanns’ corporate 
entities are their mere alter ego and their own personal 
business conduit, thus satisfying the first element of the 
instrumentality test.  The corporate entities owned and 
controlled by the Hartmanns lacked a separate mind, will or 
existence of their own.219 
Turning next to the second element of the 
instrumentality test, the court finds that the control exerted 
by the Hartmanns was purposefully used to commit a “fraud 
or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other 
positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in 
contravention of [the] plaintiff’s legal rights . . . .”  The 
control exerted by Hartmann, Sr., over Seawind, JR Inc. and 
JRC LLC has been used to frustrate the efforts of the 
plaintiffs to obtain the kitchen equipment that secured their 
debt from Wiseman.  For example, in April of 2004, the 
doors of Seawind’s restaurant were closed for business, its 
kitchen equipment was being appraised for sale, plans were 
being made to remove custom furnishings in the restaurant, 
and Seawind was in default on its lease and its list of 
accounts payable exceeded its assets.  At this time, and with 
full awareness of the above situation, Hartmann, Sr., signed 
a $1000 check from Seawind’s checking account to one of 
his corporate entities.  The evidence indicates that he 
exercised his control over Seawind to wrongfully give 
preference to other entities he controlled.220 
Additionally, regarding the kitchen equipment, the court 
 
218.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 840. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. (citations omitted).  
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has previously noted that Hartmann, Sr., and/or his attorney, 
Shepro, were aware of the perfected security interest held by 
the plaintiffs and the faulty foundation of JRC LLC’s 
asserted interest in the kitchen equipment.  At a time when 
he was aware of the filing of the instant action, Hartmann, 
Sr., ordered Shepro to do anything necessary to get back into 
Selden Street to remove “his” property.  Hartmann, Sr., took 
steps to give a preference to the debts owed to his corporate 
entities as opposed to the secured interest of the plaintiffs or 
other creditors.  These steps included his decision to remove 
kitchen equipment from the property knowing that it was 
subject to the plaintiffs’ security interest, when given access 
by Alpert to remove only the items subject to a lien in his 
favor.  The court finds that Hartmann, Sr. used his position 
of control to wrongfully contravene the rights of others to his 
own benefit.  The conduct of Hartmann, Sr., therefore, is 
sufficient to satisfy the second element of the instrumentality 
rule.221 
Finally, the third element, requiring that “the aforesaid 
control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury 
or unjust loss complained of” is also satisfied in the present 
case.  As a result of the actions of Hartmann, Sr., on behalf 
of his numerous corporate entities, the plaintiffs were injured 
in that the kitchen equipment that they had a security interest 
in was removed and the plaintiffs have been entangled in 
litigation involving numerous corporate entities controlled 
by Hartmann, Sr.  He successfully exerted his control over 
the various corporate entities to the plaintiffs’ detriment.222 
With regard to the Hartmanns’ corporate entities, the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is an 
absence of corporate formalities, overlapping ownership or 
managers, common office space, a lack of arm’s-length 
transactions, and preferences exercised in favor of the 
dominate corporation or entities controlled exclusively by 
Hartmann, Sr., or his family members.  Additionally, the 
facts indicate that the plaintiffs have shown that there was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the independence 
of Seawind, JR Inc. and JRC LLC had in effect ceased.  The 
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate identities 
 
221.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 841–42. 
222.  Id. at 842. 
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would serve only to defeat justice and equity.  The court 
concludes that it is appropriate, and justice requires, that in 
this case the corporate entities Seawind, JR Inc. and JRC 
LLC be pierced and that the responsibility for their conduct 
be placed upon Hartmann, Sr., Hartmann, Jr., and Jason R. 
Hartmann.223 
 
 
The court in Tzovolos also cited as a factor showing that there was a 
lack of separateness among the defendant LLCs was that “each of the 
entities was represented by a single law firm, [Sherpo & Blake, LLC], even 
when they had conflicting interests and when at least one, Seawind, was 
insolvent.”224  In addition to approving alter ego liability for Hartmann, Sr., 
Jason R. Hartmann, and Hartmann, Jr., the court awarded common-law 
punitive damages against them on the ground that they had “acted 
dishonestly and with intentional disregard to the rights of the plaintiffs.”225  
Despite the laundry list of factors discussed by the court, Tzovolos appears 
to be a case of “preventing fraud or something like it.”226 
A Federal District Court in Georgia gave an interesting take on 
separateness.  In Instituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC,227 
the court responded to plaintiff’s argument that the member failed to treat 
the LLC as separate from the member by noting that the plaintiff’s 
evidence may have shown that the member failed to keep the LLC separate 
from another entity owned by the member but did not show that he failed to 
keep the LLC separate from himself.  In this case, plaintiff owned several 
patents relating to a process for repairing sewage pipelines.  One of the 
defendants was Cosmic-Sondermaschinenbram, GmbH (“Cosmic 
Austria”), an Austrian corporation owned by an individual defendant, 
Johann Kübel, who was also the president of Cosmic Austria.  Kübel also 
owned and controlled another defendant, Cosmic TopHat, LLC (“Cosmic 
TopHat”), a California LLC.  Plaintiff alleged that a competing product 
formerly manufactured by Cosmic Austria infringed plaintiff’s patents.  
The court first noted that although all of the claims in the case were patent 
law claims, the veil-piercing issue was governed by Georgia law.228  It then 
 
223.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 842. 
224.  Id. at 841. 
225.  Id. at 846. 
226.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 109. 
227.  Instituform Tech., LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2013).  
Also discussed infra, notes 304-10 and accompanying text (undercapitalization must be coupled with 
intent to avoid debts), notes 499-501 and accompanying text (causation), and notes 620-22 and 
accompanying text (reverse veil piercing). 
228.  Insituform Tech., LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. 
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observed that plaintiff “wants to pierce the veil in both directions. That is, it 
wants to hold Kübel liable for Cosmic Top Hat’s infringement (traditional 
piercing), and it wants to hold Cosmic Top Hat liable for Kübel’s 
infringement (reverse piercing).”229  But, the court noted, the Georgia 
Supreme Court had rejected outsider reverse piercing.230 
As to the plaintiff’s arguments for piercing the veil of Cosmic Top Hat 
to impose personal liability on Kübel, the court noted that Georgia law 
provided that “[t]he failure of a limited liability company to observe 
formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or the management of its 
business and affairs is not a ground for imposing personal liability on a 
member, manager, agent, or employee of the limited liability company for 
liabilities of the limited liability company.”231  The court then stated: 
 
Next, Insituform argues that alter-ego liability is appropriate 
because Kübel failed to treat Cosmic TopHat as a separate 
entity from himself.  In support of this argument, Insituform 
relies on evidence that (1) customers paid Cosmic-Austria 
directly for products distributed by Cosmic TopHat; (2) 
Cosmic TopHat paid the duty tax for Cosmic-Austria’s sales 
into the United States; and (3) Kübel controlled the cash 
flow between the entities and ensured that Cosmic TopHat 
had only enough cash to pay its expenses.  But while these 
facts may show that Kübel failed to keep the Cosmic entities 
separate from each other, they do not show that he failed to 
keep Cosmic TopHat separate from himself.232 
 
The court in Cosmic TopHat appears to be saying that there was no 
evidence that what lack of separateness the plaintiff showed had 
contributed to the harm suffered by plaintiff. 
In McWilliams Ballard, Inc. v. Level 2 Development,233 plaintiff 
McWilliams Ballard, Inc. loaned $100,000 to Level 2 Development, a 
District of Columbia limited liability company, to assist in the purchase and 
development of real property in the District of Columbia.234  Another LLC 
 
229.  Insituform Tech., LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. 
230.  Id. (citing Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873, 874 (Ga. 2003)). 
231.  Id. at 1344. 
232. Id. (citing Bonner v. Brunson, 585 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. App. 2003) (“[E]vidence of 
overpayment to [the defendant’s] corporation would not be evidence that [the defendant], individually, 
confused his personal affairs with the LLC.”) and Global Diagnostic Dev., LLC v. Diagnostic Imaging 
of Atlanta, 643 S.E.2d 338, 341 (Ga. App. 2007) (“[S]ole ownership of a corporation by one person is 
not a factor, nor is the fact that the sole owner uses and controls it to promote his ends.”)). 
233.  McWilliams Ballard, Inc. v. Level 2 Dev., 697 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2010). 
234.  Id. at 104. 
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involved was L2CP, a Delaware limited liability company doing business 
in the District of Columbia with the same address as Level 2 Development.  
Jeffery Blum and David Franco were “managers, members, directors, or 
officers of Level 2 and L2CP.”235  L2CP purchased the property, 
presumably with the money plaintiff lent to Level 2 Development.236  No 
payments were ever made on the loan.  Plaintiff sued, alleging that the two 
LLC defendants and the two individual defendants were alter egos of each 
other.  The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating:237 
 
[P]laintiff has sufficiently alleged facts allowing a 
plausible inference that there is unity of ownership and 
interest between Level 2, L2CP, and the individual 
defendants.  In particular, plaintiff alleges that “[t]he 
acquisition of the Property and development of the [View 
14] Project were the personal investments and business 
ventures” of the individual defendants and that the individual 
defendants formed L2CP to “create a layer of a limited 
liability company” between them and defendant Level 2 and 
between defendant Level 2 and the View 14 Project without 
establishing any separate business structure, following 
business formalities, or maintaining separate business 
records.  Plaintiff also alleges that neither Level 2 nor L2CP 
was a separate business with its own separate decision-
making process and personnel allowing them to deviate from 
the wishes of the individual defendants.  At this stage, these 
claims are sufficient to plead the unity of ownership and 
interest element of this cause of action. 
Second, the complaint sufficiently demonstrates that 
considerations of equity and justice justify maintaining the 
claim against the moving defendants at this stage.  For 
instance, plaintiff alleges that the defendants represented that 
the loan was “absolutely necessary” to effectuate the 
purchase, development, and improvement of the View 14 
Property.  Thus, as plaintiff argues, the project could not 
have moved forward without the loan and should Level 2 be 
found liable for the money allegedly owed plaintiff, 
considerations of justice and equity may require piercing the 
corporate veil in order to ensure that the loan is repaid. 
 
235.  McWilliams Ballard, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 2d at 104. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Id. at 106. 
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Federal Trade Commission v. Bronson Partners, LLC238 involved a 
false advertising enforcement action brought against Bronson Partners, 
LLC, a Texas LLC and Martin Howard.  The Commissioner later sought to 
add Sandra Howard, Martin’s wife, and H & H Marketing, LLC, a Texas 
LLC (“H & H”) owned in equal shares by Martin and Sandra Howard.  In 
explaining its determination that H & H was the alter ego of Howard 
Martin, the court stated: 
 
The record reflects that H & H was formed on the advice of 
the Howards’ accountant in order to pay the Howards’ 
personal expenses.  This is consistent with Sandra Howard’s 
testimony at the hearing that H & H was formed to pay the 
personal expenses of the Howards.  H & H paid the 
Howards’ mortgage, medical expenses, household expenses 
and Sandra Howard testified that she could take extra money 
out of H & H as needed.  In his deposition, Martin Howard, 
provided further support for the finding that the Howards’ 
monies were indistinguishable from H & H’s monies.  He 
testified that H & H received $787,940 from Bronson during 
the 2003 and 2004 tax years.  Those monies were evenly 
split between Martin and Sandra Howard and were used for 
mortgage payments, real estate taxes, income taxes, 
household expenses, medical expenses, retirement savings, 
and to pay off a mortgage.  The Howards used the H & H 
bank accounts to pay those personal expenses.  The total 
dealings of H & H and the Martin Howard are inextricably 
intertwined.  The Howards were the only employees of H & 
H and H & H’s location was wherever the Howards 
happened to be.  Other than the filing of formation papers, 
Martin Howard did little to operate H & H as a company.  
The evidence at the hearing showed that H & H ignored the 
corporate form and did not hold membership meetings. 
Additionally, Sandra Howard acknowledged that it did not 
matter if the money came from Bronson or H & H, the 
money belonged to the Howards, not H & H.  Overwhelming 
evidence shows that Martin Howard maintained full control 
over H & H.  Accordingly, I find that H & H is an alter ego 
of Martin Howard and grant the Commission’s motion to 
name H & H a full defendant in light of the evidence at trial  
 
238.  Federal Trade Commission v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Conn. 2009). 
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because I find that H & H is an alter ego of Martin Howard, I 
do not need to decide if H & H is engaged in a common 
enterprise with Bronson.239 
 
The final outcome of this case was that Bronson Partners, LLC, H & 
H, and Martin Howard were held jointly and severally liable to pay 
$1,942,325 in restitution.240 
Harris v. Kupersmith241 held the individual owner of an LLC and a 
corporation personally liable to the plaintiff for plaintiff’s unpaid salary 
from the LLC on the basis that the entities were the alter ego of the owner 
and for damages to the plaintiff for defamation on the basis that the 
defamation was tortious conduct in which the owner directly participated.  
With respect to the alter ego claim, the court stated: 
 
[T]he plaintiff’s . . . allegations state that Kupersmith used 
the assets of the companies for his own personal use and 
exercised complete control over the companies with respect 
to all aspects of the business.  Thus, when reading these 
allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the 
allegations are sufficient to show that the lack of formalities, 
use of employees for personal business and use of the LLC’s 
assets for personal matters, evidence such a unity of interest 
and ownership that the independence of the LLCs, if it 
indeed ever existed, ceased to exist.  Thus, the court finds 
that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Kupersmith liable for the acts and 
omission of the defendant companies.242 
 
239.  Federal Trade Commission, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
240.  Id. at 394.  Macey and Mitts would classify Bronson Partners as a case in which the result 
was appropriate to support a statutory scheme.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11.  Moreover, Bronson 
Partners appears to be an example of recordkeeping so poor that “where the failure to keep records is 
so profound that one cannot utilize such records to determine which assets legitimately belong to the 
corporation and which legitimately belong to its shareholders, then piercing is appropriate to prevent the 
unfair and strategic abuse of creditors by unilaterally categorizing assets as belonging to the shareholder 
(and thus unavailable to creditors) when there is no legitimate basis for doing so.”  Macey & Mitts, 
supra note 11 at 109. 
241.  Harris v. Kupersmith, No. FSTCV086000995S, 2009 WL 3286108 (Conn. Super. Aug. 31, 
2009). 
242.  Id. at *8.  Harris v. Kupersmith appears to be another case that Macey and Mitts would 
classify either as one in which a creditor needed protection from the acts of the entity’s owners or one 
that was correctly decided as necessary to carry out the goals of a regulatory scheme.  Macey & Mitts, 
supra note 11, at 102.  Whether or not there is an applicable statute, society certainly has an interest is 
seeing that legitimate salary and wage claims are paid.  For another instance where a court approved 
piercing the veil in a case involving unpaid wages, see Allison v. Danilovic, 2004 WL 2797988 (Cal. 
App. 2 Dist. Dec. 7, 2004), infra note 364. 
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Bastan v. RJM & Associates, LLC243 suggests that total disregard of 
formalities may indicate a lack of separateness between an LLC and its 
owner.  The plaintiff alleged that “the [individual defendant] is the 
controlling member of the LLC, that he treated LLC funds as his own by 
paying virtually all of his personal expenses from the account of the LLC, 
thus draining the LLC’s assets such that they are insufficient to meet its 
obligations, that by his conduct [he] ‘caused the independence of said LLC 
to cease,’ and that adherence to the fiction of separate identity would defeat 
the interests of justice.”244  The court first gave short shrift to the LLC’s 
owner’s argument that because the Connecticut statutory scheme allowed 
single-member LLCs that were member-managed, and the member 
necessarily had to act for the LLC, there could be no veil piercing of a 
member-managed LLC.245  The court then discussed the circumstances 
under which it is appropriate to pierce the veil of a corporation and stated 
that “a person who ignores the intended separation between the individual 
and the company ought to be no better off than the sole shareholder who 
ignores corporate obligations.”246 
 
F.  COMMINGLING OF FUNDS 
 
GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc.247 
affords a constructive look at commingling, improper payments, and under 
capitalization as well as domination.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc. 
(“GreenHunter”) was the sole member of GreenHunter Wind Energy, LLC, 
a Wyoming limited liability company (the “LLC”).  The LLC and Western 
Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (“Western”) entered into a contract pursuant 
to which Western agreed to provide consulting services to the LLC related 
to the potential development of a wind turbine farm in Platte County, 
Wyoming.  The evidence at trial showed that the LLC did not have 
employees of its own, that employees of GreenHunter performed all 
bookkeeping and financial management for the LLC, the LLC consistently 
carried an operating capital balance that was insufficient to cover its debts, 
and that GreenHunter decided when and how much money to advance to 
the LLC to allow it to pay its accounts payable. “Therefore, [GreenHunter], 
as the sole source of operating funds for the LLC, decided which of its 
 
243.  Bastan v. RJM & Associates, LLC, No. CV99 0593189 S, 2001 WL 1006661 (Conn. Super. 
June 4, 2001).  This case also appears to be one that Macey and Mitts would describe as correctly 
decided to protect creditors.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123. 
244.  Bastan, 2001 WL 1006661, at *1. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at *2. 
247.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. W. Ecosystems Tech., Inc., 337 P.3d 454 (Wyo. 2014). 
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creditors would be paid. Although [GreenHunter] advanced funds to permit 
the LLC to pay some creditors, it did not transfer any funds to allow the 
LLC to pay Western.”248 
The court in GreenHunter affirmed the district court’s finding in favor 
of Western and its holding that the LLC’s veil should be pierced.  In 
discussing inadequate capitalization as applicable to limited liability 
companies, the GreenHunter court states that “it is important to note, 
however, that undercapitalization alone will not suffice to pierce the veil . . 
. .  If the LLC is undercapitalized, or its members have never attempted to 
make arrangements to secure sufficient capital, these facts may be evidence 
that the company was used to screen members from legitimate debt.”249 
The Greenhunter court’s observations on undercapitalization are 
consistent with Macey and Mitts view that the second of the real 
justifications for veil piercing is to protect creditors against owner 
misrepresentations.250  Indeed, one of the defendant’s arguments was that 
the plaintiff should have protected itself by seeking a guarantee or a 
retainer; the court responded to this argument as follows: 
 
It makes good business sense for a contract creditor to try to 
obtain a guarantee from the member or retainer from the 
limited liability company itself.  But we are mindful of the 
reality of the marketplace that many businesses are not in a 
position — competitively or economically — to insist on 
guarantees.  For that reason, we decline Appellant’s 
invitation to find piercing inappropriate in this case because 
Western did not protect itself from Appellant’s misuse of the 
LLC by attempting to obtain a guarantee or other form of 
security.  To do so would invite abuse of entities, as is the 
case here.251 
 
With respect to intermingling, the court stated that: 
 
Funds and assets should be separated and not commingled.  
Failure to maintain an arm’s-length relationship between the 
member and company, as by not keeping separate bank 
accounts and bookkeeping records, may be weighed along 
with other factors.  If the member treats limited liability 
company property as if it were that person’s or company’s 
 
248.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 458. 
249.  Id. at 463. 
250.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 102. 
251.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 469. 
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personal property, a court should consider also this fact.  
Manipulation of assets and liabilities between the member 
and company so as to concentrate the assets in the former 
and the liabilities in the latter can be suggestive of improper 
use of the LLC as well.252 
 
In GreenHunter, the court determined that undercapitalization and 
commingling were both present because the LLC often had a zero balance 
in its bank account, and the sole member of the LLC transferred money to 
it from time to time to pay bills selected by the member.253  In the end, the 
GreenHunter court approved the trial court’s finding that “Appellant 
misused the LLC in order to improperly manipulate the situation to avoid 
paying for services which benefitted it, that it failed to maintain adequate 
separation, and that to allow it to do so would be unjust and inequitable.”254  
Accordingly, Macey and Mitts255 would say that GreenHunter reached the 
right result because Western needed to be protected from the actions of the 
owner of the LLC. 
A bankruptcy court in New York also stated that the veil of an LLC 
should only rarely be pierced because of undercapitalization: 
 
As an initial matter, undercapitalization is rarely sufficient to 
pierce the corporate veil, because otherwise “the veil of 
every insolvent subsidiary or failed start-up corporation 
could be pierced.”  The inquiry “is most relevant for the 
inference it provides into whether the corporation was 
established to defraud its creditors or other improper purpose 
such as avoiding the risks known to be attendant to a type of 
business.”  When determining whether a subsidiary was 
adequately capitalized, courts focus on the initial 
capitalization: “whether a corporate entity was or was not set 
up for financial failure.”256 
 
In Polaris Industrial Corporation v. Kaplan,257 the Nevada Supreme 
 
252.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 464 (citations omitted). 
253.  Id. at 465–67. 
254.  Id. at 470. 
255.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 110. This Article discusses GreenHunter further, including 
an amendment to Wyoming’s veil piercing statute prompted, in part, by GreenHunder, at infra, notes 
404-08 and accompanying text. 
256.  In re BH S&B Holdings LLC, 420 B.R. 112, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing In re RSL 
COM PRIMECALL, Inc., No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669, at *16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003); 
Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 521, 530 (D. Del. 2008); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. 
Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d, 129, 152–53 (D. Mass. 1998). 
257.  Polaris Indus. Corp. v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884, 887 (Nev. 1987). 
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Court stated that the failure by a corporation to issue stock or to keep 
proper minutes would not support a veil-piercing claim when there was no 
evidence that the plaintiff had been harmed by these failures.258  Following 
its discussion of formalities, however, the court went on to note: 
 
We are, however, troubled by the district court’s 
conclusion in light of its findings that Davis and Kaplan 
cashed numerous unnumbered counter checks for their 
personal benefit and that these withdrawals further thinned 
the capitalization of CRI which, according to another 
finding, had little real assets and a negative net worth.259 
On July 20, 1979, the same day that Polaris served 
Kaplan and Davis with its complaint, Kaplan withdrew 
$12,500.00 by unnumbered counter check.  A notation on 
the check charged the withdrawal to Account 140, revealed 
at a trial to be “Employee Advances.”  From August 1979 to 
October 1979, Kaplan and Davis made numerous payments 
to themselves, Jerome Kaplan and McKenzie Davis.  CRI’s 
bookkeeper was not apprised of the withdrawals by 
unnumbered checks. Kaplan admitted Davis took funds from 
the corporation to support his gambling habit.  He, himself, 
claimed to have made temporary withdrawals to protect 
corporate funds from Davis.  However, the district court 
found the funds were taken for the personal use of both 
officers.  This finding is supported by notations on the 
checks charging them to “employee advances.”  R. Craig 
Bird, an auditor retained by Polaris, opined that CRI would 
have had the funds to pay its debt if the withdrawals had not 
further thinned the capitalization of the corporation.  He also 
stated that CRI had few real assets because the accounts 
receivables carried on its books were uncollectable. The 
district court was entitled to accept his opinion.  Our review 
of the record shows the district court’s findings concerning 
the unnumbered counter checks and their effect on the 
corporation are supported by substantial evidence. They will, 
therefore, not be disturbed on appeal.260 
In light of the findings, it becomes clear that CRI’s 
officers treated corporate funds as their own by making ad 
 
258.  Polaris Indus. Corp., 747 P.2d at 887.  See also infra notes 542-46 and accompanying text. 
259.  Polaris Indus. Corp., 747 P.2d at 887. 
260.  Id. at 887–88. 
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hoc withdrawals at the bank in the form of advances to 
themselves at a time when the corporation’s debt to Polaris 
was not being paid, and that Polaris was damaged because 
these actions left the corporation without funds to repay the 
debt.  The essence of the alter ego doctrine is to do justice.  
We are compelled to recognize that the district court clearly 
reached a wrong conclusion in determining that Michael 
Kaplan had not been shown to be the alter ego of NMS and 
CRI.261 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court 
as to Jerome Kaplan, and reverse the judgment as to Michael 
Kaplan.262 
 
Polaris, thus, as to its holding with regard to Kaplan’s use of counter 
checks to pay personal expenses and his failure to inform the bookkeeper 
of his withdrawals, demonstrates another instance in which a court felt it 
necessary to protect a third party creditor from “fraud or something like 
it.”263 
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld veil piercing in a case where it 
found inadequate capitalization and disregard of formalities.”264  In this 
case, C & B Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (“C & B”) owed Amfac 
Mechanical Supply Company (“Amfac”) $11,000.  Amfac sued Carl and 
Beverly Federer, the sole shareholders of C & B, to collect the debt of C & 
B from them.  Although the Amfac court found that there was inadequate 
capitalization and disregard of formalities, the crucial facts supporting the 
court’s determination that veil piercing was appropriate in this case were 
that Carl Federer sometimes billed for plumbing work in his personal name 
and sometimes billed in the name of C & B.  Further, payments for 
plumbing work sometimes were deposited directly into the Federers’ 
personal bank account.265  In addition, the Federers placed themselves in a 
preferred position by taking $1,000 per month out of C & B to repay 
themselves for a loan they had made to the corporation but did not pay 
anything to Amfac.266 
Amfac was followed in Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc.267  In that case, the 
court affirmed the district court’s piercing of the veil of Meadowbrook 
 
261.  Polaris Indus. Corp., 747 P.2d at 888 (emphasis added). 
262.  Id. 
263.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 101. 
264.  Amfac Mech. Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982). 
265.  Id. at 78. 
266.  Id. at 80–81. 
267.  Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Wyo. 1988). 
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Development, Inc. (“Meadowbrook”) and holding its majority shareholder, 
Maurice Miles, liable for an unpaid obligation of Meadowbrook.  Factors 
that the court emphasized were that Miles moved funds into and out of the 
Meadowbrook accounts at his whim without any documentation, that 
Meadowbrook constructed buildings for Miles without being reimbursed 
for its expenses, and that there was unauthorized diversion of assets of 
Meadowbrook for personal purposes.268  These actions by Miles left 
Meadowbrook without funds to pay its obligations. 
In Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson,269 the Idaho Supreme Court 
returned the case to the trial court with instructions to consider the 
plaintiff’s claim that an LLC was the alter ego of the managing member 
where the evidence showed that the managing member paid himself, as 
manager, to manage his personal properties, and he “and his accountant 
testified that the LLC’s checking account was so confusing that the 
accountant could not be sure whose money was in the account at what 
times.”270 
Amfac, Miles, and Vanderford Company all involved significant 
commingling of funds and use of entity funds for personal purposes.  
Accordingly, these three cases appear to be classifiable as instances in 
which veil piercing was appropriate to protect creditors against 
misrepresentations by owners.271 
In 2012, the Colorado Court of Appeals rendered an improvident veil-
piercing decision in Martin v. Freeman.272  Dean C.B. Freeman was the 
sole member and manager of Tradewinds Group, LLC, a single-member 
Delaware LLC.273  Tradewinds contracted with Robert C. Martin to 
construct an airplane hangar and, in 2006, sued Martin for breaching the 
construction agreement.  In 2007, while the litigation was still pending, 
Tradewinds sold its only asset — an airplane — for $300,000.  The 
proceeds were distributed to Freeman as the single member (in a manner 
that the trial court had found proper under § 7-80-606 of the Colorado LLC 
 
268.  Miles, 753 P.2d at 1024. 
269.  Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 2007). 
270.  Vanderford Co., 165 P.3d at 271. 
271.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123.  Macey and Mitts that “where the failure to keep 
records is so profound that one cannot utilize such records to determine which assets legitimately 
belong to the corporation and which legitimately belong to its shareholders, then piercing is appropriate 
to prevent the unfair and strategic abuse of creditors by unilaterally categorizing assets as belonging to 
the shareholder (and thus unavailable to creditors) when there is no legitimate basis for doing so.” 
 Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 109. 
272.  Martin v. Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182 (Colo. App. 2012). 
273.  Id. at 1185.  The Court of Appeals did not address the fact that Tradewinds Group, LLC was 
a Delaware LLC in applying C.R.S. § 7-80-606 or in applying Colorado veil piercing case law. 
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Act274), and Freeman paid for the ongoing litigation against Martin.  
Judgment in the litigation was initially entered in favor of Tradewinds 
(2008), but then reversed (2009) and on remand judgment in the amount of 
$36,645.40 in costs was entered for Martin.  At the time of the judgment, 
Tradewinds had no remaining assets.  Martin then brought suit against 
Freeman seeking to pierce the LLC veil of Tradewinds, and in 2010 the 
trial court found Freeman to be personally liable. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that 
Freeman should be held liable for the debts of Tradewinds on the grounds 
that: (i) Tradewinds was the alter ego of Freeman; (ii) the limited liability 
form was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim; and (iii) an 
equitable result would be achieved by disregarding the limited liability 
form of Tradewinds.275 
The Court of Appeals did not apply a fraudulent transfer analysis 
under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act in Martin v. 
Freeman as the court had done in an earlier case,276 but assumed that the 
transfer by the LLC to Freeman’s individual account was fraudulent. 
The Court of Appeal’s real justification for alter ego determination 
would appear to be the commingling of assets described in footnote 275.  
 
274.  Id. at 1189; see generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-606 (2015).  Note that the trial court 
initially, and the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently, ignored the fact that Tradewinds was a 
Delaware limited liability company, not a Colorado LLC.  Both courts applied Colorado law to 
conclude that the distribution was improper.  Id. at 1189. 
275.  Martin, 272 P.3d at 1185.  In reaching the conclusion that Tradewinds was the alter ego of 
Freeman, the trial court made six findings.  Four of the trial court’s findings should be inapplicable or 
of little weight in piercing the veil of an LLC — poor record keeping, the same person was the sole 
member and manager, thin capitalization, and undocumented infusions of cash were used to pay 
Tradewinds’ operating expenses.  The Colorado LLC Act (applied by the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals) specifically provides in Colorado Revised Statutes section 7-80-107(2) that the failure of an 
LLC to observe the formalities or requirements relating to the management of its business and affairs is 
not in itself a ground for imposing personal liability for the debts of the LLC on its members.  Veil 
piercing for inadequate capitalization should be less likely for LLCs than corporations, in part because 
of the anticipated informalities.  2 ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE 
ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 12.3 (2d ed. 2010); see also 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 
FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.35 (suggesting that a sole 
shareholder should not be suspect “merely because he or she conducts business in an informal 
manner”). 
276.  See, e.g., CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, LLC, 251 P.3d 523 (Colo. App. 2010).  There, the 
LLC was in litigation with CBRE over a real estate commission.  The LLC distributed the proceeds of a 
property sale to the members, but the members delivered two promissory notes to the LLC to reflect the 
likely costs of the litigation and an estimate of a potentially unfavorable outcome.  The litigation was 
significantly more expensive than expected and the LLC had no further funds.  In an effort to recover 
damages following a favorable judgment, CBRE sued the two members under a fraudulent transfer 
theory which, like the Colorado law on LLC distributions, contemplated insolvency as a precursor to 
liability.  Because the two LLC members had contributed promissory notes equal to a reasonable 
estimate of litigation expenses and damages at the time they took the distribution from the LLC, the 
members were found not to be liable to CBRE even though, when the litigation was concluded, there 
were insufficient assets remaining in the LLC to pay the resulting damages. 
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Commingling assets is a bad business practice and, more often than not, 
will result in a judicial determination that the entity is an alter ego of the 
defendant.277 
Alter ego is only the first step.  The second step is whether the LLC 
form was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim.  The majority 
noted that the transfer of the assets occurred during the litigation, but years 
before Martin’s claim was liquidated.  The majority stated that “[a]ny party 
engaged in litigation is exposed to potential liability” regardless of the 
nature of the litigation.  (It could be just as easily stated that any person 
driving a car is exposed to potential liability.)  Based on this statement, the 
majority supported the trial court’s determination that the transfer of assets 
was “sufficient to support piercing the corporate [sic] veil,” and that (as a 
matter of “first impression”) “wrongful intent or bad faith need not be 
shown to pierce the LLC veil.”278 
It is difficult to see how Martin v. Freeman would fit into one of the 
categories of appropriate veil-piercing articulated by Macey and Mitts.279  
There is no indication that the plaintiff was misled by any action of the 
defendant.  There is no statutory or regulatory scheme involved, and it is 
not a bankruptcy case.  Martin v. Freeman, therefore, must be included in 
what thankfully are a handful of results-driven cases that seem to hold that 
undercapitalization may be found if the entity lacks assets to satisfy any 
liability arising at any time.280 
 
G.  INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION 
 
Macey and Mitts state that they had found “no piercing cases in which 
a court pierced the corporate veil solely because a corporation is 
undercapitalized.”281  In their analysis of corporate veil-piercing cases, 
Macey and Mitts282 argue that inadequate capitalization per se should not 
 
277.  See, e.g., GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 454; Amfac Mechanical Supply Co. v. 
Federer, 645 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Wyo. 1988); 
Sheffield Services Co., 211 P.3d at 714;  McCallum Family LLC v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69 (Colo. App. 
2009); Polaris Indus. Corp. v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884 (Nev. 1987). 
278.  Martin, 272 P.3d at 1186.  The dissent noted that the trial court had found that, at the time of 
distribution, “Freeman actually and reasonably believed” that Tradewinds “had more than sufficient 
value to cover any reasonably possible obligation on the horizon for the corporate [sic] entity,” and that 
the “distribution was lawful under section 7-80-606.”  Id. at 1189.  The application of the CB Richard 
Ellis analysis under CUFTA requires a finding of fraudulent intent and is more appropriate in situations 
such as Martin v. Freeman.  If the distribution was made when the liabilities were covered, where is the 
fraud or wrongful conduct just because a new liability later surfaces? 
279.  See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
280.  See the discussion infra notes 312–29 of Axtmann v. Chillemi, 746 N.W.2d 838 (N. D. 2007) 
and other similar cases. 
281.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 103 (emphasis added). 
282.  Id. at 126. 
  
Spring 2016 WILL YOUR VEIL BE PIERCED? 405 
be a veil-piercing factor.  They discuss how undercapitalization as a factor 
is inconsistent with several other policies and state: 
 
[C]urrent accounts of the rationales for disregarding the 
corporate form, particularly accounts that consider 
undercapitalization as a grounds for veil piercing fail to 
reconcile the basic tension between the well-settled doctrine 
that corporations can be established for the very purpose of 
avoiding personal liability, and the doctrine that the veil can 
be pierced to avoid injustice.  Under our account, 
corporations can be established for the sole purpose of 
avoiding personal or corporate liability on the part of 
investors, but not when doing so is inconsistent with the 
goals of another regulatory or statutory scheme; when there 
is evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by companies or 
individuals trying to obtain credit; or when respecting the 
corporate form facilitates or enables favoritism among 
claimants to the cash flows of a firm.283 
 
In connection with their analysis of undercapitalization as a factor, 
Macey and Mitts discuss Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter 
Maat.284  In Browning-Ferris, the plaintiffs sued two corporations in a 
contribution action for cleanup costs resulting from the defendants 
improperly abandoning a landfill and also sued Richard Ter Maat, the 
president and principal shareholder of the two corporations.  The Seventh 
Circuit remanded the case because the district court had failed to consider 
the individual’s potential liability under the environmental laws.  The 
Seventh Circuit noted that, as the plaintiffs were involuntary creditors, 
there was no issue of reliance on misrepresentations by the defendant.285  
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant 
corporations’ veil should be pierced because of undercapitalization, stating: 
“[t]he cases in which undercapitalization has figured in the decision to 
pierce the corporate veil are ones in which the corporation had so little 
money that it could not and did not actually operate its nominal business on 
its own.”286 
Macey and Mitts discuss Minton v. Cavaney287 and describe it as “a 
 
283.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 153. 
284.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999); see Macey & 
Mitts, supra note 11, at 117–18. 
285.  Ter Maat, 195 F.3d at 960. 
286.  Id. at 961. 
287.  Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961). 
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leading case often mistakenly cited for the proposition that 
undercapitalization alone is sufficient to pierce the veil.”288  The plaintiffs 
in that case had obtained a judgment against the Seminole Hot Springs 
Corporation (“Seminole”) for their daughter’s wrongful death by drowning 
in a public swimming pool operated by the corporation.  The plaintiffs then 
sought to hold William M. Cavaney (“Cavaney”), the sole director and the 
secretary and treasurer of the corporation, personally liable for the 
judgment.  Macey and Mitts state that “in imposing liability on Cavaney 
personally, the California Supreme Court emphasized Seminole’s 
insufficient capitalization” and quoted from the court’s opinion: 
 
The equitable owners of a corporation . . . are personally 
liable when they . . . provide inadequate capitalization and 
actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs. In the 
instant case the evidence is undisputed that there was no 
attempt to provide adequate capitalization.  Seminole never 
had any substantial assets.  It leased the pool that it operated, 
and the lease was forfeited for failure to pay the rent.  Its 
capital was “trifling compared with the business to be done 
and the risks of loss.”289 
 
Macey and Mitts then analyze the court’s holding as follows: 
 
Despite the Minton court’s rhetorical emphasis on 
undercapitalization, this was not the only deficiency in 
Seminole’s conduct as a corporation.  Specifically, the court 
emphasized that “section 800 of the Corporations Code 
provides that ‘* * * the business and affairs of every 
corporation shall be controlled by, a board of not less than 
three directors.’  . . . A person may not in this manner 
divorce the responsibilities of a director from the statutory 
duties and powers of that office.”290 
Seminole’s failure to comply with an express statutory 
mandate provides a much more compelling basis to 
disregard the corporate form because it suggests inadequate 
oversight of the corporation.  Inadequate oversight (i.e., by a 
board of directors that is smaller than the statutory 
minimum) can increase the probability that the corporation 
 
288.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 127–28. 
289.  Minton, 364 P.2d at 475 (internal citations omitted). 
290.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 128. 
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will act in a socially harmful manner.  Were Seminole to 
have been subject to a larger board of directors and 
conducted its affairs in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, perhaps it would have taken greater care in 
preventing drowning in the swimming pool, i.e., by posting a 
lifeguard.  The Minton court’s emphasis on failure to 
observe formalities should be understood as reflecting a 
refusal to uphold limited liability when the corporation is 
operated in a manner that is significantly likely to impose 
harm on others and thereby render them involuntary tort 
creditors of the firm.291 
 
Whether the view that a single director is more likely to cause a 
corporation to engage in socially undesirable activity is correct appears 
open to question.  Certainly, if the organizer of a corporation added two 
cronies to the board just to have the statutory minimum, it is unlikely that 
the two cronies would make much difference.  On the other hand, a single 
director, if conscientious, may certainly keep the corporation on the proper 
path.  Instead of placing hope in statutory requirements for a minimum 
number of directors, law makers would be better served by reviewing what 
industries are required to have liability insurance and in what amounts.  
Meanwhile, bad actors, whether solo or in an ensemble, may be policed by 
the courts. 
For a different take on the legal effect of a corporation acting without 
the minimum number of directors, see White v. Thatcher Financial 
Group.292  In White, the court held that action taken by a corporation’s 
board of directors at a time when there were only two directors instead of 
the then statutory mandated minimum of three was binding on the 
corporation because all actions were approved by the two serving directors, 
who constituted a quorum of the statutory minimum of three.293 
Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc.294 offers useful guidance on 
inadequate capitalization.  In that case, Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc. 
(“Total Pay”) sought to hold Joseph Milk personally liable for amounts due 
under a under a payroll services contract with Burrito Joe’s Holdings, LLC 
(“Burrito Joe’s).  Milk was the sole member and the manager of Burrito 
Joe’s.  The court stated that for undercapitalization to justify piercing the 
veil, “it must be coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of 
 
291.   Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 128. 
292.  White v. Thatcher Fin. Group, Inc., 940 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1996). 
293.  Id. at 1037–38. 
294.  Milk v. Total Pay and HR Solutions, Inc., 634 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. App. 2006). 
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capitalization to improperly avoid future debts of the [LLC].”295  The court 
further stated: 
 
There is a lack of evidence of such intent in the present 
case.  While Total Pay contends that a $20,000 check written 
out to cash conclusively shows that Milk withdrew “working 
capital for personal use so that the business would not have 
sufficient funds to pay creditors,” there is no evidence in the 
record whatsoever that the withdrawn money was used for 
such a purpose.  In fact, the check is dated April 30, 2003, 
before the debt to Total Pay was even incurred, the memo 
portion of the check denotes “equipment,” and the amount 
withdrawn matches the amount McGhee testified was spent 
on equipment for the restaurant.296 
In a further effort to show that funds were purposefully 
and wrongfully diverted from Burrito Joe’s to avoid paying 
the payroll services debt, Total Pay relies upon a one-page 
correspondence from McGhee to Milk in which McGhee 
suggested that the restaurant’s limited funds be used to pay 
the current payroll of the restaurant’s employees rather than 
to pay off past debt owed to Total Pay.  However, as 
previously noted, veil-piercing based on undercapitalization 
requires an improper “intent at the time of the capitalization 
to improperly avoid future debts.” [5]  Moreover, there is no 
evidence showing that these payments to employees were 
anything other than legitimate business expenses, or that the 
payments were even made.  Accordingly, Total Pay has 
failed to show that it was entitled to pierce the veil of the 
separately maintained Burrito Joe’s in order to impose 
personal liability upon Milk.297 
 
The court’s footnote 5 in the above quote states: “For the same reason, 
Total Pay cannot rely upon McGhee’s deposition testimony in which he 
discussed how Milk declined to make additional financial contributions to 
the restaurant after it was clear that the restaurant was not making a profit 
 
295.  Milk, 634 S.E.2d at 212 (emphasis added) (citing Boswell v. Primary Care Professionals, 
265 Ga. App. 522, 525–26 (2004)). 
296.  Id. 
297.  Milk, 634 S.E.2d at 212–13 (citing Fuda v. Kroen, 204 Ga. App. 836, 838 (1992)) (veil 
could not be pierced when plaintiff failed to establish that Correct withdrawal of corporate funds “were 
not legitimate business expenses or authorized by the corporation as part of . . . [legitimate] 
compensation packages”). 
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and had incurred substantial debt.” 
In Flores v. DDJ, Inc.,298 the court rejected an alter ego claim, noting, 
in part, that the existence of a dissatisfied creditor does not itself create an 
inequitable result, and an inequitable result does not follow in cases where 
the corporation was once adequately capitalized and then encountered bad 
financial times.  The court also noted that the plaintiff had the burden of 
proof to show that checks were written for a nonbusiness purpose299 and 
that: 
 
In this case, many of the factors often discussed in alter ego 
cases are not raised by Plaintiffs.  For example, it appears 
that the Individuals never held themselves out as being liable 
for the corporations’ debts, the Individuals did not fail to 
segregate their own records from that of the corporations, the 
individuals did not obtain required licenses or certifications 
in their own name rather than the corporate name, the 
Individuals segregated their funds from those of the 
corporation, the Individuals did not treat the corporations’ 
physical assets as their own, and the Individuals and 
corporations did not use the same address.  There is no 
evidence that anyone dealing with Defendant Corporations 
believed or would have reasonably believed that they were 
dealing with the Individuals in their personal capacity rather 
than Defendants.300 
 
In Canter v. Ebersole,301 the court denied plaintiff’s veil piercing 
claim, noting that the plaintiff argued that the individual had caused the 
LLC to be undercapitalized and that he should be responsible for paying all 
of the LLC’s debts because he had paid some of them.  The court 
responded:302 
 
Mr. Ebersole testified that the initial capital of WPT was 
$ 1,000.00.  However, he and Mr. Mabee and companies 
they controlled made loans to WPT as needed. Most 
important, the members had estimated the costs of the 
 
298.  Flores v. DDJ, Inc., No. 1:99 CV 5878, 2007 WL 4269259, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 
2007).  
299.  Id. at *9. 
300.  Flores, 2007 WL 4269259 at *6. 
301.  Canter v. Ebersole, No. E2005-02388-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1627288, at *3 (Tenn. App. 
May 13, 2006). 
302.  Id.  
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project and agreed to borrow sufficient funds from First 
Tennessee Bank to build the townhomes.  Unfortunately for 
Mr. Ebersole, there was an increase in costs and expenses 
and two townhomes did not sell as expected.  The 
anticipated profit did not occur. 
Mr. Canter points to Mr. Ebersole’s personal payment of 
some of WPT’s debts.  Therefore, Mr. Canter argues that 
Mr. Ebersole should be liable for all debts of WPT.  Mr. 
Ebersole testified, without contradiction, that he only paid 
those obligations of WPT for which he also was personally 
liable.  For example, he executed a personal guarantee to 
First Tennessee Bank.  He had paid some of his personal 
monies to First Tennessee Bank when WPT did not have the 
funds to make payment.  His alternatives were to loan funds 
to WPT, so WPT could make the payment, or let the bank 
sue him.  His direct payment to the bank was reasonable and 
permissible.  This case is an example why creditors want a 
personal guarantee and/or adequate security for a loan. 
 
Milk, Flores, and Canter v. Ebersole are cases in which the court 
could be viewed as saying that the creditors in these cases did not need 
protection from actions by the entities’ owners because the owners acted 
reasonably.303  In Instituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC,304 
the court stated that to justify piercing the veil of an LLC based on 
undercapitalization the plaintiff must show undercapitalization coupled 
with an intent at the time of capitalization to improperly avoid future 
debts.305 
In United States v. WRW Corp.,306 the United States brought suit 
against three individuals seeking to hold them personally liable for 
substantial fines levied against WRW Corporation for violations of the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.307  The court upheld piercing the veil 
of WRW Corporation on the grounds of undercapitalization and lack of 
formalities.308  The court stated: 
 
303.  Cf. Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 133-35. 
304.  Insituform Tech., LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.  See also supra notes 227-32 and 
accompanying text (interesting take on separateness) and infra notes 499–501 and accompanying text 
(discussing causation) and notes 620-22 and accompanying text (reverse veil piercing). 
305.  Insituform Tech., LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
306.  United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1993). 
307.  Id. at 140. 
308.  Id. at 143.  Macey and Mitts would classify United States v. WRW Corp. as a case in which 
the stated rationales of the court may not express the true rationale of the case, i.e., to protect the 
purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 115–23. 
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The [district] court first found that WRW was 
undercapitalized because it was incorporated with only 
$3,000 of capital, which the record indicates was insufficient 
to pay normal expenses associated with the operation of a 
coal mine.  Although the defendants complain that there was 
no expert testimony on whether WRW was undercapitalized, 
it is clear from the record that expert testimony was not 
required to support the district court’s conclusion in this 
case, based upon uncontroverted findings by the district 
court that WRW lacked working capital to pay any 
employees or expenses, to pay licensing or permit fees, or to 
obtain adequate mining equipment.  Although 
undercapitalization will not support piercing the corporate 
veil in every case, . . . the district court did not err in 
weighing its significance in this case.309 
 
In its discussion of failure to observe formalities, the court noted that 
the “individual defendants do not contest the district court’s additional 
findings that they commingled funds with WRW, and guaranteed WRW’s 
liabilities in their individual capacities.”310  The court then stated: 
 
In addition to holding that the equities of this case support 
piercing the corporate veil, the district court held that the 
corporate veil should be pierced under the “alter ego” theory, 
because WRW and the defendants did not have separate 
personalities. In light of the lack of observance of corporate 
formalities or distinction between the individual defendants 
and the corporation, we agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that “[t]here was a complete merger of ownership 
and control of WRW with the individual Defendants.”311 
 
A decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court arguably stands for the 
proposition that adequate capitalization must exist at all times.312  In 1985, 
Geri Chillemi (“Chillemi”) and another individual formed Main Realty, 
Inc. (“Main Realty”) to purchase the trade name Main and Company 
Realtors and “everything that was in it” for $20,000.313  Chillemi was the 
 
309.  WRW Corp, 986 F.2d at 143. 
310.  Id. 
311.  Id. 
312.  Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838, 844 (N.D. 2007). 
313.  Id. at 840. 
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sole shareholder, president, and treasurer of Main Realty.  Jon Natwick was 
the vice president and secretary of Main Realty.  Chillemi and Natwick 
lived with each other and were partners in Mainland Ventures Unlimited, a 
partnership owning commercial property that leased office space to Main 
Realty. 
Main Realty’s business model was to engage real estate agents as 
independent contractors.  An agent could opt for either a seventy percent 
earned commissions contract or a one hundred percent earned commissions 
contract.  In the case of a one hundred percent earned commissions 
contract, the agent would be responsible for: 
 
Desk fee, all MLS dues, books, and listing fees, all 
advertising expenses, all their own promotional advertising, 
all individual office supplies, all business cards, stationary, 
envelopes, Purchase Agreements, Listing Contracts, Handy 
Pads, For Sale Signs, Open House Signs, Sign Installation 
fees, long distance phone calls, camera and film, and any 
other expenses incurred over and above the Company 
Expenses listed in paragraph 9.314 
 
The Company Expenses were: 
 
The monthly office fee will pay for the office rent, office 
desk and chairs, secretary and related expenses such as 
FICA, Unemployment Insurance and Workmen’s 
Compensation, telephones and local telephone service, office 
MLS fees, office Real Estate Commission fees.  Copy 
machine supplies and service, Supra Locks, business liability 
insurance and office keys.315 
 
Thomas P. Axtmann and Ariel E. Axtmann (the “Axtmanns”) sued a 
Main Realty agent and Main Realty in connection with the Axtmanns’ 
purchase of a house.  In May 2004, a jury found that Main Realty and the 
individual agent were liable to the Axtmanns for $75,000 in economic 
damages, the individual agent was guilty of fraud and liable to the 
Axtmanns for $45,000 in exemplary damages, and Main Realty was guilty 
of fraud and liable to the Axtmanns for $19,000 in exemplary damages.316 
 
 
314.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 841. 
315.  Id. 
316.  Id. at 842. 
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Apparently while the trial was going on, Chillemi and Natwick held a 
special meeting of the board of directors on Main Realty on April 22, 2004.  
The minutes of that meeting reflected that Main Realty had lost a number 
of agents, that it could not get any new agents to transfer to it, and the rent 
from the remaining five agents was insufficient to cover Main Realty’s 
costs of doing business.  The minutes also record approval of a motion to 
dissolve Main Realty and state that Natwick would form his own company 
and transfer his real estate license to that company.317 
Natwick formed Mainland, Inc. (“Mainland”) in May 2004, and, on 
June 1, 2004, Chillemi, as president of Main Realty, executed assignments 
of all listing contracts of agents affiliated with Main Realty to Mainland.  
Main Realty agreed to relinquish to Mainland all claims for any 
commissions for the sale of real estate covered by the assigned listings.  
Mainland did not pay any consideration to Main Realty for these 
assignments and Chillemi began working for Mainland as an agent and 
independent contractor.318 
After Main Realty dissolved, the Axtmanns levied on Main Realty’s 
property and received $7.52 from a sheriff’s sale of office equipment.  The 
Axtmanns then sued Chillemi, Natwick, Mainland, Main Realty, and 
Mainland Ventures asserting that the transfer of the listing agreements from 
Main Realty to Mainland was a fraudulent transfer and seeking an order 
piercing the veil of Main Realty and imposing personal liability on 
Chillemi and Natwick for the Axtmanns’ judgment against Main Realty.319 
The court upheld the trial court’s imposition of personal liability on 
Chilllemi and Natwick, primarily on the grounds that, in the court’s view, 
Main Realty was substantially undercapitalized.  The court stated: 
 
Proof of fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for 
disregarding the corporate entity, but an element of injustice, 
inequity, or fundamental unfairness must be present before a 
court may properly pierce the corporate veil and that element 
of unfairness may be established by the showing of a number 
of the requisite factors for piercing the corporate veil.  The 
essence of the requirement for fairness is that an individual 
cannot hide from the normal consequences of carefree 
entrepreneuring by doing so through a corporate shell.320 
This Court has also recognized that the attitude toward 
piercing the corporate veil is more flexible in tort than in 
 
317.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 842. 
318.  Id. 
319.  Id. at 842–43. 
320.  Id. at 843. 
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contract, because the creditor has an element of choice 
inherent in a voluntary contractual relationship whereas the 
ordinary tort case forces the debtor-creditor relationship 
upon the creditor by the occurrence of an unexpected tort. In 
tort cases, particular significance is placed on whether a 
corporation is undercapitalized, which involves an added 
public policy consideration of whether individuals may 
transfer a risk of loss to the public in the name of a 
corporation that is marginally financed.  [T]his Court [has] 
explained the obligation for adequate capitalization: “[t]he 
obligation to provide adequate [risk] capital begins with 
incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter * * * 
during the corporation’s operations.” ‘321 
 
The court cited with approval the following findings of the trial court: 
 
The [trial] court found Main Realty was 
undercapitalized, it was insolvent and could not pay its debts 
at the time of the Axtmanns’ judgment and for several years 
before that judgment, and it was a “pass through” 
corporation with no substantial assets.  The court said it 
would be unfair and unjust not to pierce Main Realty’s 
corporate veil, and the court held Chillemi and Natwick 
personally liable for the Axtmanns’ judgment. 
The district court found Chillemi “purchased the 
business twenty years ago for $20,000.00.  However, there 
[was] no evidence that more capital was put into the business 
after that $20,000.00.”  The court also found it was 
foreseeable that Main Realty might be liable for claims by 
customers, Main Realty failed to make any provisions for 
assets to cover foreseeable liabilities, and Main Realty was 
insolvent at the time of the Axtmanns’ judgment and for 
years because it was unable to pay its normal debts and 
relied upon Chillemi’s personal credit to operate.  The court 
said although Main Realty “provided a necessary service to 
Chillemi, Natwick and the other agents by providing the 
tools they needed to sell real estate and close on real estate 
transactions, most notably the brokerage services and the use 
of a trust account,” Main Realty was merely a “pass 
 
321.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 843–44 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 566 (N. D. 
1985)). 
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through” corporation. 
[T]he minutes of Main Realty’s annual meetings 
establish that Main Realty was not itself making a profit and 
had some outstanding credit card debt.  The minutes also 
reflect that Chillemi and Natwick used their commissions to 
pay Main Realty’s credit card debt.  Although Main Realty 
may have operated as a viable entity for several years, there 
was evidence it struggled to satisfy corporate debts, which 
must be considered with the evidence about its level of 
capitalization and the use of the corporation as a “pass 
through” business for its agents. 
The Axtmanns’ underlying judgment against Main 
Realty was based, in part, on a jury finding that Main Realty 
was guilty of fraud.  Our analysis in this case is informed by 
that underlying judgment.  In tort cases, a lack of 
capitalization is particularly significant and involves an 
added policy consideration of whether individuals may 
transfer a risk of loss to the public in the name of a 
corporation that is marginally financed.  As we [have] 
recognized, the essence of the requirement for fairness is that 
an individual cannot hide from the normal consequences of 
corporate entrepreneuring by doing so through a corporate 
shell.322 
The references to Main Realty being a “pass-through” corporation or 
business are apparently references to the fact that Main Realty had elected 
to be taxed as an S corporation.323 
In approving piercing the veil of Main Realty, Inc., the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in Axtmann stated that “the ordinary tort case forces the 
debtor-creditor relationship upon the creditor by the occurrence of an 
unexpected tort”324 and “it was foreseeable that Main Realty might be liable 
for claims by customers.”325  Note the similarity of the logic used by the 
court in Axtmann to that employed by the Colorado Court of Appeals in 
Martin v. Freeman, where the court stated that “[a]ny party engaged in 
litigation is exposed to potential liability.”326  As the dissent in Axtmann 
stated, the better view is that inadequate capitalization should be 
determined when an entity is formed and the majority’s view of the law 
“would hold shareholders of any failing corporation liable for the 
 
322.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 846–47. 
323.  Id. at 852.  
324.  Id. at 843 (emphasis added). 
325.  Id. at 845 (emphasis added). 
326.  Martin v. Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182, 1186 (Colo. App. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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company’s debts.”327  Also see Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Company,328 
where the court stated that “a corporation is inadequately capitalized when 
its assets are insufficient to cover its potential liabilities, which are 
reasonably foreseeable from the nature of the corporation’s business.”329 
For a contrasting and arguably more appropriate from a policy 
standpoint result, see Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Company, Inc.330  In that 
case, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the appeals 
court and trial court piercing the veil of the corporation to hold its 
shareholder personally liable for damages to the plaintiffs’ home when the 
corporation attempted to jack and level the home.  Despite some evidence 
of lack of formalities and improper payments, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
focused on the many formalities maintained by the corporation over a more 
than twenty-year period of business operations.  Although not discussed by 
the court, there was no indication that any of the factors that the trial court 
and appeals court thought supported piercing the veil of the corporation had 
any connection, causal or otherwise, to the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.  
In addition, the trial court found that there was no personal negligence on 
the part of the shareholder of the corporation in connection with the work 
on the plaintiffs’ home. 
Also see Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, 
N.V.331  Oriental involved a $34,000,000 transaction between a Belgian oil 
trading corporation (“Rosseel”) and Oriental U.K. Ltd., a United kingdom 
corporation established and held by Abdul Hamed Bokhari, who also 
owned Oriental S.A., a Saudi Arabian corporation.332  Rosseel sought to 
hold Bokhari personally liable for Oriental U.K’s breach of contract.  
Rosseel argued that Bokhari should be liable because Oriental U.K. was 
extremely undercapitalized and had represented that Bokhari and Oriental 
S.A. would stand behind Oriental U.K.’s contractual obligations.  The 
court, although acknowledging that undercapitalization was an element to 
be considered, stated that “undercapitalization alone is not a sufficient 
ground for disregarding the corporate form” and “the mere fact that an 
entity may or may not have the capital to respond to a potential large award 
against it does not justify piercing the corporate veil.”333  However, the 
court went on to say that undercapitalization is “particularly important 
 
327.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 852. 
328.  Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 707 P.2d 1250 (Or. App. 1985). 
329.  Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). 
330.  Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1169 (La. 1991). 
331.  Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
332.  Id. at 1009. 
333.  Id. at 1020; see also Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 126 (stating that “just as in Mobridge, 
the undercapitalization in Oriental constituted the subject of the misrepresentation to creditors”). 
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where, as here, there has been a misrepresentation as to the assets of the 
company.”334  The court held Bokhari personally liable, finding that he had 
used his entities to commit fraud.335 
 
H.  ENTITY FORMED/USED FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE 
 
Anderson, LLC v. Stewart336 held the owners of an LLC personally 
liable for the debts of Check Mart of Hot Springs, LLC (“Check Mart”).  
Check Mark operated a payday loan business, and Check Mark and its 
owners failed to comply with state statutes on check cashers by failing to 
properly maintain business records.337  The owners could not explain 
whether Check Mark had an accountant or anyone keeping its books, and 
the entire amount of the loss reflected on Check Mart’s profit and loss 
statement for the period from January through November 2001 was 
reported by one of the owners on his 2001 personal federal income tax 
return.338  Moreover, one of the members withdrew the LLC’s letters of 
credit and cancelled its bond339 (actions that the plaintiff contended to 
ensure that the LLC would not be able to satisfy any judgment), and the 
owners operated the same business under another name after the LLC 
closed. 
In Kalashian v. Krebs,340 Mona G. Krebs and Ronald C. Krebs owned 
a computer sales company, Mark Data Products, Inc., doing business as 
Connecting Point Computer Centers (“Mark Data”).  The Krebs agreed to 
sell all of their Mark Data stock to Connecting Point Computers, LLC (the 
“LLC”).  Michael N. Kalashian and Vita Kalashian were the sole members 
of the LLC.341  The agreement for the sale of the Mark Data stock provided 
that the Krebs would retain ownership of an account of Mark Data 
containing over $1,000,000.342  The purchase price for the sale of the Mark 
Data stock was $700,000.  $140,000 was paid to the Krebs at closing, and 
 
334.  Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co., Ltd., 702 F. Supp. at 1020. 
335.  Id. at 1023. 
336.  Anderson, LLC v. Stewart, 234 S.W.3d 295, 301 (Ark. 2006). 
337.  Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-112(a) requires check cashers to “keep and use in its business any 
books, accounts, and records that the State Board of Collection Agencies may require to carry into 
effect the provisions of this chapter and the administrative regulations issued hereunder”; § 23-52-
112(b) requires check cashers to “preserve all relevant records for a period of at least two (2) years after 
making the last entry on any transaction.” 
338.  Anderson, LLC, 234 S.W.3d at 301. 
339.  Id. at 296.  If Check Mart continued to operate its business after its letters of credit and bond 
were cancelled, it would be in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 23-52-107(1). 
340.  Kalashian v. Krebs, No. G03297, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10789 at *3 (Cal. App. 
Nov. 29, 2004). 
341.  Id. at *4. 
342.  Id. 
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the LLC executed a promissory note for the $560,000 balance.343  The 
promissory note was secured by a pledge agreement reciting that the 
Kalashians were the pledgors, but only Michael Kalashian executed the 
pledge agreement, and he did so in his individual capacity.344 
A few months after the sale of the First Data stock, Kalashian and the 
LLC sued the Krebs, asserting breach of contract, fraud, and other causes 
of action in connection with the Mark Data sale.  The Krebs filed a cross-
complaint alleging breach of contract and other causes of action and 
asserted that the Kalashians had raided the Mark Data account that the 
Krebs were to retain.345 
The Court approved the jury’s findings, which included the following: 
 
(1) the Krebses did not breach any contract with Kalashian 
and the LLC; (2) the Krebses did not commit fraud and made 
no negligent misrepresentations in connection with the stock 
purchase; (3) the LLC breached the terms of its promissory 
note, and the resulting damages were $ 549,814.68 plus 8 
percent interest; (4) the LLC breached the Sales Agreement 
with the Krebses, and the resulting damages were $ 
1,575,000 plus interest; (5) the Kalashians and the LLC had 
and received money from the Krebses that ought to be 
repaid, and interfered with the Krebses’ superior right of 
ownership of the funds; (6) the Kalashians and the LLC did 
not commit fraud in inducing the Krebses to leave their 
funds in a Wells Fargo bank account; (7) the Kalashians and 
the LLC did not fraudulently conceal or suppress a material 
fact; and (8) the total amount of all damages the Krebses 
suffered on account of the breach of contract, money had and 
received, conversion, fraud, and concealment or suppression 
by the Kalashians and the LLC was $ 2,124,815 plus interest 
as described above, and attorney fees.346 
 
The court characterized the Kalashians’ actions with respect to the Mark 
Data account as “theft.”347 
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to hold the LLC 
member personally liable as the alter ego of the LLC based on 
 
343.  Kalashian, LEXIS 10789 at *4. 
344.  Id.  The court noted that this was “interesting, as it would appear that it was the LLC that 
had purchased the stock.”  Id. at *39. 
345.  Id. 
346.  Id. at *7–*8. 
347.  Id. at *23. 
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undercapitalization of the LLC, use of the LLC’s account to pay personal 
expenses, payment of the LLC’s debts with personal funds, failure to 
observe LLC formalities (by failing to keep financial statements, signing 
documents on behalf of the LLC before it came into existence,348 and 
personally exercising lease agreements for the LLC subsidiary’s space), 
and the member’s use of his position with the LLC to accomplish the 
wrongful purpose of seizing an account that belonged to the plaintiffs.349 
In Devan Lowe, Inc. v. Stephens,350 a commission based salesman for 
an auto dealership formed an LLC and requested that the dealership begin 
paying commissions to the LLC.  The testimony in the case did not show 
any reason for forming the LLC other than to attempt to avoid a 
garnishment action filed against the dealership with respect to the 
salesman’s commissions. 
In Stone v. Frederick Hobby Associates II,351 the plaintiffs sued 
Frederick L. Hobby, III, Sally M. Leindecker, Frederick Hobby Associates, 
LLC (“Hobby 1”), and Frederick Hobby Associates II, LLC (“Hobby II”).  
The plaintiffs purchased a home from Hobby II for $3,300,000.  Hobby II 
failed to complete items on a punch list it had agreed to and the residence 
had a variety of substantial defects in design, materials, and workmanship.  
Hobby II also failed to fix any of these defects.  The court noted the 
requirements of the instrumentality rule and the identity rule, stating the 
second requirement of the instrumentality rule as being that the domination 
requirement of the first prong of the instrumentality test “must have been 
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation 
of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in 
contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights.”352  The court then stated that it 
found the following: 
 
Frederick L. Hobby, III is one of two members of Hobby 
II and Sally M. Leiendecker is the other.  Each member has a 
fifty percent ownership interest in Hobby II, as well as full 
authority to manage and control the company’s business.  
Hobby II’s office is located in Frederick L. Hobby, III’s 
private home, owned by him in his individual capacity, and 
Hobby II pays no rent and has no lease with him.  
Furthermore, Hobby II currently has no assets and it never 
 
348.  Kalashian, LEXIS 10789 at *30.  See also infra notes 633-39 and accompanying text. 
349.  Id. at *23. 
350.  Devan Lowe, Inc. v. Stephens, 842 So.2d 703, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). 
351.  Stone v. Frederick Hobby Associates II, No. CV000181620S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1853 at *1, (Conn. Super. July 10, 2001). 
352.  Id. at *29–*30. 
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had any assets other than the premises now owned by the 
plaintiffs.  Attorney Gold, the attorney who formed Hobby II 
as a limited liability company, created Hobby II to enable the 
development of the subject premises and to shield and 
protect Frederick L. Hobby, III and Sally M. Leiendecker, 
the principals of Hobby II, from personal liability.  
Moreover, during a meeting between the parties in May of 
2000, Attorney Gold, while acting on behalf of Hobby II, 
told the plaintiffs to “go ahead and sue us [Hobby II].  There 
is no money in [Hobby II]. Why do you think we set it up as 
an LLC in the first place?”  This last statement evidences an 
intent on the part of the individual defendants, Frederick L. 
Hobby III and Sally M. Leiendecker, to use the limited 
liability company as a shield in order to avoid responsibility 
for contractual obligations owed to the plaintiffs.353 
 
Bainbridge criticizes the opinion and result in Stone.354  Bainbridge 
expressly criticizes the court’s emphasis on the statements by Attorney 
Gold: “But so what?  . . . [S]etting up a limited liability entity to shield 
oneself from personal liability is not a fraud or wrong.”355  True enough,356 
but what is wrong is when the owners of an entity misrepresent their 
involvement in the entity and its affairs.357 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Veterans Service Club v. 
Sweeny,358 disregarded the existence of a nonprofit corporation ostensibly 
organized to extend charitable help to ex-service men and to promote 
certain civic causes but that in operation promoted gambling.  The court 
stated: “The facts developed . . . justified the finding by the Chancellor that 
the incorporation was but a cloak or mask devised by the incorporators to 
cover their illegal acts of gambling and to shield them from the 
consequences of those acts.”359 
In re Turner (Kendall v. Turner)360 involved a debtor who with his 
wife, after attending an asset protection seminar, engaged in a series of 
transactions involving the transfer of their home.  The transactions included 
transferring the home to a Bahamian trust, execution of a transmutation 
agreement purporting to change the character of the home to the wife’s 
 
353.  Stone, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1853 at *33. 
354.  Bainbridge LLCs, supra note 16, at 89. 
355.  Id.  
356.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
357.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 131. 
358.  Veterans Service Club v. Sweeny, 252 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1952). 
359.  Id. at 27. 
360.  In re Turner, 335 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005). 
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separate property, creation of a Nevada LLC and a Nevada corporation, 
transfer of the home to the Nevada LLC, encumbrance of the home in favor 
of the Nevada corporation, and transfer of the home to the wife.  The court 
devoted most of its opinion to discussing why the transfer of the home was 
a fraudulent transfer but also held that the Nevada LLC and Nevada 
corporation were alter egos of the debtor.  In connection with its alter ego 
holding, the court stated: 
 
“Asset protection” is not illegal and is honored by the law if 
done for a legitimate purpose.  For example, an individual 
may do business through a corporation or limited liability 
company and will not be held personally liable for the debts 
of the entity.  The assets of the corporation or limited 
liability company will not be considered the assets of the 
individual interest holder.  However, an entity or series of 
entities may not be created with no business purpose and 
personal assets transferred to them with no relationship to 
any business purpose, simply as a means of shielding them 
from creditors.  Under such circumstances, the law views the 
entity as the alter ego of the individual debtor and will 
disregard it to prevent injustice.361 
 
In FILO America v. Olhoss Trading Company, LLC,362 based on legal 
commentary and cases from other states, the court concluded that the veil 
of an Alabama LLC could be pierced under Alabama law.  Although the 
court stated that while some corporate veil-piercing factors might not apply 
in the same way to LLCs, “a fraudulent purpose in the conception or 
operation of an LLC should certainly be a valid reason for ‘piercing’ the 
LLC’s ‘veil’ and ‘[h]ere, FILO America has stated a claim adequate to 
pierce Olhoss’s LLC ‘veil’ by alleging that Fowler and Spann had a 
fraudulent purpose in the conception of their business.”363  Unfortunately, 
the court did not provide any details of what went into the plaintiff’s claim. 
Allison v. Danilovic364 affirmed the trial court’s decision holding an 
individual who was the CEO, director, and 662/3 owner of a Delaware 
LLC personally liable for plaintiff’s unpaid wages whether Delaware or 
California law applied.  The court cited as factors supporting piercing the 
LLC’s view as the individual’s never having held board meetings, never 
 
361.  In re Turner, 335 B.R. at 147 (emphasis added). 
362.  FILO Am. v. Olhoss Trading Co., LLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2004). 
363.  Id. at 1270. 
364.  Allison v. Danilovic, No. B163363, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 10988, at *1–*12 (Cal. App. 2d. 
Dec. 7, 2004). 
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having executed a company agreement, never issued stock(!), had the 
authority to make business decisions for the LLC, and made the decision 
not to pay the plaintiff her wages when the LLC had $500,000 in its bank 
account but used the funds to pay investors instead.  The court did not 
discuss what weight it gave to the factors it listed, and, except for using the 
LLC’s funds to pay investors instead of the plaintiff, none of the factors 
appear to be ones that would have damaged the plaintiff.  The court also 
did not discuss what considerations were used by the individual to pay the 
LLC’s funds to investors.  It would seem, however, that a valid wage 
claim365 would be an expense of the LLC that should have been taken into 
account in determining whether to make a payment to investors and how 
large the payment to investors should be. 
Somerville S Trust v. USV Partners, LLC366 involved a member’s 
demand for information from a Delaware LLC.  The court’s examination of 
this issue led the court to observe that: 
 
Somerville next claims that Earls mismanaged USV by 
not observing legal formalities while operating the business.  
In effect, Somerville argues, Earls used USV as his alter ego. 
The defendants make no effort to rebut that claim, and I find 
independently that Somerville’s evidence supporting that 
claim is credible, Earls testified that USV had no officers, 
directors, or employees, that USV had no office, and that 
USV’s address was Earls’s home address.  Moreover, USV’s 
documents were kept at USXX’s office, at Earls’s personal 
accountant’s office, and at his home. 
In a previous arbitration proceeding brought against 
Earls for his management of an unrelated single-purpose 
entity, the arbitrators found that there, as here, Earls was the 
“sole shareholder, director, officer, and decision-maker of 
the PC, which has no office or employees.  Either Earls or 
his accountant maintains PC’s books and records and its 
mailing address is that of Earls’s office or residence.  In that 
case, the arbitration panel also found (as Somerville claims 
here) that Earls had improperly used the entity’s assets to 
secure debts, which the panel characterized as a “pervasive 
disregard of corporate formalities, all of which is probative 
in supporting the conclusion that the LLC, PC, and the Trust 
 
365.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 121–133 (discussing the argument that protected the 
purpose of a regulatory scheme is one of the three true justifications for veil-piercing). 
366.  Somerville S Trust v. USV Partners, LLC, No. Civ. A. 19444-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
103, at *1–*34 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2002). 
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were in fact merely alter egos of Earls.” 
In summary, the preponderance of the evidence supports 
Somerville’s stated purpose of investigating possible 
mismanagement.367 
 
In United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers 
of America Local 157 v. OEM/Erie Westland, LLC,368 the court applied an 
alter ego analysis in denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on the issue whether a twenty-four-percent member of an LLC was liable 
as a single-employer with the LLC under the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act (the “WARN Act”).  Factors that the court 
found important in its WARN Act analysis included that the twenty-four-
percent member controlled whether the employing LLC dissolved because 
the LLC’s operating agreement provided that the LLC would be dissolved 
by member vote only if the vote were unanimous.369  Another factor the 
court found significant in the WARN Act context was the twenty-four-
percent member’s refusal to make additional capital contributions to the 
LLC.370 
The cases discussed above are similar in their rationale to the cases 
Macy and Mitts discuss to support their argument that one of the 
appropriate reasons to pierce the veil is to achieve the purpose of a 
regulatory or statutory scheme.371 
 
I.  FAILURE TO FOLLOW FORMALITIES 
 
Note that limited liability company statutes often provide that the 
failure to follow formalities is not a factor that by itself justifies piecing the 
veil of a limited liability company.  Section 304(b) of the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”)372 states: “The failure of a 
limited liability company to observe any particular formalities relating to 
the exercise of its powers or management of its activities is not a ground 
for imposing liability on the members or managers for the debts, 
 
367.  Somerville S Trust, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103 at *23. 
368.  United Auto., Aero. & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 157 v. OEM/Erie Westland, 
LLC, 203 F. Supp. 2d 825, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
369.  Id. at 833. 
370.  Id. at 834. The court found the member’s refusal to make additional capital contributions 
relevant to whether the member had played a role in the LLC’s decision to close its manufacturing 
plant.  Id. at 830. 
371.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 115–123 (discussing cases arising under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act). 
372.  REV. UNIF. LLC ACT § 304(b) (2011). 
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obligations, or other liabilities of the company.”373 
2 Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies §12.3 
concludes that veil piercing for inadequate capitalization should be less 
likely for LLCs than corporations, in part because of the anticipated 
informalities.  1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 41.35 
(also cited by the Court of Appeals) suggests that a sole shareholder should 
not be suspect “merely because he or she conducts business in an informal 
manner.” 
Macey and Mitts374 liken piercing the veil because of failure “to 
observe corporate formalities such as holding directors’ meetings or 
keeping minutes” to “imposing liability on a person because he did not 
wear a tie or keep a napkin in her lap while eating.”375  Note, however, that 
a total, or almost total,376 disregard of formalities may support a finding of 
lack of separateness, particularly in the case of a single-member LLC.377 
Texas appears to have gone further than any other state in statutorily 
protecting shareholders of corporations and members of LLC against veil-
piercing/alter ego claims, particularly with respect to failure to follow 
formalities.  Texas Business Organizations Code § 21.223 provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
 
Sec. 21.223. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR 
OBLIGATIONS.  (a)  A holder of shares, an owner of any 
beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose 
subscription has been accepted, or any affiliate of such a 
 
373.  California, which has adopted RULLCA, revised this provision to read as follows: 
“A member of a limited liability company shall be subject to liability under the common law 
governing alter ego liability, and shall also be personally liable under a judgment of a court for any 
debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company, whether that liability arises in contract, 
tort, or otherwise, under the same or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a shareholder of a 
corporation may be personally liable for any debt, obligation, or liability or the corporation; except that 
the failure to hold meetings of members or managers or the failure to observe formalities pertaining to 
the calling or conduct or meetings shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that a member or 
the members have alter ego or personal liability for any debt, obligation, or liability of the limited 
liability company where the articles of organization or operating agreement do not expressly require the 
holding of meetings of members or managers.”  CAL. CORP. CODE, tit. 2.6, § 17703.04(a) (2014). 
374.  See generally Macey & Mitts, supra note 11. 
375.  Id. at 109.  This author has known, and is sure that Macey and Mitts have known, people 
who would try to impose some sort of social liability for the faux paus that they mention. 
376.  A validly formed LLC will always at the least have a formation document on file with the 
appropriate filing office.  If a person acts on behalf of an LLC that has not been validly formed, that 
person will be subject to liability for acting as the agent of a nonexistent principal.  See infra notes 633-
39 and accompanying text. 
377.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 109 (“[W]here the failure to keep records is so profound 
that one cannot utilize such records to determine which assets legitimately belong to the corporation and 
which legitimately belong to its shareholders, then piercing is appropriate to prevent the unfair and 
strategic abuse of creditors by unilaterally categorizing assets as belonging to the shareholder (and thus 
unavailable to creditors) when there is no legitimate basis for doing so.”). 
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holder, owner, or subscriber or of the corporation, may not 
be held liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect 
to: 
(1) . . .; 
(2) any contractual obligation of the corporation or any 
matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis 
that the holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or 
was the alter ego of the corporation or on the basis of actual 
or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other 
similar theory; or 
(3) any obligation of the corporation on the basis of the 
failure of the corporation to observe any corporate formality, 
including the failure to: 
(A) comply with this code or the certificate of formation or 
bylaws of the corporation; or 
(B) observe any requirement prescribed by this code or the 
certificate of formation or bylaws of the corporation for acts 
to be taken by the corporation or its directors or 
shareholders. 
(b) Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of 
a holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate if the 
obligee demonstrates that the holder, beneficial owner, 
subscriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for 
the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud 
on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the 
holder, beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate.378 
 
TBOC § 21.223 clearly distinguishes “any contractual obligation”379 
and “any obligation.”380  It would appear difficult to craft a clearer statutory 
statement that “the failure of the corporation to observe any corporate 
formality” shall not be the basis of imposing liability on a shareholder for 
obligations of the corporation.381  As Macey and Mitts assert, and as cases 
 
378.  TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223 (2015) (emphasis added).   Section 21.223 is made 
applicable to members of LLCs by section 101.002 of the Texas Business Organizations Code. 
379. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)(2). 
380.  Id. at § 21.223(a)(3).  Further, the exception to the protection from liability in subsection 
21.223(b) applies to subsection 21.223(a)(2). 
381.  Arguably, however, the provisions of, for example, RULLCA and the California Corporate 
Code lead to the same substantive result as section 21.223.  See REV. UNIF. LLC ACT § 304(b) (2011); 
CAL. CORP. CODE, tit. 2.6, § 17703.04(a) (2014).   Perhaps the Texas Business Organizations Code 
section 21.223(a) provision appears stronger because it states that a shareholder “may not be held 
liable” for any failure to observe formalities rather than stating that failure to observe formalities “is not 
a ground for” imposing liability or “shall not be considered a factor tending to establish” that a member 
has alter ego liability. 
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such as Polaris Industrial Corporation v. Kaplan382 illustrate, failure to 
observe formalities rarely seems to cause any harm.  As this Article 
discusses earlier,383 one commentator has asserted the following with 
respect to SSP Partners v. Gladstone Investments (USA) Corporation:384 
 
SSP rejects the business enterprise liability theory, and 
adopts the approach taken by the Legislature in TBCA 
article 2.21 as the embodiment of public policy in Texas.  
Additionally, because it was a pure products liability case, 
SSP should be interpreted as applying the public policy of 
TBCA article 2.21 to all tort cases, not just those arising out 
of contracts.  SSP is now the definitive statement of the 
Texas law of veil piercing for all cases, whether arising out 
of contracts, torts or otherwise.385 
 
The problem with the assertion that “SSP is now the definitive 
statement of the Texas law of veil piercing for all cases” is that SSP is not a 
veil-piercing case.  The issues in SSP as framed by the court were: 
 
In Texas, the seller of a defective product is subject to 
strict liability for damages the product causes even though 
the defect was not his fault, but he is generally entitled to 
indemnity from the manufacturer by statute and by common 
law.  Is he entitled to indemnity from an upstream supplier 
other than the manufacturer?  Not, we hold, by statute, and 
not under the common law without showing that the 
upstream supplier was at fault.  We also hold that 
corporations cannot be held liable for each other’s 
obligations merely because they are part of a single business 
enterprise.386 
 
The issues as framed by the court do not mention veil-piercing or alter 
ego.  Indeed, the court in SSP noted that plaintiff did not “contend that 
liability should be imposed on Gladstone USA by disregarding its structure 
as a separate corporation-that is, by piercing the corporate veil or holding it 
 
382.  Polaris Indus. Corp. v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884, 887 (Nev. 1987); see also discussion in supra 
notes 257-63 and infra notes 542-46. 
383.  See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text. 
384.  SSP Partners v. Gladstone Inv. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008). 
385.  EGAN, supra note 118, 81–82 and accompanying text. 
386.  SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 446–47. 
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to be the alter ego of Gladstone Hong Kong.”387  As no alter-ego/veil 
piercing claim was before the court for decision, the statements in SSP 
about when alter-ego/veil piercing liability may be imposed are dicta.  
Whether the rule of TBOC § 21.223(2) as made applicable to LLCs by 
TBOC § 101.002 that shareholders and members will not be liable for any 
contractual obligation of the entity unless the shareholder or member 
“caused the corporation [or LLC] to be used for the purpose of perpetrating 
and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct 
personal benefit of the” shareholder or member will be applied in tort cases 
remains for further development.  There is nothing in SSP to suggest that it 
intended to limit Lucas v. Texas Industries, Inc.,388 or its statements that the 
proof required to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden differs in a tort case from a 
contracts case.  In Lucas, the court observed that in a tort case “it is not 
necessary to find an intent to defraud. Generally, in a tort case, the financial 
strength or weakness of the corporate tortfeasor is an important 
consideration.”389  The Texas legislature appears to have recognized this 
distinction by making TBOC § 21.223(a)(2) applicable by its terms only to 
“any contractual obligation.”  It is appropriate that TBOC § 21.223(a)(3) 
provides that failure to observe formalities is not a ground for imposing 
liability on a shareholder for “any obligation.”  Just as the failure to 
observe formalities seldom if ever bears a causal relation to the harm 
suffered by a contract creditor, it is difficult to envision how failure to 
follow formalities would contribute to the harm suffered by a tort creditor 
from difficulty in collecting a judgment.  As the court in Lucas noted, in a 
tort case an important consideration is the financial strength or weakness of 
the corporate tortfesor.390  Public policy suggests that the rule of TBOC § 
21.223(a)(2) should not be applied in tort cases.  Where an entity has 
committed a tort, it should be irrelevant whether the facts show that the 
owner has caused the entity “to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and 
did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct 
personal benefit of the” owner.  Rather, when an entity tortfeasor lacks 
adequate resources to respond in damages, the issue then should be whether 
the entity had adequate capitalization (including insurance) for the 
liabilities reasonably foreseeable in its business391 or whether it is 
 
387.  SSP Partners, 275 S.W.3d at 451. 
388.  Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984); see supra notes 113-20 and 
accompanying text. 
389.  Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at 375 (noting the policy that “an inadequately capitalized corporation in 
a risky business in effect transfers the risk of loss to innocent members of the general public” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
390.  Id. 
391.  See generally Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Company, 707 P.2d 1250 (Or. App. 1985). 
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appropriate to impose liability in all events, as Martin v. Freeman392 and 
Axtmann v. Chillemi393 would appear to stand for. 
In Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC,394 after a general partnership 
refused to post the profile of a gay couple on the partnership’s website 
facilitating adoption, the couple sued the partnership, its two individual 
partners, two Arizona LLCs subsequently formed by the individuals, and 
two corporations formed by the individuals to serve as members of the 
LLC.  The court denied the plaintiffs’ alter ego claims, characterizing the 
evidence of the individuals’ occasional disregard of corporate formalities 
and distinctions as “not particularly compelling.”  The court stated that the 
interests of management and ownership generally collide in a closely held 
corporation and that lack of formality is not unusual in a closely held 
corporation.395  The court stated that it was more important that the 
plaintiffs had failed to present any evidence of bad faith or that the LLCs 
were created to avoid the operation of a statute. 
In Peinado v. Barnett,396 the court affirmed the conclusion of an 
administrative law judge that the alter-ego doctrine applied to a single 
member LLC that acted as a contractor without the required license.  When 
formed under California law, the LLC was required to have at least two 
members but had only one — the court stated that the LLC accordingly was 
not legally constituted when formed.  In addition, the court characterized 
the LLC’s failure to file the required statement of information with the 
Secretary of State as a disregard of legal formalities and a failure to 
maintain adequate records. 
With Peinado, one should also consider Minton v. Cavaney.397 Minton 
v. Caveney is a case where the court’s stated ground for its holding was the 
undercapitalization of the defendant corporation.  Macey and Mitts, 
however, argue that “a much more compelling basis”398 for disregarding the 
corporate form in this case was the corporation’s having only one director 
rather than the statutorily mandated minimum of three.399 
In Regency Centers, L.P. v. Civic Partners Vista Village I, LLC,400 the 
court affirmed the trial court’s holding that the sole member of an LLC was 
liable for the LLC’s obligations as the LLC’s alter ego.  The court pointed 
 
392.  Martin v. Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182 (Colo. App. 2012). 
393.  Axtmann, 746 N.W.2d at 838. 
394.  Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
395.  See supra note 42 for a discussion of why this kind of reference to a “corporation” in a case 
involving LLCs is troubling. 
396.  Peinado v. Barnett, No. A093923, 2001 WL 1380441 (Cal. App. Nov. 6, 2001). 
397.  Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961). 
398.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 43. 
399.  Id.  See discussion supra notes 287 to 291 and accompanying text. 
400.  Regency Centers, L.P. v. Civic Partners Vista Village I, LLC, No. G038095, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 4760, 2008 WL 2358860. (Cal. App. June 11, 2008). 
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to the trail court’s findings that the LLC had no capitalization, that funds 
between it and a corporation owned by the member were used 
interchangeably, that the entities were controlled by the member without 
formalities, that the LLC had no employees, no books, and no positive 
income, that the LLC’s money was dissipated after it was reimbursed for 
costs and development fees, that the LLC was used for the convenience of 
its member, and that it would be inequitable to allow the LLC to shield the 
member from liability. 
The court in Cement-Lock v. Gas Technology Institute401 stated that 
failure to observe formalities might not be as significant in the LLC context 
as in the corporate context,402 but concluded that there was sufficient other 
veil-piercing evidence for plaintiffs’ claim to survive summary judgment 
based on allegations that LLC was intended to and did serve a fraudulent 
purpose.403 
 
IV.  TAX STATUS AS A FACTOR IN VEIL-PIERCING 
 
GreenHunter404 is one of a few cases in which the court discussed the 
tax status of the single member LLC as part of its veil-piercing analysis.  
The court in GreenHunter noted that “The LLC’s tax returns were 
consolidated with the tax returns of Appellant.”405  The court further stated: 
 
Appellant claimed a deduction in the amount of $884,092.00 
attributable to the Platte County wind energy project and a 
loss on its corporate tax return in the amount of $61,047.00 
attributable to the same project on its 2009 tax return.  
Appellant manipulated the assets and liabilities in a manner 
such that Appellant improperly reaped all of the rewards and 
benefits of the LLC’s activities, while simultaneously 
saddling the LLC with all of its losses and liabilities, 
including the unpaid bills for services rendered by Western.  
Appellant has enjoyed significant tax breaks attributable to 
the LLC’s losses, without bearing any responsibility for the 
LLC’s debt and obligations that contributed to such losses.  
Such a disparity in the risks and rewards resulting from this 
 
401.  Cement-Lock v. Gas Tech. Inst., 523 F. Supp.2d 827 (N. D. Ill. 2007). 
402.  Id. at 846. 
403.  Id. 
404.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 454; see also supra notes 247-55 and accompanying 
text. 
405.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 467. 
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manipulation would lead to injustice.406 
 
The GreenHunter court attempted to moderate its remarks by stating: 
 
Appellant properly points out that as a single-member 
limited liability company, the LLC can properly be taxed as 
a disregarded entity.  Federal tax law allows the LLC’s 
losses to be attributed to Appellant and a consolidated tax 
return filed.  As one commentator explains: With the advent 
of check-the-box, the tax treatment of single-member LLCs 
injects a new concept of “disregarded entity.”  A trend, 
however, is not to treat the LLC as disregarded for all 
purposes.407  A single-member LLC is a “disregarded entity.” 
The term “disregarded entity” is defined by IRC § 7701 and 
the regulations thereunder as any single-member entity that 
is not a corporation.  The owner of a single-member entity 
can be a natural person or any other entity including a 
corporation.  Natural persons who own single-member LLCs 
[disregarded entities] do not file any federal income tax 
forms for the entity.  The disregarded entity owner reports 
the profits and losses of the company on the individual’s 
personal Schedule C on the 1040 form.  Single-member 
LLCs whose owners are corporations are treated as divisions 
of the corporate owner and the profits and losses are 
reflected on the corporate owner’s returns . . . . 
For that reason, while consideration of Appellant’s 
consolidated tax return and the losses of the LLC reported 
therein may have been relevant to the district court’s 
piercing analysis, the amount of weight given to this 
evidence must be balanced by the fact that this practice is 
permitted under our nation’s tax laws.  Stated differently, 
courts should not create a scenario in which a single- 
member limited liability company would be confronted with 
a catch 22: either follow federal tax law and risk losing 
limited liability, or forego advantages available under federal 
tax law to assure limited liability.  The district court’s ruling 
 
406.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 467. 
407.  Id. at 468.  It is unclear what the court meant by this statement.  The disregard of single-
member LLCs has always only been for tax purposes.  Single-member LLCs have always been state 
law entities to the same extent as single-shareholder corporations.  Single-member LLCs are now 
regarded for self-employment tax purposes and certain excise tax purposes.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-
2(c)(2)(iv) (1996) (employment taxes) & 303.7701-2(c)(2)(v) (1996) (certain excise taxes). 
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does not create that dilemma.  Instead, it considered 
Appellant’s tax filings as only one of many relevant pieces 
of evidence demonstrating that Appellant directed benefits 
from the LLC to itself, while at the same time it concentrated 
wind farm project debts it decided would not to be paid in 
the LLC.  The district court did not err in doing so.408 
 
Another such case is White Family Harmony Investment, Ltd. v. 
Transwestern West Valley, LLC,409 where one of the factors cited by the 
court in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its alter 
ego claim against Business Properties LLC (“Business Properties”) was 
that Business Properties had for all years filed “a single tax return for 
itself” and its two wholly owned LLC subsidiaries and that one of the 
subsidiaries, Transwestern West Valley LLC did not have its own tax 
identification number.410  “Accordingly, any bank accounts that were 
opened and all 1099-MISCs that were provided by Transwestern Valley 
 
408.  GreenHunter Energy, Inc., 337 P.3d at 468. Wyoming recently amended its LLC statute to 
impose new requirements that must be met before the veil of a Wyoming limited liability company may 
be pierced. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-304(2016) now provides in new subsections (c) and (d); 
(c) for purposes of imposing liability on any member or manager of a limited liability company for the 
debts, obligations or other liabilities of the company, a court shall consider only the following factors 
no one (1) of which, except fraud, is sufficient to impose liability: 
(i) Fraud; 
(ii) Inadequate capitalization; 
(iii) Failure to observe company formalities as required by law; and 
(iv) Intermingling of assets, business operations and finances of the company and the 
members to such an extent that there is no distinction between them. 
(d) In any analysis conducted under subsection (c) of this section, a court shall not consider factors 
intrinsic to the character and operation of a limited liability company, whether a single or multiple 
member limited liability company. Factors intrinsic to the character and operation of a limited liability 
company include but are not limited to: 
(i) The ability to elect treatment as a disregarded or pass-through entity for tax purposes; 
(ii) Flexible operation or organization including the failure to observe any particular 
formality relating to the exercise of the company’s powers or management of its activities; 
(iii) The exercise of ownership, influence and governance by a member or manager; 
(iv) The protection of members’ and managers’ personal assets from the obligations and acts 
of the limited liability company. 
The 2016 amendment also deleted § 17-209-304(b), which had provided that neither a failure to observe 
formalities as to the operation and management of a limited liability company nor an election to be 
treated as a disregarded entity for federal income taxes was sufficient to justify setting aside limited 
liability. 
The legislative fact sheet accompanying the amendment indicates that the changes were in 
response to GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc., 337 P.3d 454 (Wyo. 
2014). Although the court in GreenHunter did make some unfortunate references to the tax status and 
attributes of the single-member LLC at issue in that case, the court appeared to place much more weight 
on the sole member’s total control of the LLC’s finances, including deciding to contribute funds to pay 
some of the LLC’s debts and not others. See supra, notes 247-55 and accompanying text. 
409.  White Family Harmony Inv., Ltd. v. Transwestern W. Valley, LLC, No. 2:05CVDAK, 2007 
WL 2821798 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 2007). 
410.  Id. at *26. 
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used Business Properties’ tax identification number.”411  In Connecticut 
Light and Power Company v. Westview Carlton Group, LLC,412 the court 
affirmed the trial court’s determination that the LLC’s veil should be 
pierced to hold the single member personally liable for the LLC’s unpaid 
electric bills.  The LLC had no registered agent, filed no annual reports 
with the Secretary of State, failed to maintain any business records for its 
property, failed to file any tax returns for the years involved,413 and was 
undercapitalized.  Finally, when the LLC sold its property, the member 
rather than the creditor was the beneficiary of the proceeds.414  
Notwithstanding that the court in Connecticut Light and Power cited a list 
of all possible veil-piercing factors,415 the case appears to be one that, in the 
parlance of Macey and Mitts,416 turns on the necessity to protect creditors 
against misrepresentations about owner involvement.417  Although the tax 
status does not appear to have been given much weight in any of these case, 
it is unfortunate to see opinions that mischaracterize the tax attributes of an 
entity, and it would be unfortunate if the normal tax attributes of a single 
member LLC became seen as factors supporting piercing the veil.418  In the 
corporate context, in Axtmann v. Chillemi,419 the district court appears to 
have placed some weight that the S corporation was a “pass-through” in 
determining that its veil should be pierced.  The better view of taking tax 
status into account was expressed in Pinebrook Properties, Ltd. v. 
Brookhaven Lake Property Owners Association.420  In that case, the 
 
411.  Id.  Business Properties’ wholly-owned LLC subsidiaries would have been disregarded 
entities for tax purposes, assuming no election to be an association taxable as a corporation.  
Accordingly, they were not required to have their own tax identification numbers if they had no 
employees, and, any income and deductions generated by them were properly reportable on Business 
Properties’ Form 1065. 
412.  Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Westview Carlton Group, LLC, 950 A.2d 522 (Conn. App. 
2008). 
413.  Id.  As a single-member LLC, Westview Carlton Group, LLC was not required to file 
federal income tax returns.  There is no indication in the opinion that the LLC had elected to be treated 
as an association taxable as a corporation, which would have required it to file tax returns, 
notwithstanding the court’s reference to the LLC’s sole member as the LLC’s “sole shareholder.”  Id. at 
524.  See supra note 42 for a discussion of why using corporate terms in an LLC case is problematic. 
414.  Conn. Light & Power Co., 950 A.2d at 527. 
415.  Id. 
416.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11, at 123. 
417.  Conn. Light & Power Co., 950 A.2d at 525–526. 
418.  Some states have addressed this issue statutorily.  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 10A-5A-1.04(a) (A 
limited liability company is a separate legal entity.  A limited liability company’s status for tax purposes 
shall not affect its status as a separate legal entity formed under this chapter.”); Va. Code § 13.1-1002 
(“A limited liability company’s status for federal tax purposes shall not affect its status as a distinct 
entity organized and existing under this chapter.”).  A similar provision is included in § 104(a) of the 
Prototype Act. 
419.  Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 844; see also supra notes 312-29 and accompanying text. 
420.  Pinebrook Prop., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 77 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App. 
2002). 
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plaintiffs sought to pierce the veil of Pinebrook Properties Management, 
L.L.C. to impose personal liability on A.C. Musgrave, Jr.  In rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ veil-piercing claim, the court stated: 
 
The evidence of alter ego between Musgrave and Pinebrook 
Management presented by the Owners is that Pinebrook 
Management had no checking account, had not filed a tax 
return, and that Musgrave sent a letter to the lot owners, 
signing his own name and not designating that he signed it in 
any other capacity.  However, the Owners failed to cite any 
authority holding that failure to have a checking account, or 
failure to file tax returns, establishes alter ego.  There is no 
evidence provided that Musgrave commingled funds or that 
his assets and those of Pinebrook Management were not kept 
separate.  The evidence clearly shows Pinebrook 
Management has never had the need, or been required, to 
file a tax return.  This is no evidence that Pinebrook is the 
alter ego of Musgrave.421 
 
The opinion in New Horizons Supply Coop. v. Haack422 would be 
more troubling if the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had not reversed the trial 
court, which had imposed partner liability on the members of an LLC 
because the LLC was taxed as a partnership: “the court’s going to find that 
the corporate veil is pierced by the fact that the people were acting like a 
partnership, being taxed like a partnership, and haven’t even dissolved the 
— I’m treating this as a partnership and assessing liability to the remaining 
partner.  That’s the evidence that’s before me, and unless I would have 
some other evidence that was not presented, I have to treat this matter as a 
partnership and assume that the limited liability agreement did not alter the 
normal partnership liability situation.”423  The appellate court’s holding that 
the trail court had improperly imposed partner liability on the remaining 
member of the LLC was cold comfort to the member because the appellate 
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the ground that the member 
had not followed proper statutory proceedings to dissolve the LLC and was 
liable to the plaintiff to the extent of the value of the property the member 
had received from the LLC in dissolution.424 
 
421.  Pinebrook Prop., Ltd., 77 S.W.3d at 500 (emphasis added).  See infra notes 649-653 and 
accompanying text. 
422.  New Horizons Supply Coop. v. Haack, No. 98-1865, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 108 (Wisc. 
App. 1999). 
423.  Id. at *6–*7. 
424.  Id. at *9-*13. 
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United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.425 in its opinion holding that 
Jon-T Chemicals was liable for a tort committed by its subsidiary discussed 
a great number of facts it considered as showing that Jon-T Chemicals 
dominated and controlled its subsidiary and included the observation that 
“Chemicals and Farms filed consolidated financial statements and tax 
returns.”426 
Note that tax issues may arise other than in connection with the 
entity’s status.  For example, in NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC 
Communications, LLC,427 one factor the court cited as showing injustice in 
the individual defendant’s actions was that he had instructed the person in 
charge of the LLC’s books to treat certain payments by the member to the 
LLC as loans so that the member could take money out of the LLC without 
tax consequences.428 
 
 
V.  IMPORTANCE OF DRAFTING CONTRACTS TO STATE WHAT IS INTENDED 
 
Although the cases discussed under this heading are not, strictly 
speaking, veil-piercing cases, they are related in that sometimes poor 
contract drafting may leave a party unsatisfied and seeking a veil-piercing 
or alter-ego remedy.  As these cases demonstrate, with one unusual 
exception,429 courts generally will not protect a party against poor or 
incomplete drafting. 
In Primary Investments, LLC v. Wee Tender Care III, Inc.,430 the 
members/managers of an LLC that had sold its day care facility formed a 
new LLC and opened a new day care facility within three years after the 
sale.  The purchaser sued the selling LLC, its members/managers, and the 
new LLC for breach of a noncompetition clause in the agreement for sale 
of the day care facility.  The court held that the members/managers and the 
new LLC were not bound by the noncompetition agreement because they 
were not parties to the agreement.  In a footnote, the court mentioned that 
the plaintiffs did not argue, and there was no evidence, that the existence of 
the selling LLC should be ignored.  The attorney for the purchaser could 
have protected his client by requiring that the members/managers sign the 
sales agreement in their individual capacities agreeing to be bound by the 
 
425.  United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 121-
139 and accompanying text. 
426.  Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d at 695. 
427.  NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2008), supra notes 
163-177 and accompanying text. 
428.  NetJets Aviation, Inc., 537 F.3d at 182. 
429.  See infra notes 436-437 and accompanying text. 
430.  Primary Inv., LLC v. Wee Tender Care III, Inc., 746 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. App. 2006). 
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noncompetition agreement and drafting the noncompetition agreement to 
be binding on affiliates (appropriately defined) of the selling LLC and its 
members/managers. 
Similar issues arise when the members of an LLC desire to restrict its 
activities to a specified line of business or a specified geographic area.  To 
ensure that the restriction will accomplish its purpose, the language should 
also prohibit the LLC from engaging in a prohibited business or area 
through affiliates.  Otherwise the managers of the LLC might be able to get 
around the restriction by forming a subsidiary LLC.431  Of course, in many 
instances, the managers’ attempt to get around the restriction might exceed 
their authority432 or violate a duty.433  Careful drafting, however, would 
provide certainty. 
Another case illustrating the consequences of failing to understand the 
meaning of applicable contract terms before a dispute arises is Farina v. 
Perrotti.434  Plaintiff, the minority member of Hometown Waste, LLC 
(“Hometown Waste”) sought to compel the owner of HTW Funding, LLC 
(“HTW”), the majority member of Hometown Waste, to participate in an 
arbitration pursuant to a provision of the operating agreement of 
Hometown Waste.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt, noting that 
the owner of HTW was not a signatory to the operating agreement of 
Hometown Waste, and the record contained no evidence that would justify 
ignoring the existence of HTW.  The plaintiff had originally formed 
 
431.  As long ago as 1925, commentators noted that “a subsidiary transacting business in a state, 
though a mere adjunct or instrumentality of a foreign corporation which owns and controls it, is a 
separate entity so that the foreign corporation is not doing business there itself.”  Henry W. Ballantine, 
Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12, 13 (1925), discussing the 
holding of Cannon Manufacturing Company v. Cudahy Packing Company, 267 U. S. 333 (1925). More 
recently, in Estate of Thompson v. Toyota Motor Corporation Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2008), 
the court held that, even though a plaintiff has only to make a prima facie showing that personal 
jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff in that case could not obtain jurisdiction over Toyota Motor Corporation 
Worldwide (“TMCW”) merely because TMCW, a Japanese corporation, had numerous United States 
subsidiaries and a national presence.  The court observed that plaintiff had presented no evidence that 
TMCW’s United States subsidiary Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., was the alter ego of TMCW.  
According to the court “the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction, in the parent-subsidiary context, 
provides that ‘a non-resident parent corporation is amenable to suit in the forum state if the parent 
company exerts so much control over the subsidiary that the two do not exist as separate entities but are 
one and the same for purposes of jurisdiction.’”  Citing Danton v. Innovative Gaming Corp. 246 F. 
Supp.2d 64, 72, (D. Me. 2003). 545 F.3d at 362. 
432.  Some LLC statutes limit a manager’s authority to actions taken in the ordinary course of the 
LLC’s business.  Other LLC statutes do not contain an explicit limit.  Under either type of statute, 
however, the manager is an agent of the LLC and, as such, has a duty to act in accordance with the 
express and implied terms of any contract between the agent and the principal and to take action only 
within the scope of the manager’s actual authority.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.07, 
8.09(1).  This agency law provision, of course, also applies to members and other persons if they are 
acting as agents of the LLC. 
433.  Id. 
434.  Farina v. Perrotti, CV084032655, 2009 WL 941846 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2009). 
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Hometown Waste as the sole member, and when HTW was admitted as a 
member, the following arbitration provision was inserted in the operating 
agreement: 
 
In the event that any dispute shall arise between the 
Members as to the interpretation of this Operating 
Agreement or any dispute that may arise between the 
Members under this Operating Agreement or any dispute in 
regard to the management of the Company, such dispute 
may be submitted to a board of arbitrators.  [and] . . 
.”[c]ompany” shall refer to HometownWaste, LLC [and] 
“[m]ember” shall mean each of the parties who executes a 
counterpart of this Operating Agreement as a Member and 
each of the other parties who may hereafter become a 
Member in accordance with the terms of this Operating 
Agreement.435 
 
A Connecticut homebuilder won in two different courts on two 
different theories in attempting to enforce an arbitration clause he had 
signed with defendants, who resisted the arbitration demand on the ground 
that between signing the contract to build the defendants’ home and making 
the demand for arbitration, the homebuilder, who had been operating as a 
sole proprietor, formed a single-member Connecticut LLC to conduct his 
business.  The LLC was not a party to the construction contract the 
defendants had signed.  The Connecticut Superior Court enforced the 
arbitration demand on the ground that the individual and his LLC were 
“practically identical” in relation to the defendant homeowners and there 
had been no suggestion that the formation of the LLC had any effect on the 
contractor’s performance of his obligations to the defendants.436  The 
Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Superior Court437 by 
characterizing the formation of the LLC as a conversion of the contractor’s 
sole proprietorship and holding that the consequences would be the same as 
Connecticut statutory law provided for the conversion of a general 
partnership to an LLC. 
It will not be often that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a contract that is 
missing a crucial term (such as one providing that the contractor could 
transfer the contract to a wholly-owned entity so long as he remained liable 
for performance) will be saved once, much less twice, by the courts. 
 
435.  Id. at *3. 
436.  C & J Builders and Remodelers, LLC v. Geisenheimer, No. CV 970405555S, 1998 WL 
203400 (Conn. Super. April 17, 1998). 
437.  C & J Builders and Remodelers, LLC v. Geisenheimer, 733 A.2d 193 (Conn. 1999). 
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For a case where the plaintiff who failed on a veil-piercing claim 
could have protected himself by better contract drafting, see K. C. 
Properties of N.W. Arkansas v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC.438 
 
VI.  VEIL-PIERCING FOR JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES 
 
Courts may apply a lesser standard to veil piercing and alter ego if the 
issue is personal jurisdiction.  Boston Scientific Corporation v. Wall 
Cardiovascular Technologies, LLC439 rejected an argument that a Texas 
LLC was subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware as alter ego of 
Delaware LLC because the record did not show a sufficient level of 
control, absence of corporate formalities, or fraud, injustice, or inequity in 
use of the corporate form.  The court recognized the separate legal 
existence of the LLC and its members under Texas law and rejected the 
argument that personal jurisdiction over an LLC is proper in any forum in 
which the LLC’s members are subject to jurisdiction.  Wolf v. Summers-
Wood, LP440 held that the fiduciary shield doctrine barred jurisdiction over 
non-resident officers of an LLC where the officers’ contacts were in a 
representative capacity and were not systematic or continuous and the 
officers did not operate in a manner indistinguishable from their personal 
affairs or in a manner calculated to mislead.  ING (U.S.) Securities, 
Futures, & Options, Inc. v. Bingham Investment Fund, L.L.C.441 determined 
that personal jurisdiction over LLC members was lacking because of the 
fiduciary shield doctrine.  Yukon Partners, Inc. v. The Lodge Keeper 
Group, Inc.442 held, in the context of a challenge to personal jurisdiction, 
unspecified affiliation was insufficient to pierce the veil of numerous hotel 
LLCs in the absence of a showing that the entities were shams or were used 
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or 
that there was any other reason that would in equity or good conscience 
justify disregard of the entities.443  The Federal District Court for Nevada 
held, in a consolidated multi-district case arising out of the 2000-2001 
energy crisis, that indirect partially owned subsidiary LLC’s contacts could 
not be imputed to the parent North Carolina LLC for personal jurisdiction 
purposes where the parent LLC did not control the daily operations of its 
 
438.  K.C. Prop. of N.W. Ark. v. Lowell Inv. Partners, LLC, 280 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2008); see infra 
notes 536-41 and accompanying text. 
439.  Boston Sci. Corp. v. Wall Cardiovascular Tech., LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367 (D. Del. 
2009). 
440.  Wolf v. Summers-Wood, LP, 214 S.W.3d 783, 789 (Tex. App. 2007). 
441.  ING (U.S.) Sec., Futures, & Options, Inc. v. Bingham Inv. Fund, LLC, 934 F. Supp. 987, 
989 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
442.  Yukon Partners, Inc. v. The Lodge Keeper Group, Inc., 572 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. App. 2002). 
443.  Id. at 652.  
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subsidiary and plaintiff failed to establish that fraud or injustice would 
result from failure to pierce veil even assuming lack of separateness was 
established.444 
Other cases have found personal jurisdiction based on alter ego 
claims.  Oliver v. Boston University445 held that an LLC was the alter ego of 
Boston University for purposes of personal jurisdiction, assuming truth of 
allegations that LLC was formed by Boston University solely to serve its 
interest and was completely dominated by the University.  Gonzalez v. 
Lehtinen446 concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court 
to make an implied finding that a Texas LLC was the alter ego of Cardenas, 
a prominent Mexican citizen, and that Cardenas was therefore subject to 
the Texas long-arm statute as someone who “did business” in Texas.  In a 
jurisdictional veil-piecing case, the court stated that it does not assess 
certain issues such as fraud and undercapitalization.  Instead, the focus was 
on whether Cardenas controlled the internal business operations of the LLC 
to a degree “greater than that normally associated with common ownership 
and directorship.”  In Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Company,447 the Oregon 
court exercised personal jurisdiction over a Maryland resident who had 
only visited Oregon once on the ground that the defendant corporation, 
over which the court clearly had jurisdiction, was his alter ego.  XL Vision 
v. Holloway448 exercised personal jurisdiction over an LLC’s president and 
foreign parent where the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the president and 
the foreign parent of the LLC formed, operated, and manipulated the LLC 
to defraud creditors, that they commingled funds, that they failed to 
maintain other corporate formalities, that the parent directly paid the 
liabilities of the LLC, and that the LLC was run by the president and parent 
for their benefit.  White Family Harmony Investment, Ltd. v. Transwestern 
West Valley, LLC449 held that the evidence before the court was sufficient to 
treat LLCs under common ownership as alter egos and to impute forum 
contacts of one to the other for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction.  
 
444.  See, e.g., Heartland Reg’l Med. Ctr.  v. Oneok Inc., No 2:03-CV-01431-PMP-PAL, 2: 07-
CV-009887-PMP-PAL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13850 (D. Neb. 2009); Breckenridge Brewery of 
Colorado, LLC v. Oneok, Inc., No 2:03-CV-01431-PMP-PAL, 2:06-CV-01351-PMP-PAL, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13815 (D. Neb. 2009); Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc., No 05-2531-CM,  2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24589 (D. Kan. 2006); J.P. Morgan Trust Co. v. The Williams Co., Nos. 2:03-CV-01431-PMP-
PAL, 2:06-CV-00233-PMP-PAL,2:05-CV-01331-PMP-PAL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39686 (D. Neb. 
2008). 
445.  Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570, 2000 WL 1038197 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
446.  Gonzalez v. Lehtinen, No. 13-06-441-CV, 2008 WL 668600, at *4 (Tex. App. 2008). 
447.  Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 707 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Or. App. 1985). 
448.  XL Vision v. Holloway, 856 So. 2d 1063, 1066–67 (Fla. App. 2003). 
449.  White Family Harmony Inv., Ltd., 2005 WL 2893784, at *7; see also supra notes 404-28 and 
accompanying text. 
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Kirby Morgan Dive Systems v. Hydrospace Ltd.450 held the evidence in the 
record sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over the sole owner and 
managing director of a Scottish LLC.  The court held that the LLC was the 
alter ego of its owner on the basis of evidence that the LLC was under the 
total control of its owner, the LLC was undercapitalized in relation to the 
obligations it had under a contract with the plaintiff, and injustice would 
result if the owner was not held personally liable for the arbitration award 
because plaintiff would not be able to recover fully and the Scottish owner 
could circumvent the arbitrator’s injunctive relief through operation of his 
other businesses. 
In Morris v. Powell451 Dr. Robert Morris and his wife, Joyce Morris, 
were employees of Morris Genetics, LLC, a Missouri LLC.  Dr. and Mrs. 
Morris travelled to Texas for four days in September 2001 to perform 
embryo transplant surgeries in plaintiff’s Boer goats.  Dr. Morris 
represented that his transplant program could achieve a seventy percent 
success rate.  Instead, with the plaintiff’s goats, Dr. Morris achieved only a 
ten percent success rate.  The court did not find jurisdiction on the basis of 
alter ego,452 but held that Dr. Morris was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Texas on the ground that, assuming plaintiff’s allegations to be true, he had 
personally committed a tort in Texas and: 
 
In determining whether there is a substantial connection 
between the nonresident defendant and the State of Texas, 
we must consider “foreseeability.”  Where a defendant sends 
false information into a state, knowing it will be relied upon 
by a resident of the forum state, there is a foreseeable 
consequence of direct economic injury to the resident at its 
domicile.  Therefore, if the alleged tortfeasor knows that the 
brunt of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in the 
forum, it must reasonably anticipate being hailed into court 
there to answer for its actions.453 
 
With respect to Dr. Morris specifically, the court stated: 
 
[W]hen Dr. Morris provided plaintiffs with an estimate of 
approximately 252.8 pregnancies while allegedly 
 
450.  Kirby Morgan Dive Sys. v. Hydrospace Ltd., No. CV 09-4934, 2010 WL 234791, at *4 (C. 
D. Cal. 2010), rev’d on other grounds and vacated by, Kirby Morgan Dive Sys. v. Hydrospace Ltd., 
478 Fed. Appx. 382 (9th Cir. 2012). 
451.  Morris v. Powell, 150 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. App. 2004). 
452.  Morris, 150 S.W.3d at 220. 
453.  Id. at 221 (internal citations omitted). 
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withholding information about his declining success rate, he 
knew the plaintiffs were in Texas and it was foreseeable that 
plaintiffs would rely on the estimated success rate he 
represented to them.  Accordingly, the injurious effect in 
Texas of the torts Dr. Morris allegedly committed could 
have been foreseen.  Furthermore, there is a strong nexus 
between the alleged torts committed by Dr. Morris and the 
contacts with Texas, i.e., it is these specific contacts that 
give rise to the claims brought by plaintiffs against Dr. 
Morris.  For these reasons, we conclude that Dr. Morris’ 
alleged actions/inactions support a finding that the trial court 
had specific jurisdiction over him.454 
 
In Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten,455 the Texas Supreme 
Court disapproved the foreseeability analysis applied in Morris.456  The 
court in Michiana provides a comprehensive review of Texas long-arm 
jurisdiction.  The court reversed the trial court’s holding that it jurisdiction 
over the defendant.  It appears, however, that the court could have disposed 
of the case on the basis that a forum selection clause in the contract 
between plaintiff and defendant for the purchase by plaintiff of a $64,000 
Coachmen recreational vehicle provided that all actions under the contract 
would be brought in Indiana.  With respect to the forum selection clause, 
the court stated: 
 
Holten argues it was within the trial court’s discretion to 
refuse to enforce this clause.  But enforcement of a forum-
selection clause is mandatory absent a showing that 
“enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the 
clause was invalid due to fraud or overreaching.”  Holten 
does not assert that the clause itself was fraudulently 
induced, and presented no evidence showing why 
enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.  Accordingly, 
he should be held to it.457 
 
VII.  CHOICE OF LAW FOR VEIL PIERCING 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts states: “The local law of the 
state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent 
 
454.  Id. at 222–23 (internal citations omitted). 
455.  Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005). 
456.  Id. at 788–89. 
457.  Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc., 168 S.W.3d at 793. 
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of a shareholder’s liability to the corporation for assessments or 
contributions and to its creditors for corporate debts.”458 
A majority of cases either follow the Restatement rule or hold that a 
veil-piercing claim should be governed by the law of the state of formation 
of the entity whose veil may be pierced on the basis of other authority 
substantially the same as the Restatement rule.  For example, Soviet Pan 
Am Travel Effort v. Travel Committee, Inc.459 holds that “Because a 
corporation is a creature of state law whose primary purpose is to insulate 
shareholders from legal liability, the state of incorporation has the greater 
interest in determining when and if that insulation is to be stripped 
away.”460  In re American International Refinery461 noted that “the Fifth 
Circuit has predicted that Louisiana courts would look to the law of the 
state of incorporation. This choice-of-law rule is consistent with the 
Restatement as well as the choice-of-law rules of other jurisdictions.”462  
Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. American Financial Corporation463 stated that the 
law of state of incorporation controls alter ego claims notwithstanding a 
choice of law provision in related debentures that the court labelled 
“irrelevant.”464  Blue Whale Corporation v. Grand China Shipping 
Development Co., Ltd.465 stated that Kalb, Voorhis “teaches us that choice-
of-law clauses in underlying contracts are ‘irrelevant’ to assessing alter-ego 
claims.”466  Howell Contractors, Inc. v. Berling467 followed the Restatement 
and Kalb, Voorhis to hold that Kentucky would apply Ohio law in a veil-
piercing action against the sole owner of an Ohio LLC.468  The court 
affirmed the trial court’s piercing of the veil of the LLC, and also noted that 
the same result would obtain under Kentucky law.469  Dassault Falcon Jet 
Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc.470 states: 
 
A choice of law provision in a contract is not binding on 
what law to apply for piercing the corporate veil.  The reason 
for this is that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is 
collateral to and not part of the parties’ negotiations or 
 
458.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 307 (1971). 
459.  Soviet Pan Am Travel Effort v. Travel Comm., 756 F. Supp. 126 (S. D. N. Y. 1991). 
460.  Id. at 131. 
461.  In re American Int’l Refinery, 402 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W. D. La. 2008). 
462.  Id. at 743 (internal citations omitted). 
463.  Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1993). 
464.  Kalb, Voorhis & Co., 8 F.3d at 132. 
465.  Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd, 722 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2013). 
466.  Id. at 496.  
467.  Howell Contractors, Inc. v. Berling, 383 S.W.3d 465 (Ky. App. 2012). 
468.  Howell Contractors, Inc., 383 S.W.3d at 467. 
469.  Id. at 469.   
470.  Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 348–49 (M.D. N.C. 1995). 
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expectations with respect to the contract.  It involves 
imposing liability on third-party shareholders as opposed to 
governing the parties’ obligations under the contract.   
The restatement position, which applies the law of the 
state of incorporation, is supported by sound policy reasons.  
After all the state’s primary purpose for permitting 
corporations to be formed is to allow for limited liability.  It 
would seem then that ‘the state of incorporation has the 
greater interest in determining when and if that insulation is 
to be stripped away.’471   
 
A bankruptcy court in Texas held that a veil-piercing claim against a 
Delaware corporation would be governed by Delaware law on the basis of 
the following then effective provision of Texas statutory law: 
 
[O]nly the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a 
foreign corporation shall govern (1) the internal affairs of the 
foreign corporation, including but not limited to the rights, 
powers, and duties of its board of directors and shareholders 
and matters relating to its shares, and (2) the liability, if any, 
of shareholders of the foreign corporation for the debts, 
liabilities, and obligations of the foreign corporation for 
which they are not otherwise liable by statute or 
agreement.472 
 
California courts have applied the state of formation rule in veil 
piercing actions involving a Delaware LLC and an Arizona LLC.473  These 
cases were decided on the basis of Cal. Corp. Code § 17708.01, which is 
California’s general rule applying the internal affairs doctrine to foreign 
LLCs.  An earlier California case, Allison v. Danilovic,474 although 
concluding in a case involving piercing the veil of a Delaware LLC that 
Delaware law and California law reached the same result, that had there 
been a conflict, the court would have applied California law because of 
California’s superior interest in enforcing a wage claim and alter ego claim 
 
471.  Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., 909 F. Supp. At 348–49 (citing Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. 
Corp., 8 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
472.  In re Kilroy, 357 B.R. 411, 425 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Texas Business 
Corporations Act article 8.02 (2003)).  Substantially the same rules are now set forth in Texas Business 
Organizations Code sections 1.102, 1.104, 1.105.  
473.  E.g., Bronstein v. Crowell, Weedon & Co., No. B191738, 2007 WL 969559, at *9 (Cal. 
App. Apr. 3, 2007); River Rock Dev. v. Palk, No. C057850, 2010 WL 46783, at *1 n. 1, (Cal. App. 
2010). 
474.  Allison v. Danilovic, No. B163363, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 10988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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where all parties, as well as the directors, officers, and employees of the 
LLC all lived in California. 
It is unclear what law Colorado would follow in a veil piercing/alter-
ego case.  In Martin v. Freeman,475 although the caption in the case 
identified the LLC in question as a Delaware LLC, the trial court and the 
Colorado Court of Appeals applied Colorado law without any discussion of 
choice of law issues.  An earlier Court of Appeals opinion applied 
Colorado law to an alter-ego case involving a Montana corporation.476  In 
Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh,477 the Colorado Supreme Court applied Colorado 
law to determine the liability to creditors of the directors of a dissolved 
District of Columbia corporation.  The court stated that Colorado law 
should apply because all of Ficor, Inc.’s activities were conducted in 
Colorado and all of its assets were located there.478  However, the court 
took pains to demonstrate that the result would have been the same under 
the law of the District of Columbia.479  Colorado now statutorily applies the 
internal affairs doctrine to foreign entities.480  The court in Martin v. 
Freeman 481 and McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger482 did not discuss this 
statute, possibly because not argued by the parties.  Whether this statute 
will make a difference if properly presented and argued remains to be 
determined. 
Illinois applies the state of formation rule.483  A federal court in Illinois 
applied Colorado law to determine veil-piercing claims against the 
members of a Colorado LLC and concluded that the plaintiff had presented 
no significant evidence of factors that would support veil piercing.484  Iowa 
applies the state of formation rule on the basis of the internal affairs 
doctrine.485 
Kansas applies the state of formation rule.486  A federal court in the 
District of Columbia and a bankruptcy court in Louisiana both applied 
 
475.  See Martin v. Freeman, 272 P.3d 1182–85 (Colo. App. 2012). 
476.  McCallum Family LLC. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 73–74 (Colo. App. 2009). 
477.  Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982). 
478.  Id. at 391. 
479.  Id. 
480.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-805(4) (2015) (“As to any foreign entity transacting business or 
conducting activities in this state, the law of the jurisdiction under the law of which the foreign entity is 
formed shall govern the organization and internal affairs of the foreign entity and the liability of its 
owners and managers.”). 
481. See Martin, 272 P.3d at 475. 
482. See McCallum Family LLC, 221 P.3d at 74–75. 
483. Westmeyer v. Flynn, 889 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
484.  In re Liberty Coal Co., LLC, No. 09-CV-0371, 2010 WL 1415998, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 
2010); see infra notes 566–84 and accompanying text. 
485.  Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. v. Lauer Limited, LLC, 918 F. Supp. 2d 835, 850 (N.D. Iowa 
2013). 
486.  See ColtTech, LLC v. JLL Partners, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358–59 (D. Kan. 2008). 
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Nevada law where that was the state of formation of the entities 
involved.487  A federal court in Mississippi applied the law of the state of 
formation on the ground that the Mississippi LLC Act provided that the 
liability of a member is governed by the state of organization.488  Federal 
courts in Oklahoma and Wisconsin have applied the law of the state of 
formation.489  A federal court in California applied Washington veil-
piercing law to alter ego claims against several Washington LLCs and a 
Washington corporation.490  The court based its holdings on California LLC 
law and a balancing of interests. 
A federal court in Nebraska applied Nebraska law to veil piecing 
claims against two Delaware entities on the ground that Nebraska’s interest 
in applying its law to its citizens outweighed the interest of the state of 
formation.491  Similarly, a federal court in Kentucky applied Kentucky law 
to a breach of contract and veil-piercing action against the members of a 
Tennessee LLC.492  The court stated that Kentucky had the most significant 
relationship to the transaction despite the fact that the LLC was organized 
under Tennessee law, and the court relied on a Kentucky Supreme Court 
case493 for the proposition that Kentucky law will apply to a contract issue 
if there are sufficient contacts in Kentucky and not overwhelming interests 
to the contrary.  The Federal Court in this case treated the matter as a 
breach of contract action and did not address any choice of law issues in its 
relatively brief discussion of plaintiff’s piercing claim (which the court 
denied.)  If application of the law of the state of formation of the entity may 
be outcome determinative, an attorney who is defending an alter-ego/veil 
piercing claim will want to ensure to present to the forum court all of the 
preceding authorities that argue for the state of formation and that discount 
choice of law provisions. 
A contrary argument could be been made that Section 307 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is incorrect because the potential 
liability of the individual defendants in a veil-piercing case should be 
viewed as an external affair of the entities.  This argument, however, would 
be based on a mistaken reading of the internal affairs doctrine, which is 
commonly stated as follows: “The internal affairs of a corporation will be 
 
487.  SEC v. Levine, 671 F. Supp. 14, 33 (D. D.C. 2009); In re Am. Int'l. Refinery, 402 B.R. 728, 
743 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008). 
488.  Andrews v. Kerr McGee Corporation, No. 1:00CV158-D-A, 2001 WL 1704144, at *2 (N.D. 
Miss. 2001). 
489.  Tomlinson v. Combined Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1298, 1300 (N.D. 
Okla. 2010); Rual Trade Ltd. v. Viva Trade LLC, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
490.  Wehlage v. EmpRes Healthcare Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
491.  Schwan v. CNH Am., LLC, No. 4:04CV3384, 2006 WL 1215395, at *17 (D. Neb. 2006). 
492.  First Constr., LLC v. Gravelroad Entm't, LLC, No. 6:07-155-DCR, 2008 WL 2038878, at *3 
(E.D. Ky. 2008). 
493.  Breeding v. Mass. Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1982).  
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governed by the corporate statutes and case law of the states in which the 
corporation is incorporated.”494 
This potential analysis is flawed because owners of corporations and 
limited liability companies ordinarily are not liable for obligations of the 
entity.  If a corporation or limited liability company is sued because one of 
its employees causes an accident while acting in the scope of employment, 
it is appropriate that the liability of the entity will be determined by the law 
of the state in which the accident took place.  If a plaintiff sues a 
shareholder or member seeking to pierce the veil of the entity to hold the 
shareholder or member liable for the obligation of the entity to the injured 
person, the plaintiff is seeking to hold the shareholder or member liable for 
an obligation of the entity.495  The shareholder or member will have no 
liability if the plaintiff has not or cannot establish that the entity owes 
something to the plaintiff.  Logically, it does not appear that a 
shareholder’s or member’s liability for an obligation of the entity can be 
termed an external affair. 
The policy of the Restatement is sound.  Although a court may be 
inclined to apply the law of the forum if that law is more favorable to a 
plaintiff who is a resident of the forum state,496 if the rule of the 
Restatement is not applied, a shareholder’s or member’s liability for such 
an obligation of the entity might vary depending on where the accident 
occurred or where suit is brought against the shareholder.  This Article 
posits that applying the law of the forum state is not good policy because 
the prerogative of each state to determine when a limited liability entity 
may be formed and when limited liability should be disregarded should be 
respected as an important aspect of federalism and the desirability of 
promoting uniformity. 
In a subsidiary question, the court in Advanced Telephone Systems, 
Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile Radio, LLC497 held that the plaintiff 
 
494.  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89–90 (1987); Edgar v. Mite Corp. & 
Mite Holdings, Inc., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215, n.44 (1977); 
Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. 
Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116–18 (Del. 2005); McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis & Altman, 531 A.2d 
206, 215 (Del. 1987).  Of course, Delaware has significant encouragement to expand the internal affairs 
doctrine as far as possible to protect the national and international applicability of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law to Delaware corporations.  See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantage 
Point: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91 (2008); Matt 
Stevens, Internal Affairs Doctrine: California Versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to Regulate 
Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1047 (2008); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs 
Doctrine: The Proper Law of a Corporation, 44 BUS. LAW. 693 (1988). 
495.  See Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., 909 F. Supp. at 348 (stating that veil piercing “involves 
imposing liability on third-party shareholders”). 
496.  Supra note 491 and accompanying text. 
497.  Advanced Tel. Sys., Inc. v. Com-Net Prof'l Mobile Radio, LLC, 846 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Super. 
2004). 
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was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue whether the veil of a LLC should 
be pierced.  Although the LLC in question was a Delaware LLC, the court 
held that entitlement to a jury trial, vel non, was a procedural issue, not a 
substantive issue, and applied Pennsylvania law to make this 
determination.498 
 
VIII.  CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
The essence of this issue is what causal connection, if any, there 
must be between the improper actions that arguably support veil 
piercing and the harm suffered by the plaintiff who is asserting the 
veil piercing claim.  Relatively few cases discuss causation explicitly 
— apparently because causation is obvious in most successful veil-
piercing cases. 
Instituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC499 is 
discussed at several points in this Article.500  The court stated that while the 
defendant may have failed to keep the entities in question separate from 
each other, the evidence did not show that he had failed to keep them 
separate from himself.501  It would appear that the court was saying by this 
that the lack of separateness that plaintiff had established had not 
contributed to the harm suffered by plaintiff. 
In re Weddle (Elsaesser v. Cougar Crest Lodge, LLC)502 considered a 
plaintiff’s claims that the defendant LLC received a preferential transfer 
when it recorded judgments it recovered against the individual debtors 
(who were members of the LLC).  Since the judgments were recorded more 
than ninety days before the bankruptcy petition, the plaintiff could prevail 
on its preference claim only if it could prove that the LLC was an insider.  
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the LLC and the debtors 
were statutory insiders as defined in Section 101(31)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, but the plaintiff also argued that the LLC and its managing member 
were alter egos.  Because the managing member was the father of one of 
the individual debtors and was a per se insider, plaintiff argued that the 
LLC, as the managing member’s alter ego, was an insider.  Although the 
court noted some evidence of unity of interests, it granted summary 
 
498.  Id. at 1274–78. 
499.  Insituform Tech., LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. 
500.  See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (for its interesting take on separateness) and 
notes 304-10 and accompanying text (undercapitalization must be coupled with intent to avoid debts) 
and infra notes 620-22 and accompanying text (reverse veil-piercing). 
501.  Insituform Technologies, LLC, 959. F. Supp. 2d at 1345. 
502.  Elsaesser v. Cougar Crest Lodge, L.L.C. (In re Weddle), 353 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2006). 
  
Spring 2016 WILL YOUR VEIL BE PIERCED? 447 
judgment to the LLC because the plaintiff presented no evidence 
supporting its allegation that failure to treat the LLC and its managing 
member as alter egos would lead to inequitable results.  In re Weddle’s 
holding that the LLC and the debtors were not statutory insiders was 
criticized in a later case.503 
The Delaware Chancery Court has indicated that the circumstances to 
piece the veil of an entity must be pervasive — not just stemming from a 
single transaction.  Thus, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained the 
Delaware approach to piercing the corporate veil as follows: 
 
This Court will disregard the corporate form only in the 
“exceptional case.”  Determining whether to do so requires a 
fact intensive inquiry, which may consider the following 
factors, none of which are dominant: (1) whether the 
company was adequately capitalized for the undertaking; (2) 
whether the company was solvent; (3) whether corporate 
formalities were observed; (4) whether the controlling 
shareholder siphoned company funds; or (5) whether, in 
general, the company simply functioned as a façade for the 
controlling shareholder.  Delaware courts also must find an 
element of fraud to pierce the corporate veil.504 
 
In Winner, plaintiffs Winner Acceptance Corporation and Winner 
Group Leasing, Inc. (collectively, “Winner”) leased thirty-seven trucks and 
trailers to Jubb’s Mail Service, Inc. (“Jubb’s”), which operated a rural mail 
route in Virginia.505  As part of a Chapter 11 restructuring of Jubb’s, Mid-
Atlantic Postal Express, Inc. (“Mid-Atlantic”) assumed Jubb’s lease 
obligations to Winner.506  Defendants included Postal Express of America, 
Inc., which guaranteed the lease obligations undertaken by Mid-Atlantic, 
Return on Capital (“ROC”) or Return on Equity Group, Inc., and Edward 
Daspin (“Daspin”), described in plaintiffs’ complaint as “a director, chief 
executive officer, and ‘alter-ego’ of Postal Express, ROC, and ROEG.507  
To acquire Jubb’s mail route, the defendants needed the approval of 
 
503.  Redmond v. CJD & Assocs., LLC (In re Brooke Corp.), 506 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2014). 
504.  Winner Acceptance Corp. v. Return on Capital Corp., No. 3088–VCP, 2008 WL 5352063 at *5 
(Del. Ch. 2008) (citing Mason v. Network of Wilmington, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19434-NC, 2005 WL 
1653954 at *3 (Del. Ch. 2005)). 
505.  Winner Acceptance Corp., 2008 WL 5352063 at *1. 
506.  Id. 
507.  Id.  (stating that the complaint alleged that Postal Express was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
ROC or ROEG, which “hold themselves out as merchant or investment banks incorporated in 
Delaware”). 
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plaintiffs, the bankruptcy court, and the U. S. Trustee overseeing Jubb’s 
bankruptcy.508  To operate the route, defendants also needed access to the 
fleet of trucks leased to Jubb’s by Winner.509  At subsequent meetings, 
Daspin: 
 
Offered to make Postal Express a guarantor of Mid-
Atlantic’s obligations to Winner under the Fleet lease.  
Daspin allegedly represented that Postal Express was a “well 
funded and long-established ‘Delaware transportation and 
logistics based holding company’ under the total control of 
Daspin, ROC and ROEG” and that Daspin would personally 
oversee “the new business to be formed as part of the plan 
and Postal Express.”  Plaintiffs also were provided with 
certain unnamed “documents” and unspecified “information” 
concerning Postal Express’s “viability and operations,” upon 
which Winner claims to have justifiably relied.510 
 
Within a year, Mid-Atlantic was no longer meeting its obligations 
under the lease.511  “Winner also discovered that, far from being a long 
established and successful company, Postal Express actually had been 
formed” in the month preceding Jubb’s bankruptcy filing.512  Plaintiffs sued 
Mid-Atlantic for breach of the lease and obtained a judgment on November 
30, 2004.513  By mid-2005 Daspin told Winner that he had transferred the 
trucks to other operations of his, rejected Winner’s demands to return the 
trucks, and asserted that he owned the trucks.514  Winner began searching 
for the trucks and found them “scattered across the eastern seaboard having 
been abandoned in various states, such as Virginia, Georgia, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and New York.”515 
The court concluded its analysis of plaintiffs’ alter ego claims as 
follows: 
 
Regarding the requisite element of fraud for piercing the 
corporate veil, Plaintiffs allege that after relying in late 2003 
on the documents Daspin provided, they later discovered, for 
example, that Postal Express was not established until 
 
508.  Winner Acceptance Corp., 2008 WL 5352063 at *1. 
509.  Id. 
510.  Id. at *2. 
511.  Id. at *3. 
512.  Winner Acceptance Corp., 2008 WL 5352063 at *3. 
513.  Id. 
514.  Id. 
515.  Id. 
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November 2003.  Additionally, the Complaint avers that 
Defendants did not intend to continue the mail service or the 
lease payments when they gave assurances to Winner to the 
contrary.  Instead, Daspin and the other Defendants 
“intended to abscond with the equity invested by Jubbs and 
Capitimino, abscond with the substantial payments from the 
United States Postal Service and to use the Fleet assets for 
their own gain and purposes.”  The Complaint further alleges 
that Daspin used the Fleet for his own purposes after Mid-
Atlantic ceased making payments.  Plaintiffs claim they “had 
received correspondence from Daspin, stating that he had 
transferred the Fleet to other of Daspin’s operations in order 
to ‘generate revenue.’”  Daspin also claimed he himself 
owned the Fleet, despite the fact that Mid-Atlantic was 
allegedly a mere lessee. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that 
“Defendants’ direct acts, and their clandestine, fraudulent 
and wrongful activities, intentionally left Mid-Atlantic 
without any assets or ability to pay Plaintiffs any judgment, 
Mid-Atlantic’s assets having been transferred to or otherwise 
coming under the exclusive control of Defendants.”  
Additionally, Plaintiffs seek damages directly from Daspin, 
as well as from the other Defendants.  These allegations 
provide a sufficient basis to support a claim for piercing the 
corporate veil, which falls within this Court’s equitable 
jurisdiction.516 
 
Winner clearly appears to be a case of “preventing ‘[f]raud or something 
like it.’”517 
In EBG Holdings LLC v. Vredezicht’s Gravenhage 109 B.V.,518 EBG 
Holdings LLC (“EBG”), a Delaware LLC, sued one of its members, a 
Dutch LLC (“VG 109”), and the member’s parent corporation (“NIBC”), 
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that VG 109 was NIBC’s alter ego.519  The 
court found that EBG had not: 
 
[M]ade a sufficient showing of fraud or other inequity to 
 
516.  Winner Acceptance Corp., 2008 WL 5352063 at *6. 
517.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at 109 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. 
Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989)). 
518.  EBG Holdings LLC v. Vredezicht’s Gravenhage 109 B.V., No. 3184-VCP, 2008 WL 
4057745 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
519.  Id. at *2 (providing that VG 109 owned 163,999 equity units representing approximately 
2.5% of EBG’s equity).  
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justify a departure from the usual rule recognizing the 
corporate form.  Even drawing all inferences in favor of 
EBG, it has not shown that NIBC’s use of the corporate form 
for its VG 109 subsidiary constituted a ‘sham and exist[s] for 
no other purpose than as a vehicle for fraud.  To the 
contrary, NIBC has presented uncontroverted evidence that 
VG 109 predated the formation of EBG and serves as a 
broader investment vehicle, which has held other assets 
besides the membership interests in EBG.  In fact, VG 109 
was formed as a special purpose entity in July 2001, several 
years before the creation of EBG.  In addition, VG 109 has 
observed a number of corporate formalities.  It has, for 
example, filed separate US tax returns and maintains 
separate books and records.  Moreover, although VG 109 
and NIBC’s alleged breach of contract may be unjust or 
wrongful, the requisite element of fraud under the alter ego 
theory must come from an inequitable use of the corporate 
form itself as a sham, and not from the underlying claim.520 
 
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that NIBC should be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware because VG 109 was acting as 
NIBC’s agent in Delaware. 
Texas cases hold that, in addition to establishing alter-ego, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant perpetrated an actual fraud for the 
defendant’s personal benefit.521  Fin and Feather Club involved an attempt 
by Fin and Feather Club to recover over $37,000 in unpaid club dues, 
assessments, and other charges from Dale and Don Leander.522  The club 
shares had been transferred to Father and Sons Property, LLC, a single-
member Texas LLC.523  The court noted the lack of evidence showing that 
Father and Sons Property, LLC should be considered the alter ego of the 
individuals,524 and, the court further noted, there was no evidence that, as 
required by Texas law,525 the LLC was “used to commit an actual fraud on 
 
520.  EBG Holdings LLC, 2008 WL 4057745 at *12. 
521.  Fin & Feather Club v. Leander, 415 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App. 2013); DDH Aviation, L.L.C. v. 
Holly, 2005 WL 770595 (N.D. Tex. 2005); see also supra notes 444-57 and accompanying text. 
522.  Fin & Feather Club, 415 S.W.3d at 551–52. 
523.  Id. at 552. 
524.  Id. at 555–56. 
525.  Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 612–14 (Tex. App. 2012) (explaining that the Texas 
legislature amended the Texas statutes to limit application of alter-ego/veil piercing claims.  Article 
2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act was amended, and, as carried forward in Texas Business 
Organizations Code Section 21.223, provides that a shareholder may not be held liable for any 
contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis that the shareholder is or was the alter ego of the 
corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar 
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the plaintiff for the defendant’s personal benefit.”526  Further, “to recover 
against a member of an LLC individually, the plaintiff must show 
dishonesty or purpose or intent to deceive.”527  Shook v. Walden rejected the 
plaintiffs’ veil-piercing claim on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to 
present evidence that defendant had either used the entity to perpetrate an 
actual fraud or that he did so for his direct personal benefit.528  In 
explaining the policy behind this requirement of Texas law, the court 
observed that the Texas Legislature had amended the Texas entity statutes 
to provide a different balance in veil-piercing cases than had been 
articulated in earlier Texas cases and stated: 
 
[A] claimant must prove that the individual used the 
corporate form to perpetrate actual fraud (i.e., that 
characterized by deliberately misleading conduct) for the 
individual’s direct personal benefit.  This balancing in part 
reflects a distinction, also reflected in [earlier cases], 
between the perceived relative equities of veil-piercing 
claimants who are asserting tort theories of recovery versus 
those suing in contract.  The basic notion was that contract 
claimants, unlike most third parties suing in tort, had 
voluntarily chosen to deal with the corporation and, 
“[a]bsent some deception or fraud,” would have had the 
opportunity to apportion, through negotiated contract terms, 
the risk that the entity would be unable to meet its 
obligations.529 
 
A New York court has stated that a member must have “engaged in 
acts amounting to an abuse or perversion of the LLC form to perpetuate a 
wrong or injustice” to justify piercing the veil of an LLC.530  A California 
court has held that “actual fraud is not required to invoke the alter ego 
doctrine” but that the doctrine will be applied to prevent an unjust and 
inequitable result.531  Another California court held that alter ego liability 
 
theory, or for any obligation of the corporation on the basis that the corporation failed to observe any 
corporate formality.  Texas Business Organizations Code Section 101.002 makes Section 21.223 
applicable to LLCs.). 
526.  Fin & Feather Club, 415 S.W.3d at 556 (citing Shaw v. Maddox Metal Works, Inc., 73 
S.W.3d 472, 481 (Tex. App. 2002)). 
527.  Id. (citing Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App. 1998)). 
528.  Shook, 368 S.W.3d at 622. 
529.  Shook, 368 S.W.3d at 620. 
530.  Grammas v. Lockwood Assoc., LLC, 944 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
531.  Stinky Love, Inc. v. Lacy, No. B163377, 2004 Cal. App. 2004 WL 1803273 (Cal. App. 
2004) (upholding the trial court’s judgment piercing an LLC’s veil and holding Lacy, the LLC’s 
founder and CEO, personally liable on a judgment against the LLC.  The LLC contracted with Stinky 
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could apply even where the individuals did not directly own an interest in 
the LLC but were members of the sole member of the LLC and even 
though the individuals’ indirect interest was only eighteen percent.  “The 
ownership of even a single share in the corporate entity is sufficient to 
qualify one for alter ego liability.”532  Of course, the grounds for imposing 
alter ego liability must otherwise be present.533 
In Ohio, to pierce the veil of a corporation of LLC, the plaintiff must 
show “(1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was so 
complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its 
own, (2) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was 
exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the 
person seeking to disregard the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust 
loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong.”534 
 
Love, Inc. (“Stinky”) to distribute Stinky’s movie “Love Stinks.”  Various representatives of the LLC 
represented to Stinky on more than one occasion that Lacy had committed $30,000,000 in capital to the 
LLC.  Lacy tried to raise $30,000,000 but was unsuccessful and instead capitalized the LLC with 
$1,000,000 of his own money and $150,000 from another company he controlled.  Lacy and his family 
controlled one hundred percent of the LLC, and Lacy closely managed the details of the LLC’s business 
and its expenditures.  The distribution agreement between Stinky and the LLC required the LLC to 
spend $8,000,000 on prints and advertising and to pay $4,300,000, plus a portion of the gross receipts, 
for the distribution rights to the movie.  The movie fared poorly, and Stinky never received any of the 
purchase price.  Stinky obtained an arbitration award against the LLC for breach of contract in the 
amount of $4,300,000, and the award was confirmed by a judgment.  Lacy filed bankruptcy, but the 
stay was lifted to allow Stinky to pursue Lacy.  Following a bench trial, the court found Lacy was the 
alter ego of the LLC and amended the arbitration judgment to add Lacy as a debtor.  The court of 
appeals noted that the alter ego doctrine applies to members of an LLC and stated that two conditions 
must be met to invoke the doctrine: (1) there is such unity of interest between the corporation and its 
equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and its shareholder do not really exist; 
and (2) it would be inequitable to treat the acts in question as those of the corporation alone.  The court 
listed various factors that are considered in applying the alter ego doctrine and concluded the evidence 
was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of alter ego.  The court pointed to evidence of unity of 
interest and ownership based on the Lacy’s family’s control of the LLC and use of its assets for their 
own benefit (including paying off personal credit cards and other debts and maintaining family-owned 
realty).  Stinky’s accountant identified 750 related party disbursements totaling millions of dollars.  The 
court found ample evidence of inadequate capitalization based on the minimal amount of capital 
committed to the LLC relative to its obligations under the distributorship agreement.  Finally, the court 
found it unjust and inequitable that the LLC convinced Stinky to enter the distribution agreement based 
on repeated assurances of adequate capitalization and resources.  The court stated that actual fraud is 
not required to invoke the alter ego doctrine and that the doctrine is not limited to tort cases.). 
532.  Triple “R” Service v. Watson, No. G033798, 2005 WL 1023236 at *10 (Cal. App. 2005). 
533.  Id. at *6 (noting the the court concluded that the two individuals duped the plaintiff into 
transferring certain equipment to the LLC before execution of a written purchase agreement, fabricated 
an evolving series of reasons for failing to make the contractually required payments, and treated the 
equipment as though it was their own property rather than property of the LLC.  The court also stated 
that the transfer of the equipment to another entity without benefit to the LLC constituted evidence of 
several factors justifying veil piercing: commingling of assets, unauthorized diversion of corporate 
assets to other than entity purposes, treatment by a stockholder of corporate assets as his own, failure to 
maintain adequate records, use of the corporation as a mere conduit for an individual’s business, and 
disregard of formalities and failure to maintain arm’s length transactions with the corporation.). 
534.  Ossco Props., Ltd. v. United Commercial Prop. Grp., L.L.C., 968 N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2011) (citing Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 
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Occasionally, a court seems determined to avoid approving veil-
piercing no matter what factors exist.  For example, in K.C. Properties of 
N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC,535 on August 5, 
2004, K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. (“KC”) and Lowell 
Investment Partners, LLC (“LIP”) entered into an operating agreement for 
Ozark Mountain Water Park, LLC (“Ozark”).  The operating agreement 
provided that LIP owned fifty-one-percent of Ozark and that KC owned 
forty-nine-percent.  Pinnacle Management Services, LLC (“Pinnacle”) was 
named the manager of Ozark.  Ozark was created for the purpose of 
“operation of the water park at or near the intersection of Interstate 540 and 
Highway 264 in Lowell, Arkansas.”536  The park was to occupy 16.58 acres 
out of an approximately 34-acre tract owned by Pinnacle Hills Realty, LLC 
(“PHR”).  The members of PHR were Schwyhart, LLC, Graham, LLC, and 
J.B. Hunt, LLC.  The members of PHR were also the members of Pinnacle.  
The property for the water park was to be sold to Ozark for $3,000,000.  
On the same day, Ozark entered into a contract with Buildings, Inc. 
(“Buildings”) to construct the water park at cost plus six percent. 
On September 10, 2004, PHR agreed to sell the entire 34 acres to 
Parker Northwest Properties, LLC for $8,250,000.  KC and Buildings sued 
LIP, Pinnacle, the managers of Pinnacle, Ozark, and the members of 
Pinnacle and PHR.  The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s veil-
piercing claim despite admissions by defendants that one of the defendant 
LLCs had no members, no operating agreement, books, or records and no 
assets, all of its bills were paid by another LLC whose members were 
several of the individual defendants, that no capital contributions were 
made, and that no loans to the LLC were made by any member.537  In an 
apparent non-sequitur, the court responded to this litany of bad factors by 
stating “However, based on our case law, [Pinnacle], LIP, and the 
individual LLCs are separate and distinct legal entities regardless of 
whether they include the same people.”538  Perhaps the real reason for the 
court’s decision was its next sentence: “Further, there have been no facts 
presented by Appellants upon which the individual LLCs can be held liable 
for the actions of PMS and LIP.”539 
 
1077 (Ohio 1993) (emphasis added)).  In 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court modified the second prong of 
the quoted test to read “fraud, an illegal act, or a similarly unlawful act.”  Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 
895 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ohio 2008). 
535.  K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC, 280 S.W.3d 1 
(Ark. 2008). 
536.  Id. at 6. 
537.  K.C. Properties of N.W. Arkansas, Inc., 280 S.W.3d at  16. 
538.  Id. 
539.  Id. 
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Arguably, this was the court’s way of saying that the plaintiff failed to 
show how the bad factors contributed to the harm suffered by plaintiff.  
The court, however, also made a confusing statement in response to 
plaintiffs’ argument that Pinnacle, through the individuals and their LLCs, 
caused PHR to sell the property intended for the water park and that these 
actions of Pinnacle should be imputed to LIP because Pinnacle was the 
manager of LIP, and the individual defendants were the managers of 
Pinnacle.  The court stated: “The [individuals’] LLCs were acting in their 
capacity as members of PHR when they sold the property to another party 
and were not acting on behalf of either [Pinnacle] or LIP.”540  This 
statement is strange because PHR was the seller of the property.  If one gets 
past the court’s description of the seller of the property and other somewhat 
unclear language in the court’s opinion, the case appears to be one in which 
KC, had it been properly advised, could have sought contractual guarantees 
that the property it wanted would not be sold out from under it.  If 
appropriate contractual guarantees were not forthcoming, KC would have 
known that it needed to keep looking for suitable property.  Having not 
taken commercially reasonable steps to protect itself, KC could not 
convince the court on the basis of the apparently inconsequential lack of 
formalities and good recordkeeping that it should be bailed out. 
In Polaris Industrial Corporation v. Kaplan,541 the Nevada Supreme 
Court considered a case arising from a promissory note originally issued by 
National Marketing Services (“NMS”), a now-defunct Nevada corporation, 
to Polaris Industrial Corporation (“Polaris”) for amounts owing on an 
account. The note was later assumed by Commercial Resources, Inc. 
(“CRI”), another Nevada corporation no longer in existence.  In 1979, 
Polaris brought an action on the note against both corporations and their 
two shareholders and officers, Bob Davis and Michael Kaplan.  Polaris 
alleged Davis and Kaplan were the alter egos of NMS and CRI.  Summary 
judgment was entered for Polaris against the corporations.  Polaris then 
amended its complaint to add as defendants Cambist Corporation and 
respondent Jerome Kaplan alleging they, too, were the alter egos of NMS 
and CRI.  Cambist Corporation and Bob Davis defaulted.  The case 
proceeded to trial against respondents Michael and Jerome Kaplan.  The 
district court concluded Polaris had not borne its burden of proof in 
demonstrating the Kaplans were the alter egos of NMS and CRI.  Judgment 
was entered for the defendants. 
In reviewing the district court’s decision, the court in Polaris made 
several observations, including the following: 
 
540.  Id. at 9. 
541.  Polaris Industrial Corp. v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884 (Nev. 1987). 
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The district court found that the corporation paid 
Kaplan’s personal obligations, that Kaplan made 
withdrawals of funds for his own use without following 
corporate procedures and that certain corporate formalities 
were not observed.  These findings point to a unity of 
interest between the individual and the corporation.  [The 
Supreme Court then stated:] However, these actions must 
also be the cause of Polaris’s injury and must have 
sanctioned a fraud or promoted an injustice before the 
corporate veil can be pierced. (emphasis added)542 
The record does not reflect how failure to issue stock or 
keep proper corporate minutes sanctioned a fraud or 
promoted an injustice to Polaris.  It also does not establish 
that an injustice necessarily resulted from the corporation’s 
payment of Kaplan’s personal debts.  Kaplan testified the 
payments were in lieu of salary.  We also note the district 
court did not specifically find that the corporations were 
undercapitalized. (emphasis added)543 
Although Macey and Mitts544 do not discuss Polaris, the following 
statement from their article indicates that they would certainly agree with 
the court’s statements: 
 
[I]t seems nothing short of bizarre to impose liability on a 
shareholder on the grounds that the corporation has not been 
scrupulous about keeping minutes or other records unless 
there is some connection between the sloppy or non-existent 
record-keeping and the harm to the plaintiff, which generally 
there is not.545 
 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that the corporate form may 
be disregarded “to prevent unjust or inequitable consequences.”546  The 
court further stated that “[f]or a corporation to be accorded treatment as a 
separate entity, it must exist and function as such and not be the alter ego of 
the person owning and controlling it and cannot be used or ignored just to 
 
542.  Polaris Industrial Corp., 747 P.2d at 887. 
543.  Id. 
544.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 11. 
545.  Id. at 108.  Note that the court in Polaris did approve piercing the veil on grounds other than 
the lack of formalities, i.e., corporate insiders treated the corporation’s funds as their own, leaving 
corporate debts unpaid.  See supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. 
546.  Amfac Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73, 79 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis added). 
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fit the convenience of the individual.”547  Fraud is not required — “[i]t is 
sufficient if the refusal to recognize the fact of the identity of the corporate 
existence by the individual brings about an inequitable result.”548  In this 
case, C & B Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (“C & B”) owed Amfac 
Mechanical Supply Company (“Amfac”) $11,000.  Amfac sued Carl and 
Beverly Federer, the sole shareholders of C & B, to collect the debt of C & 
B from them. 
Although the Amfac court found that there was inadequate 
capitalization and disregard of formalities, the crucial facts supporting the 
court’s determination that veil-piercing was appropriate in this case were 
that Carl Federer sometimes billed for plumbing work in his personal name 
and sometimes billed in the name of C & B.  Further, payments for 
plumbing work sometimes were deposited directly into the Federers’ 
personal bank account.549  In addition, the Federers placed themselves in a 
preferred position by taking $1,000 per month out of C & B to repay 
themselves for a loan they had made to the corporation but did not pay 
anything to Amfac. 
 
Amfac was followed in Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc.550  In that case, the 
court affirmed the district court’s piercing of the veil of Meadowbrook 
Development, Inc. (“Meadowbrook”) and holding its majority shareholder, 
Maurice Miles liable for an unpaid obligation of Meadowbrook.  Factors 
that the court emphasized were that Miles moved funds into and out of the 
Meadowbrook accounts at his whim without any documentation, that 
Meadowbrook constructed buildings for Miles without being reimbursed 
for its expenses, and that there was unauthorized diversion of assets of 
Meadowbrook for personal purposes.551  These actions by Miles left 
Meadowbrook without funds to pay its obligations. 
In Naples v. Keystone Building and Development Corporation,552 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court discussed the instrumentality and identity tests.  
Although the court noted that plaintiffs had satisfied the first required 
element of the instrumentality test, i.e., that the individual defendant 
controlled the affairs of the LLC, and acknowledged the plaintiffs’ reliance 
on the close relationship between the individual’s personal finances and 
those of his LLC and the individual’s failure to comply with corporate 
formalities by failing to maintain minutes and other records such as an 
 
547.  Id. (citing Cohen v. Williams, 318 So.2d 279, 281–82 (Ala. 1975)). 
548.  Id. (emphasis added). 
549.  Amfac Mechanical Supply Co., 645 P.2d at 78. 
550.  Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1988). 
551.  Id. at 1024. 
552.  Naples v. Keystone Building and Development Corporation, 990 A.2d 326 (Conn. 2010). 
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operating agreement.553  The plaintiffs’ piercing claim failed, however, 
because the court found that the evidence did not show that the individual 
used his control in an improper way so as to violate the plaintiff’s rights or 
cause injury to the plaintiffs.554  The court stated that the plaintiffs failed to 
point to any evidence that the LLC did not serve a legitimate business 
purpose or that failure to pierce its veil would perpetrate injustice. 
A bankruptcy court in Nevada provided a comprehensive look at what 
causation is required and why in In re Giampietro.555  In that case, James 
Giampietro had formed a single-member LLC, Chianti Café, LLC 
(“Chianti”) to acquire the assets of AE Restaurants Associates, LLC 
(“AE”), an LLC owned by Dr. Allen Anes, and to be the transferee of AE’s 
restaurant lease.  Chianti and AE negotiated a contract under which Chianti 
would buy AE’s assets.  $20,000 was placed into escrow, and the closing 
and transfer of the assets were to occur as soon as Chianti acquired a liquor 
license.556  The contract failed to close, for reasons that were disputed.  
Chianti sued AE in Nevada state court for return of the $20,000 escrow 
deposit.  AE counterclaimed for breach of contract and ultimately obtained 
a judgment against Chianti for $130,000.  By the time AE obtained this 
judgment and attempted to add Mr. Giampietro as a defendant, Mr. 
Giampietro had filed for bankruptcy.557 
AE then filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy seeking to deny 
Mr. Giampietro’s discharge.558  AE would have standing to pursue denial 
only if it is a creditor of Mr. Giampietro, and AE would be considered a 
creditor of Mr. Giampietro only if it could establish that Chianti is the alter 
ego of Mr. Giampietro.559 
The court discussed the parties’ disagreement over whether Mr. 
Giampietro was to guarantee Chianti’s obligations to AE under the 
Agreement, stating: 
 
Dr. Anes was adamant that he understood that Mr. 
Giampietro was to guarantee Chianti Café’s obligations 
under the agreement, and AE introduced evidence that Dr. 
Anes, on behalf of AE, had requested and obtained a 
financial statement from Mr. Giampietro (actually, AE 
obtained a copy of a financial statement that Mr. Giampietro 
 
553.  Id. at 341. 
554.  Id. at 342. 
555.  In re Giampietro, 317 B. R. 841 (Bankr. Ct. D. Nev. 2004). 
556.  Id. at 844. 
557.  In re Giampietro, 317 B. R. at 844. 
558.  Id. 
559.  Id. at 844–845. 
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had given to Bank of America earlier during 2000).  Mr. 
Giampietro was equally adamant that he never agreed to give 
AE a guaranty of Chianti Café’s obligations to AE.  In Mr. 
Giampietro’s favor is that fact that the Agreement nowhere 
mentions a guaranty by Mr. Giampietro of Chianti Café’s 
obligations to AE.  Moreover, while a copy of the signed 
Agreement as well as drafts of the Agreement were 
produced, no guaranty signed by Mr. Giampietro was 
produced, nor was a draft of any proposed guaranty.  Mr. 
Giampietro did, however, introduce a signed guaranty in 
favor of the landlord. His credible testimony was that: the 
landlord insisted on Mr. Giampietro’s guaranty as a 
condition of consenting to the lease transfer; and Chianti 
Café needed to have the landlord bound to honor Chianti 
Café as a tenant in order to apply for a liquor license.  Dr. 
Anes’ testimony essentially was that he, on behalf of AE, did 
not distinguish between Chianti Café, LLC and Mr. 
Giampietro.  This testimony, however, is somewhat undercut 
by other parts of his testimony in which he stated that he 
wanted a guaranty from Mr. Giampietro — why obtain a 
guaranty unless there were two entities?  His testimony was 
further discredited by his and AE’s conduct in the 
subsequent state court litigation.  In that litigation, Chianti 
Café, LLC was the initial plaintiff and AE the initial 
defendant; in its answer and counterclaim, AE never sought 
to name Mr. Giampietro individually.  Finally, Dr. Anes 
knew, or he and his advisors should have known, that any 
guaranty would have had to have been in writing, since the 
Nevada statute of frauds requires “[e]very special promise to 
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another” to be 
evidenced by some writing signed by the guarantor.560 
 
The court then discussed the unity of interest existing between Mr. 
Giampietro and Chianti: 
 
Here, while at all times relevant Chianti Café was a 
separate entity, there is no question that Mr.Giampietro 
“influenced and governed” the activities and actions of 
Chianti Café.  Chianti Café was a one-person limited 
liability company, formed to acquire the Portabello 
 
560.  In re Giampietro, 317 B. R. at 850–851. 
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restaurant.  It did whatever James Giampietro wanted, 
because he was the sole flesh-and-blood person who was 
connected with it. 
It is also clear that there was a unity of interest, at least 
from the Chianti Café side.  Chianti Café was owned wholly 
by James Giampietro, and Mr. Giampietro made all the 
business decisions.  Other creditors of Mr. Giampietro, 
however, would not consider Chianti Café “inseparable” 
from James Giampietro; indeed, the $20,000 escrow deposit 
made by Chianti Café was as effectively separate from Mr. 
Giampietro’s creditors as would be any other voluntary 
transfer.  While this feature may limit the class of creditors 
that could assert an alter ego claim, cases still treat it as 
present when, from the complaining creditor’s perspective, 
the entity they dealt with and the putative alter ego possessed 
the same unity of ownership and interest.561 
 
The court then discussed why there must be a causal connection 
between the harm suffered by a plaintiff and the actions of the defendant in 
a veil-piercing case: 
 
Nevada courts have focused on “the element of reliance, or 
more particularly, on ‘reasonable reliance’ by the 
complaining creditor upon debtor conduct which would 
indicate either the absence of a corporate form or the 
assumption of liability by a person or entity controlling an 
openly visible corporation.”562 
 
Accordingly, the court stated that whether the plaintiff here had shown 
that: 
recognition of Chianti Café’s separate existence would 
sanction fraud or promote injustice — resolves itself into an 
examination of the AE’s reasonable expectations at the time 
the parties signed the Agreement. 
On this score, AE’s proof fails.  AE negotiated a contract 
that it knew was to be signed only by Chianti Café, a limited 
liability company.  It accepted this contract knowing that the 
landlord had requested — and would receive — a separately 
signed guaranty by Mr. Giampietro that was in addition to a 
 
561.  Id. at 851–852 (internal citations omitted). 
562.  In re Giampietro, 317 B. R. at 856. 
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formal assumption of the lease obligations by Chianti Café.  
The Agreement itself contains no requirement that Mr. 
Giampietro provide a guaranty at the closing of the 
transaction; indeed, Dr. Anes testified that the chief 
contingency was obtaining a liquor license.  That the parties 
did not contemplate a separate guaranty is further shown by 
the fact that the Agreement contains an integration clause, 
raising at least the presumption that the Agreement 
contained all of the material closing conditions to the 
transaction. 
Chianti Café, not Mr. Giampietro, then deposited a 
$20,000 cashier’s check for the earnest money deposit into 
escrow, albeit it is true that Mr. Giampietro was the remitter 
for that check.  Such informal contributions to capital are to 
be expected in the formation stages of a business, and Mr. 
Giampietro testified that he intended to document the 
formalities as soon as he had taken possession and opened 
up the business.  What matters here is not so much that Mr. 
Giampietro did not assiduously and contemporaneously 
document each act taken on behalf of Chianti Café — what 
matters is that AE did not rely upon, or even care about, the 
lack of formality.563 
 
The court concluded its analysis as follows: 
 
At least at the time of the signing of the Agreement, it 
appears that AE was dealing with Chianti Café and Mr. 
Giampietro as two entities.  This division continued 
throughout the sad coda to that signing.  When the 
transaction fell apart, it was Chianti Café — not Mr. 
Giampietro — who sued to recover the $20,000 earnest 
money deposit.  In response, AE counterclaimed against 
Chianti Café — not Mr. Giampietro.  And it waited over a 
year before it even attempted to add Mr. Giampietro to the 
action. 
These facts lead to the conclusion that, at all times 
relevant, AE treated Chianti Café as a separate legal 
individual.  While they expected Mr. Giampietro to continue 
to run Chianti Café, they took no steps to ensure that state of 
affairs (such as a clause in the Agreement that Mr. 
 
563.  In re Giampietro, 317 B. R. at 857 (emphasis added). 
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Giampietro would manage the restaurant, or that the 
agreement would be in default if Mr. Giampietro transferred 
his membership interest in Chianti Café to another person).  
In short, AE “received ‘exactly what [it] bargained for,’” and 
thus the denial of recourse to Mr. Giampietro is not unjust.564 
 
In In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC (Frazier v. Sikeston Board of 
Municipal Utilities),565 two public utilities (the “Utilities”) wanted to 
reopen the Brushy Creek Mine in Saline County, Illinois.  Each of the 
Utilities was a member of the Western Fuels Association, Inc. (“WFA”), a 
Wyoming nonprofit corporation that functions as a fuel-supply cooperative 
for its members.566  WFA’s members own coal-powered electric generators 
and are rural cooperative utilities and municipal utilities.567  WFA created 
and owned all the voting stock in two corporations relevant to this case: 
Western Fuels — Illinois, Inc. (“WFI”) and Western Fuel Services Corp. 
(“WFSC”).568  The Utilities owned one-half of WFI’s preferred stock but 
owned no stock in WFSC.569  The Utilities wanted to develop two coal 
seams at the Brushy Creek Mine, one to supply coal for their needs and one 
to sell to raise money to pay legacy costs of the mine, which had been 
closed since 1999.570  The Utilities had been involved in operating (through 
a third-party lessee) the Brushy Creek Mine from late 1979 through 
1999.571  Also associated with the prior operations of the Brushy Creek 
Mine was the Cities Trust, which was established by the Utilities in 1978 to 
acquire an interest in Marion Coal Sales, LP.572  Marion’s purpose was to 
generate commission revenue from the Brushy Creek Mine.  The Utilities 
were the only beneficiaries of the Cities Trust, and WFI was the original 
trustee.573 
The Utilities wanted to be protected from liability in the reopening of 
the mine.574  To that end, a new entity was formed to reopen the mine, 
Liberty Coal Co., LLC, a Colorado LLC.575  Shortly after formation of 
 
564.  Id. at 857–858 (citing Lipshie v. Tracy Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 370, 378, 566 P.2d 819, 824 (Nev. 
1977)). 
565.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, No. 09-CV-0371-MJR, 2010 WL 1415998 (S.D. Ill. 
2010). 
566.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *3. 
567.  Id. 
568.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *3. 
569.  Id. 
570.  Id. at *3–*4. 
571.  Id. at *4. 
572.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *4. 
573.  Id. 
574.  Id. 
575.  Id. 
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Liberty Coal, the Utilities amended the Cities Trust agreement to replace 
WFI as trustee with WFSC and authorizing WFSC to acquire one hundred 
percent of the membership interests in Liberty Coal.576  The Utilities each 
agreed to pay one-half of WFSC’s expenses (including attorney fees) 
incurred in connection with acquiring the membership interest in Liberty 
Coal and in the performance of any rights or duties associated with 
ownership of the membership interest.577 
On the same day, Liberty Coal and Cities Trust executed an operating 
agreement for Liberty Coal.  The operating agreement provided that Cities 
Trust would be responsible for making such capital contributions as 
determined from time to time unanimously by Liberty Coal’s Board of 
Governors and approved by Liberty Coal’s members.  Cities Trust was also 
authorized to make loans to Liberty Coal.  Liberty Coal’s Board of 
Governors consisted of three persons, one appointed by each of the Utilities 
and the third being the general manager of WFA.578 
Liberty Coal obtained $9,100,000 in bank financing that was 
guaranteed by WFI and the Cities Trust.  Cities Trust also guaranteed 
Liberty Coal’s equipment leases.  One of the Utilities loaned $1,840,000 to 
Liberty Coal, and WFI loaned Liberty Coal $1,660,000.  Liberty Coal also 
received approximately $5,000,000 in government grants.579 
Although the Brushy Creek Mine made a profit in one year, it did not 
become profitable.  Liberty Coal declared bankruptcy in July 2006.  None 
of the parties to the Brushy Creek Mine reopening received value from 
Liberty Coal, and the Utilities and WFI suffered substantial losses.580  The 
bankruptcy trustee for Liberty Coal filed this action seeking to impose 
liability for Liberty Coal’s debts on the Utilities, Cities Trust, WFSC, and 
WFI on the theory that they were the alter egos of Liberty Coal.581  The 
court stated that even if it assumed that the veil-piercing factors alleged by 
plaintiff were true, plaintiff had submitted no evidence that any of the 
alleged factors had caused plaintiff’s damages.582  With respect to the 
trustee’s argument that Liberty Coal was undercapitalized, the court stated: 
Granted, undercapitalization would be inherently prejudicial because, 
by definition, “undercapitalization occurs when a corporation or limited 
liability company is unreasonably funded at startup such that it would be 
unable to pay its liabilities and obligations when they become due.”583 
 
576.  Id. at *4–*5. 
577.  Id. at *5. 
578.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *5. 
579.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *6–*7. 
580.  Id. at *7–*8. 
581.  Id. at *1. 
582.  Id. at *11. 
583.  Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
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The court further stated with respect to undercapitalization: 
 
Mere underestimation of required startup capital does not 
rise to the level of fraud or wrongdoing.  As the text of 
Phillips indicates, a plaintiff would need to provide evidence 
of more than mere negligence in starting the corporation.  
The plaintiff would have to show fraud or wrongdoing 
associated with the undercapitalization.  For example, she 
could have shown that the defendants undercapitalized to 
defeat the rightful claim of a creditor or that they 
undercapitalized and held themselves out as adequately 
capitalized.  Frazier only argues that the venture was not 
properly funded at startup, not that the defendants funded the 
venture in a fraudulent manner or in a way to defeat 
creditor’s rights.  This undercapitalization is not a fraud and 
was not used to defeat the rightful claims of creditors.584 
 
 
The opinion in this case also reports what may the silliest argument 
ever made in a veil-piercing case.  The plaintiff argued that the court’s veil-
piercing analysis was flawed because it did not discuss the factors in the 
same order the court in In re Phillips did.585 
In re Weddle (Elsaesser v. Cougar Crest Lodge, L.L.C.)586 considered 
a bankruptcy trustee’s attempt to establish that the defendant LLC and its 
ninety percent member, Foster Manning were alter egos.  If the trustee 
succeeded in this argument then the LLC would be a statutory insider under 
bankruptcy law, and the trustee would then have a basis for pursuing a 
preferential transfer claim.  Although the court thought that there might be 
genuine issues of material fact on the unity of interest factor,587 the court 
granted the LLC’s motion for summary judgment that it was not an insider 
because plaintiff had not presented any evidence that recognizing the LLC 
as a separate entity would lead to an inequitable result.588 
In Advanced Telephone Systems Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile 
 
584.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *9–*10 (citing In re Phillips, 139 
P.3d 639 (Colo. 2006). The court in Frazier applied Colorado law because Liberty Coal was a Colorado 
LLC). 
585.  In re Liberty Coal Company, LLC, 2010 WL 1415998 at *10–*11. 
586.  In re Weddle (Elsaesser v. Cougar Crest Lodge, L.L.C.), 353 B.R. 892 (Bkrtcy, D. Idaho 
2006). 
587.  Id. at 898. 
588.  Id. at 898–899. 
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Radio LLC,589 the court denied the plaintiff’s veil-piercing claim.590  In 
discussing the plaintiff’s claim, the court noted that the evidence at trial had 
established lack of formalities but “the law nevertheless requires that this 
lack of formalities led to some misuse of the corporate form.”591 
The federal district court for the District of Oregon stated that it would 
allow the piercing of the limited liability veil of an LLC where: 
 
 the defendant controlled the debtor; 
 the defendant engaged in improper conduct; and 
 as a result of the improper conduct, the plaintiff either 
entered into a transaction that it otherwise would not 
have entered into, or the plaintiff was not able to collect 
a debt against an insolvent entity.592 
 
In this case, the court found that the defendant, who was the sole 
manager and member, clearly controlled the LLC.  The court also found 
“improper conduct” where there was “commingling assets and a general 
disregard of [the LLC’s] form and status as a separate legal entity.”593  The 
trial court could not determine the third factor on motions and left it for 
determination at trial. 
In J.C. Compton Company v. Brewster594 defendant was not liable on a 
veil-piercing claim because, although the jury found that defendant, 
through its improper conduct, caused plaintiff to enter into a contract with 
defendant’s LLC, that the LLC was grossly undercapitalized, and that the 
undercapitalization caused the LLC to default on its obligations to the 
plaintiff, the jury also found that the improper conduct and 
undercapitalization did not cause plaintiff any damages.595  The jury’s 
finding that the improper conduct and undercapitalization did not cause 
plaintiff any damages seems strange because the jury, as noted, did find 
that the LLC was grossly undercapitalized and that the undercapitalization 
caused the LLC to default on its obligations.  The court spent little time on 
the veil-piercing claim but devoted most of its opinion to finding that there 
 
589.  Advanced Telephone Systems Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile Radio LLC, 846 A.2d 
1264 (Pa. Super. 2004). 
590.  Id. at 1267. 
591.  Id. at 1279 (citing Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d 
Cir.1994)) (explaining that “[n]ot every disregard of corporate formalities or failure to maintain 
corporate records justifies piercing the corporate veil”). 
592.  BLD Prods. Ltd. v. Technical Plastics of Oregon, LLC, CV 05-556-KI, 2006 WL 3628062 
(D. Ore. 2006). 
593.  BLD Prods. Ltd.,  2006 WL 3628062 at *5. 
594.  J.C. Compton Company v. Brewster, 59 P. 3d 1288 (Or. App. 2002). 
595.  Id. at 1290. 
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was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant had 
agreed to assume the LLC’s debts to plaintiff.596  As plaintiff appears to 
have received the relief from this holding that he would have received 
under his veil-piercing claim, the court did not have to spend what little 
time it did on that claim.  Accordingly, this case does not appear to be good 
authority that the kind of behavior the defendant engaged in will not 
ordinarily result in a successful veil-piercing claim. 
Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead, LLC597 states that piercing the veil of an 
entity under the instrumentality rule requires that the control and breach of 
duty necessary for application of the instrumentality “must proximately 
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.”598  The court further stated, 
with respect to imposing personal liability on an individual owner: 
 
[A] finding that an individual member of a limited liability 
company personally engaged in certain conduct, such as 
fraud or misrepresentation, is necessary to support the 
imposition of individual liability against that member under 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57C-3-30(a), a finding of actual fraud 
against an individual member is not required to support the 
imposition of alter ego liability under the instrumentality 
rule.  Rather, the requisite element for piercing the corporate 
veil under the instrumentality rule requires a finding that the 
individual member used his control over the entity “to 
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a 
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and 
unjust act in contravention of [the] plaintiffs’ legal 
rights[.]”599 
 
IX.  REVERSE VEIL PIERCING 
 
In an outsider reverse pierce, the creditor seeks to access the assets of 
the entity in order to satisfy the owner’s debt to the judgment-creditor.  In 
the context of a corporation, outsider reverse piercing has traditionally been 
rare in that the judgment-creditor has had as an available remedy the 
seizure and sale of the judgment-debtor’s stock.  That seizure and sale has 
afforded a mechanism by which the judgment-creditor could at least in part 
be made whole.  In reverse veil piercing, owner creditors seek payment 
 
596.  Id. at 1292–93. 
597.  Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead, LLC, 748 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. App. 2013). 
598.  Id. at 574. 
599.  Estate of Hurst, 748 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 454, 329 S.E.2d 
326, 330 (1958) (emphasis in original)). 
  
466 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
from entity assets. It is the reverse of “veil piercing” where a creditor of an 
entity seeks payment of the entity debt from an owner.  In the LLC context, 
it can be defined as an approach where creditors seek payment from assets 
of the LLC to satisfy a debt of a member.600  Reverse veil piercing has been 
accepted by some courts and rejected by others.  In re Phillips601 identified 
two types of reverse piercing: 
(i) ‘inside claims’ involving a ‘controlling insider who 
attempts to have the corporate entity disregarded to avail the 
insider of corporate claims against third party claims” which 
allow a shareholder to disregard the corporate form of which 
he is a part; and 
(ii) ‘outside claims’ which occur when a corporate 
outsider ‘pressing an action against a corporate insider seeks 
to disregard the corporate entity [and] to subject corporate 
assets to the claim,’ involving an outsider seeking to obligate 
a corporation for the debts of a dominant shareholder or 
other corporate insider.602 
 
The Phillips court limited its review to ‘outside claims.’  California 
courts have rejected reverse veil-piercing.603  The Texas Court of Appeals 
in Adams v. McFadden604  rendered what is in effect a reverse veil piercing 
decision in an opinion of doubtful validity.  In that case, the court held that 
the limited liability company involved was liable for the damages caused 
by Joy Adams on the ground that Ms. Adams was a “vice-principal of the 
corporation.”605  The court treated the limited liability company as a 
corporation for this purpose because Ms. Adams had testified at trial that 
the entity was a limited liability corporation and that she was the president 
and sole stockholder.606 
The court in Chicago Title Company v. Metropolitan Property 
Holdings, LLC607 rejected an attempt by the California Franchise Tax Board 
to reach the assets of an LLC to satisfy ta liabilities of an individual owner, 
 
600.  See Carter G. Bishop, Reverse Piercing: A Single Member LLC Paradox, 54 S.D. L. REV. 
199 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2005). 
601.  In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644–45 (Colo. 2006). 
602.  Id. 
603.  See Blue Water Sunset, LLC v. First View, LLC, No. B204012, 2008 WL 5394933 (Cal. 
App. 2 Dist. Dec. 9, 2008); Chicago Title Company v. Metropolitan Property Holdings, LLC, No. 
B206217, 2009 WL 711767 (Cal. App. 2 dist. March 19, 2009). 
604.  Adams v. McFadden, 296 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App. 2009). 
605.  Id. at 762–63. 
606.  Id. at 762. 
607.  Chicago Title Company v. Metropolitan Property Holdings, LLC, No. B206217, 2009 WL 
711767 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. March 19, 2009). 
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noting that the Tax Board was attempting an outside reverse pierce of the 
LLC’s view, and that another California appellate court, in a case of first 
impression in California, had specifically declined to accept outside reverse 
veil-piercing.608  Middlesex Retirement System, LLC v. Board of Assessors 
of Billerica609 rejected an argument that real estate owned by an LLC 
should be deemed to be owned by the LLC’s sole member, Middlesex 
Retirement System (“MRS”), a governmental entity, and thus exempt from 
property tax.  The LLC did not argue that any of the factors that would 
cause it to be treated as the alter ego of MRS were present.  The court noted 
that MRS could have purchased the land itself, in which case it would have 
been entitled to a tax exemption.610  The court noted that the record did not 
disclose why MRS had formed the LLC, but observed: “If, for example, 
MRS created LLC as a shield against claims of premises liability, it may 
not properly ask to lower that shield to avoid the tax consequences of its 
decision.”611  This case offers a cautionary tale to the many nonprofits 
which place real estate in a single member LLC for liability protection. 
In Auntie Ruth’s Furry Friends Home Away From Home, Ltd. v. GCC 
Property Management,612 the court refused to disregard the separate 
existence of a commonly owned corporation and LLC for purposes of 
applying a right of first refusal provision in a lease and held that the 
transfer of the property from the lessor corporation to a commonly 
controlled LLC constituted a sale of the property that triggered the right of 
first refusal. 
Klein v. Weidner,613 approved a reverse veil-piercing action by a 
former spouse to recover assets from her ex-husband’s LLC where the LLC 
observed no formalities, the LLC’s assets were routinely used to pay 
personal expenses of the ex-husband and his new wife, and the ex-husband 
had stated his intention to hide his assets from his former spouse. 
In re Ekstrom614 rejected the Debtor’s claim that Ireland Bank should 
be treated as a secured creditor in his bankruptcy.  The Debtor argued that 
even though legal title to the property on which Ireland Bank held a 
mortgage was held by EZ Livin’ Inn, LLC, Debtor personally borrowed the 
funds from Ireland Bank, made all payments on the debt, and owns one 
 
608.  Id. at n. 7 (citing Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1501, 1513 
(2008), review declined by California Supreme Court on Aug. 27, 2008). 
609.  Middlesex Retirement System, LLC v. Board of Assessors of Billerica, 453 Mass. 495 
(2009). 
610.  Id. at 500. 
611.  Id. at 503 and note 6. 
612.  Auntie Ruth’s Furry Friends Home Away From Home, Ltd. v. GCC Property Management, 
No. A08-1602, 2009 WL 2926485 (Minn. App. 2009). 
613.  Klein v. Weidner, No.08-3798, 2010 WL 571800 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
614.  In re Ekstrom, No. 08-07750-SSC, 2010 WL 1254893 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010). 
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hundred percent of the interests of the LLC.  Debtor argued that his 
“equitable interest” was sufficient to make Ireland Bank a secured creditor 
for purposes of Debtor’s Plan.  The court disagreed, stating: 
 
It is undisputed that title to the property is vested in EZ 
Livin’ Inn, LLC.  The membership interests in EZ Livin’ 
Inn, LLC are held by the Debtor, his wife and Standard 
Management, LLC.  The EZ Livin’ Inn, LLC is owned by 
the Ekstrom Family Limited Partnership.  The Debtor holds 
a 49.5 percent limited partnership interest in the partnership.  
The Debtor’s wife also holds a 49.5 percent limited 
partnership interest.  A one percent general partnership 
interest in the Ekstrom Family Limited Partnership is held by 
Standard Management LLC.  The Debtor’s interest in the 
Ekstrom Family Limited Partnership was contributed to the 
Dennis Ekstrom Living Trust.  The Debtor is essentially 
requesting that the Court disregard several legal entities to 
determine that Ireland Bank is a secured creditor of the 
Debtor.615 
After discussing In re Hecker,616 the court observed: 
 
Here, we also have an experienced businessman who created 
numerous limited liability companies.  The Debtor has 
created such entities for estate planning purposes, but the 
Debtor’s requested relief is similar to veil piercing; that is, 
the Debtor wishes to shield certain assets from the reach of 
creditors.  The Debtor has enjoyed the benefits of limited 
liability, and must now accept the consequences of such 
estate planning.617 
 
Courts should categorically reject an effort to reverse pierce to permit 
the owners to enjoy the benefit of entity assets.  One is reminded of the 
classic description of chutzpah, namely killing your parents and then 
throwing yourself on the mercy of the court because you are an orphan.618 
 
615.  Id.at *11. 
616.  In re Hecker, 414 B.R. 499 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009). 
617.  In re Ekstrom, 2010 WL 1254893 at *11. 
618.  See, e.g., Wingate v. Celebrity Cruises, Ltd., 79 So. 3d 180, 183 n. 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); Steven B. Spector, “Chutzpah and the Law,” 87 LAW LIBR. J. 357, 375 (1995); see also J. A. 
Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner, 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 209 (2d ed. 1991) (defining the term 
“chutzpah”).  Thanks to Tom Rutledge for providing this reference in the materials for the presentation 
on “Piercing the Unincorporated Veil” at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the ABA Business Law Section, 
supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
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Instituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC619 rejected 
plaintiff’s arguments in a patent infringement action that the veil of an LLC 
should be pierced.  Plaintiff’s last argument on this point was that 
defendant’s “prior conduct in this litigation” meant “that alter-ego liability 
is necessary to ‘prevent the injustice that would arise if [the defendant] 
transferred or disposed of assets through or via [the], LLC in an effort to 
defeat collection activities.’”620  The court responded that this kind of 
misconduct could be combatted only through reverse veil piercing,  
 
which the Georgia Supreme Court has rejected, in part 
because “more traditional theories of conversion, fraudulent 
conveyance of assets, respondeat superior, and agency law 
are adequate to deal with situations where one seeks to 
recover from a corporation for the wrongful conduct 
committed by a controlling stockholder without the necessity 
to invent a new theory of liability.”621 
 
As recently observed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Turner v. 
Andrew,622 responding to the assertion that the single member of an LLC 
should be able to pursue on his own account a claim for lost profits 
suffered by the LLC: “The LLC and its solitary member, Andrew, are not 
legally interchangeable.  Moreover, an LLC is not a legal coat that one slips 
on to protect the owner from liability but then discards or ignores 
altogether when it is time to pursue a damage claim.”623 
As a general proposition, courts have rejected efforts by members to 
ignore the LLC and to treat its assets as their own.  In Abrahim & Sons 
Enterprises v. Equion Enterprises, LLC,624 Shell Oil Company and Texaco 
Inc. formed Equilon Enterprises, a limited liability company, and 
transferred all of their western refining and marketing assets and gas station 
leases to Equilon.  Plaintiffs, a group of independent dealers who operate 
gas stations from Shell or Texaco sued, alleging that the transfer of the 
leases to Equilon violated California Business & Professions Code § 
20999.25(a), which prohibits a franchisor from selling, transferring, or 
 
619.  Instituform Technologies, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.  Also discussed supra notes 499-
501 and accompanying text (causation), notes 304-10 and accompanying text (undercapitalization must 
be coupled with an intent to avoid debts), and notes 227–32 and accompanying text (interesting take on 
separateness). 
620.  Instituform Technologies, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. 
621.  Instituform Technologies, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 (citing Acree v. McMahan, 584 
S.E.2d 873, 874 (Ga. 2003)). 
622.  Turner v. Andrew, 413 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2013). 
623.  Id. at 276. 
624.  Abrahim & Sons Enterprises v. Equion Enterprises, LLC, 929 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002). 
  
470 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
assigning an interest in a premises to another person unless he or she first 
makes a boa fide offer to sell that interest to the franchisee.  The court 
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, 
giving short shrift to all of Shell and Texaco’s arguments — Equilon was a 
separate legal entity, was undoubtedly a “person,” and it was irrelevant that 
the transfer to Equilon was a tax-free exchange. 
In In re Bianchini (Bianchini v. Ryan),625 a judgment had been entered 
in a prior lawsuit against the debtor in New Jersey based on the jury’s 
finding that several entities owned by the debtor, including an LLC, were 
the debtor’s alter egos created to shield assets or for other unjust purposes 
and that the assets of any of them should be used to satisfy debts of any 
other.  A judgment lien was recorded on property owned by the LLC, and 
the property was later conveyed to the debtor.  In this bankruptcy 
proceeding, the debtor sought to treat the LLC’s property as his own at the 
time the judgment lien was recorded so that he could claim his property as 
exempt under Section 522(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The court 
rejected the debtor’s claim, stating that it did construe the New Jersey 
judgment as declaring that the debtor was the owner of the LLC’s property 
at that time.  The court noted that the debtor was attempting to “reverse 
pierce” the LLC’s veil to treat the LLC’s assets as his own.  The court 
observed that many jurisdictions recognized both offensive and defensive 
reverse veil-piercing but then stated that equitable principles govern veil 
piercing in Connecticut and concluded that Connecticut courts would not 
allow piercing the veil between the debtor and the LLC to allow the debtor 
to benefit by disregarding the record title to the property when the debtor 
had placed record title to the property in the LLC for unjust purposes.  The 
court, however, commented in a footnote that if record title to the property 
was still in the LLC at the date of the bankruptcy petition and the trustee 
sought to pierce the LLC’s veil for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors, that 
would have been a different matter. 
Professor Carter Bishop has suggested that reverse veil piercing may 
be an appropriate remedy to help a creditor of the member of a single-
member LLC where the creditor obtains ownership of all of the member’s 
transferable interest.626  The problem that arises in a state whose LLC 
statute provides that the transferor remains the sole member and the 
creditor becomes only an assignee is that the member retains control over 
the LLC and, for example, whether it will make distributions or dissolve.  
This will not be a problem in states that have amended their LLC statutes to 
 
625.  In re Bianchini (Bianchini v. Ryan), 346 B. R. 593 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006). 
626.  Carter G. Bishop, Reserve Piercing: A Single Member LLC Paradox, 54 S.D. L. REV. 199 
(2009). 
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avoid just such situations.  For example, a member of a Delaware LLC 
ceases to be a member upon assignment of all of the member’s interest.627  
An LLC dissolves if the LLC has no members,628 but the dissolution may 
be revoked by the assignee of the last member.629  In Colorado, a member 
ceases to be a member upon assignment of all of the member’s interest,630 
and an LLC will dissolve ninety days after it ceases to have a member 
unless the assignee or assignees of the last remaining member agree to 
admit a member.631  Statutory provisions like those in Delaware and 
Colorado facilitate the management of an LLC that no longer has a 
member.  The assignee of the last remaining member may admit himself or 
another person as a member.  That new member may then either continue 
the LLC or dissolve it. 
 
X.  DIRECT LIABILITY OF OWNERS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
In some cases, statutes and agency law impose direct liability on 
the owners of entities.  A veil piercing/alter-ego action is not 
generally required for the imposition of such liability.  This Article 
discusses examples of such liability below under DeFacto Doctrine, 
Undisclosed Principal, Liability for Improper Distributions, Liability 
for Unpaid Taxes, and Liability Under Other Federal and State 
Statutes. 
 
A.  DE FACTO DOCTRINE 
 
The Model Business Corporation Act states: “All persons purporting 
to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation 
under this Act, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created 
while so acting.”632 
 Several states, such as Colorado,633 have similar provisions.  Adams v. 
Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co.634 involves shareholder liability for debts 
incurred during a two year period following expiration of a corporation’s 
 
627.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3). 
628.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(4). 
629.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-806(3) 
630.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702(2). 
631.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-801(c)(2), 7-80-701(2). 
632.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.04. 
633.  All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation without authority to do so and 
without good faith belief that they have such authority shall be jointly and severally liable for all 
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof.  COLO. REV. STAT. §7-102-104.  Colorado applies a 
similar rule to LLCs. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-105. 
634.  Adams v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa 1984). 
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old charter and before reincorporation.  The court held that in the absence 
of a clear statutory mandate to the contrary, limited liability did not exist 
for liabilities incurred during the interim period.  The Iowa statute similar 
to section 105 of the 1969 version of the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act was held not to provide protection against such liabilities.  
The court also stated that Iowa does not recognize the concept of de facto 
corporations in the context of an expiration of a corporation’s charter. 
What if the owners of a planned but not formed corporation or limited 
liability company begin acting in the name of the unformed entity in a state 
that does not have a statutory provision like that of RMBA §2.04 or C.R.S. 
§§7-80-105, 7-102-104?  Unless a third party dealing with an owner of an 
unformed entity agrees otherwise, the owner will be personally liable on a 
contract entered into in the name of the unformed entity: 
 
Unless the third party agrees otherwise, a person who makes 
a contract with a third party purportedly as an agent on 
behalf of a principal becomes a party to the contract if the 
purported agent knows or has reason to know that the 
purported principal does not exist or lacks capacity to be a 
party to a contract.635 
 
In AT&T Advertising, L.P. v. Winningham,636 the defendant was liable 
because before he signed contracts on behalf of an LLC, the LLC was 
cancelled by the Oklahoma Secretary of State.  Accordingly, the LLC was 
not a legal entity existing at the time defendant signed the contracts and did 
not shield defendant from liability. 
Peinado v. Barnett, discussed previously,637 cited lack of valid 
formation of the LLC in that case as a ground for imposing liability on the 
owner.  The facts of other opinions discussed in this Article also would 
appear to raise issues of acting on behalf of an entity that has not been 
validly formed, but that was not cited as a basis for liability.638 
 
B.  UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL 
 
635.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §6.04. 
636.  AT&T Advertising, L.P. v. Winningham, 280 P.3d 360 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 2012). 
637.  Supra note 396 and accompanying text. 
638.  Kalashian, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10789 at *3; Minton, 364 P.2d at 473 (court’s 
stated ground for its holding imposing personal liability on the owner of a corporation was 
undercapitalization, but Macey & Mitts, supra note 11 at n. 43, argue that “a much more compelling 
basis” was the corporation’s having only one director rather than the statutorily mandated minimum of 
three); in New Horizons Supply Coop., 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 108, the court seemed to be somewhat 
skeptical that the LLC before it had in fact been formed, but imposed liability on the member for failing 
to follow the statutory procedures for dissolving an LLC. 
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If an owner of the entity (or someone else acting on behalf of the 
entity) fails to disclose that they are acting on behalf of an entity, the 
person so acting may be liable under the agency law theory of undisclosed 
principal. 
In Water, Waste & Land, Inc. d/b/a Westec v. Lanham,639 the court 
held that Larry Clark and Donald Lanham were personally liable where 
they entered into a contract without disclosing that they were acting on 
behalf of Preferred Income Investors, LLC, a Colorado limited liability 
company (“Preferred”).  Lanham and Clark were members and managers of 
Preferred.  Clark contacted and contracted with Westec for engineering 
services.  Clark’s business card included his name, address, and the initials 
“PII,” but not the name of the LLC or his title. 
 
In reaching its decision in this case, the court said that agency law 
applies in the LLC context, “notwithstanding the LLC’s statutory notice 
rules,” continuing: 
 
Under the common law of agency, an agent is liable on a 
contract entered on behalf of a principal if the principal is 
not fully disclosed . . . .  If both the existence and identity of 
the agent’s principal are fully disclosed to the other party, 
the agent does not become a party to any contract which he 
negotiates . . . .  But where the principal is partially disclosed 
(i.e., the existence of a principal is known but his identity is 
not), it is usually inferred that the agent is party to the 
contract.640 
 
The court went on to say, “The duty of disclosure clearly lies with the 
agent alone; the third party with whom the agent deals has no duty to 
discover the existence of an agency or . . . the identity of the principal.”641  
As a result, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court and 
reinstated the judgment of the County Court which had held Lanham and 
Clark personally liable as agents for (at best) a partially disclosed 
principal.642  Of particular note in this case is the court’s holding that the 
duty of disclosure lies solely with the agent and is not affected by the 
provisions of C. R. S. §7-80-208: 
 
 
639.  Water, Waste & Land, Inc. d/b/a Westec v. Lanham, 955 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1998). 
640.  Water, Waste & Land, Inc. d/b/a Westec, 955 P.2d at 1001. 
641.  Id. 
642.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §6.03. 
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The fact that the articles of organization are on file in the 
records of the secretary of state is notice that the limited 
liability company is a limited liability company and is notice 
of all other facts stated therein that are required to be stated 
in the articles of organization by section 7-80-204.643 
 
The facts of Water, Waste & Land illustrate the policy underlying 
liability for acting for an undisclosed principal.  As Clark’s business card 
did not disclose that he was acting on behalf of an LLC, and he failed 
otherwise to inform Westec, there was no way for Westec to check the 
publically available information nor any way for Westec to evaluate 
whether the LLC was credit worthy and otherwise suitable to be a 
contractual counter party.  Case law expresses the policy that a contractual 
party who knowingly contracts with an entity and doesn’t take 
commercially reasonable protective steps cannot later seek to hold the 
owners of the entity liable under an alter-ego/veil piercing theory.644  If a 
party to a contract can’t evaluate the entity because the other party to the 
contract has not disclosed the existence of the entity, the party who has 
failed to disclose the existence of the entity should not be permitted to hide 
behind the liability shield of the entity. 
Thames & Company v. Eicher,645 is a decision of the Mississippi 
Supreme court that a later decision of the same court described as a case in 
which the court “did not pierce the corporate veil . . . but instead found 
Rogers personally liable as the agent of an undisclosed principal.”646  This 
is confusing and it is not entirely clear what theory the court applied in 
Thames, but it appears to be more of an alter ego case than an undisclosed 
principal case.  In Thames, plaintiffs believed they were negotiating the 
purchase of a house from a Mrs. Rogers and only learned at closing that the 
seller was actually a corporation, Thames & Company.  The court stated: 
 
Mrs. Rogers contends that she was not the builder-vendor of 
 
643.  Water, Waste & Land, Inc. d/b/a Westec, 955 P.2d at 1001 (stating: “[W]e conclude that 
where an agent fails to disclose either the fact that he is acting on behalf of a principal or the identity of 
the principal, the notice provision of our LLC Act, section 7-80-208, cannot relieve the agent of liability 
to a third party.  When a third party deals with an agent acting on behalf of a limited liability company, 
the existence and identity of which has been disclosed, the third party is conclusively presumed to know 
that the entity is a limited liability company and not a partnership or some other type of business 
organization.  Where the third party does not know the identity of the principal entity, however, the 
situation is fundamentally different because the third party is without notice and the law does not 
contemplate that he has any way of finding the relevant records.). 
644.  Supra notes 90-139 and accompanying text under Tort Liability Versus Contract Liability. 
645.  Thames & Company v. Eicher, 373 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1979). 
646.  Restaurant of Hattiesburg, LLC v. Hotel & Restaurant Supply, Inc., 84 So.3d 32, 47 n. 2 
(Miss. Ct. Apps. 2012). 
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the house but a mere agent for Thames, the original builder-
vendor of the house.  However, according to the Eichers’ 
testimony, they knew only of Mrs. Rogers (and not Thames) 
during all the negotiations until the occasion of closing out 
the house purchase.  The facts show here that the corporate 
appellant, Thames, was no more than the alter ego of Mrs. 
Rogers.  She held all of the stock in the company, and when 
deposed on February 21, 1978, was unable to recall who the 
directors and stockholders of the corporation were.  She 
furnished construction funds for the corporation which 
appeared to be without substantial capital.  The evidence 
established that the corporation held no regular meetings and 
there were no minutes pertaining to its operation.  Testimony 
reveals that Mrs. Rogers treated the corporation almost as 
though it did not exist and upon the evidence, we cannot say 
that the court erred in looking past and beyond the corporate 
structure and allowing Mrs. Rogers to be held individually, 
along with Thames, liable for the defective house.647 
 
Pinebrook Properties, Ltd v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners 
Association648 also considered a situation in which the manager of an LLC 
sent a letter to the limited partners649 without indicating that he had signed 
the letter in a representative capacity.  The court stated: “However, failing 
to sign the letter with ‘president,’ or putting the corporate name on the 
letter, is a corporate formality.  Failure to comply with corporate 
formalities is no longer considered in determining alter ego and is therefore 
no evidence of alter ego.”650 
 
The court also made some interesting observations concerning veil-
piercing.  In reversing the trial court’s holding that the veil of the limited 
partnership should be pierced the court stated: 
 
The theory of alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil, is 
inapplicable to partnerships.  Under traditional general 
partnership law, each partner is liable jointly and severally 
for the liabilities of the partnership.  The Texas Legislature 
has altered this general scheme and statutorily created 
 
647.  Thames & Company, 373 So.2d at 1035. 
648.  Pinebrook Properties, Ltd v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners Association, 77 S.W.3d 487 
(Tex. App. 2002). 
649.  The LLC in question was the sole general partner of a Texas limited partnership. 
650.  Pinebrook Properties, Ltd, 77 S.W.3d at 500 (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ANN. art. 2.21(A)(3)). 
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limited partnerships which are governed by the Texas 
Revised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA).   Under TRLPA, 
“a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities 
of a partner in a partnership without limited partners to 
persons other than the partnership and the other partners.”  
Under the Texas Revised Partnership Act, “all partners are 
liable jointly and severally for all debts and obligations of 
the partnership . . . .”  Therefore, in a limited partnership, the 
general partner is always liable for the debts and obligations 
of the partnership.  Limited partners are not liable for the 
obligations of a limited partnership unless the limited partner 
is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of the 
limited partner’s rights and powers as a limited partner, the 
limited partner participates in the control of the business.  
However, if the limited partner does participate in the 
control of the business, the limited partner is liable only to 
persons who transact business with the limited partnership 
reasonably believing, based on the limited partner’s conduct, 
that the limited partner is a general partner.651 
 
The court then stated with respect to piercing the veil of the LLC 
general partner: 
 
Having determined Pinebrook Properties cannot be the alter 
ego of Musgrave, we now turn to the trial court’s finding 
that Pinebrook Management, which is a limited liability 
company, is the alter ego of Musgrave . . . . .  “Except as and 
to the extent the regulations specifically provide otherwise, a 
member or manager is not liable for the debts, obligations or 
liabilities of a limited liability company including under a 
judgment decree, or order of a court.”  In determining if 
there is evidence legally sufficient to support the trial court’s 
finding, we look to see if there is such unity between 
Musgrave and Pinebrook Management that the separateness 
has ceased to exist, and whether holding only Pinebrook 
Management liable, as the general partner of Pinebrook 
Properties, would result in injustice.  We must look to the 
relationship between Musgrave and Pinebrook Management 
to see if alter ego is shown from the total dealings of 
Musgrave and Pinebrook Management — for example, if the 
 
651.  Pinebrook Properties, Ltd, 77 S.W.3d at 499. 
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corporate and individual properties have been kept separate; 
the amount of financial interest, ownership, and control the 
individual maintains over the corporation; and whether the 
corporation has been used for personal purposes.  The 
evidence of alter ego between Musgrave and Pinebrook 
Management presented by the Owners is that Pinebrook 
Management had no checking account, had not filed a tax 
return, and that Musgrave sent a letter to the lot owners, 
signing his own name and not designating that he signed it in 
any other capacity.  However, the Owners failed to cite any 
authority holding that failure to have a checking account, or 
failure to file tax returns, establishes alter ego.  There is no 
evidence provided that Musgrave commingled funds or that 
his assets and those of Pinebrook Management were not kept 
separate.  The evidence clearly shows Pinebrook 
Management has never had the need, or been required, to file 
a tax return.  This is no evidence that Pinebrook is the alter 
ego of Musgrave.652 
 
Longview Aluminum, L.L.C. v Indus. Gen., L.L.C.653 held that the 
times that defendants clearly indicated that Michigan Avenue Partners, 
L.L.C. was a limited liability company were sufficient to put the plaintiff 
on notice that it was dealing with an LLC rather than a partnership 
notwithstanding some references to the entity that were ambiguous.  Unlike 
the plaintiff in Water, Waste & Land,654 the plaintiff in Longview Aluminum 
knew the name of the entity and therefore had notice that the entity was an 
LLC pursuant to 805 ILCS § 180’5-70.655  Empire Office Machines, Inc. v. 
Aspen Trails Associates LLC656 is another case holding that lack of 
precision in signing a contract will not result in individual liability if the 
other party to the contract knew that the person signing was doing so for an 
entity. 
 
C.  LIABILITY FOR IMPROPER DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Limited liability company statutes commonly provide that an LLC 
 
652.  Pinebrook Properties, Ltd, 77 S.W.3d at 500 (internal citations omitted). 
653.  Longview Aluminum, L.L.C. v. Indus. Gen., L.L.C., No. 02 C 0168, 2003 WL 21518585 
(N.D. Ill. July 2, 2003). 
654.  Supra notes 639-43 and accompanying text. 
655.  “The fact that the articles of organization are on file in the Office of the Secretary of State is 
notice that the limited liability company is a limited liability company and notice of all other facts set 
forth herein.” 
656.  Empire Office Machines, Inc. v. Aspen Trails Associates LLC, 322 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2014). 
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cannot make a distribution if the LLC is insolvent or becomes insolvent as 
a result of the distribution.657  A member who receives a distribution 
knowing that it improper is liable to return the distribution to the LLC.658  
This Article previously discussed a 2009 decision of the Colorado Court of 
Appeals holding that a non-member manager (Trowbridge) was potentially 
liable to a creditor, remanding to the trial court to determine “Whether it is 
equitable to hold Trowbridge personally liable for the LLC’s improper 
actions by piercing the corporate [sic] veil.”659  In connection with another 
claim, the Court of Appeals also directed the trial court to determine: 
“Whether the LLCs were or became insolvent when Trowbridge distributed 
LLC assets to the nonparty members and, if so, whether Trowbridge 
breached the common law duty of an LLC manager to avoid favoring 
personal interests over the LLC’s creditors’ claims.”660  In 2010, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed another Court of Appeals decision and 
also overruled a portion of the Court of Appeals’ finding in Sheffield, 
holding that “[t]o the extent Sheffield holds that an LLC’s manager has a 
fiduciary duty to the LLC’s creditors, it is overruled.”661 
In 2010, another panel of the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court 
dismissal of a complaint seeking to hold members liable to creditors for 
allegedly wrongful distributions.662  The trial court had determined that § 7-
80-606(2) of the Colorado LLC Act provided a remedy to the entity, not to 
creditors, and therefore dismissed for lack of standing.  In overruling the 
 
657.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6 §18-607(a).  RULLCA §406.  Prototype LLC Act 
§405(a)(2). The Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act is an ongoing project of the LLCs, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar 
Association.  The most recent version was published in THE BUSINESS LAWYER (Nov. 2011). 
658.  See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 §18-607(b). Delaware has a three-year statute of limitations 
on the member’s obligation to return an improper distribution. Del. Code Ann., tit. 6 §18-607(c). 
659.  See Sheffield Services Co., 211 P.3d at 714. 
660.  The trial court had previously found that “Trowbridge’s overall conduct resulted in a clear 
financial benefit to him, which was not properly documented because of his elaborate scheme of 
concealment.”  Id. at 722.  The Sheffield panel went on to state that “[w]hether the conduct in question 
is that of a corporate director, as in LaFond, [LaFond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367 (Colo. App. 1984)] or 
an LLC manager, as in this case, the injustice wrought by adherence to the corporate or LLC fiction is 
the same: the director’s or manager’s actions in using corporate or LLC assets for personal gain would 
defeat a creditor’s valid claim.”  Id. at 721.  The Sheffield Panel then referred to the District Court’s 
finding at page 24 of the Amended Order: “The fair inference to be drawn from the overall conduct is 
that there was a clear financial benefit to the Defendant Trowbridge, although perhaps not documented, 
from this elaborate scheme of concealment.”  Id. at 724.  To clarify this issue, one of the Sheffield 
panel’s directions to the District Court on remand was to determine “whether Trowbridge breached the 
common law duty of an LLC manager to avoid favoring personal interests over the LLC’s creditors’ 
claims.”  Id.  In Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, Inc., infra note 661, the Colorado Supreme Court 
specifically overruled Sheffield on this question. 
661.  Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, Inc., 302 P.3d 263 (Colo. 2013). 
662.  Colborne Corporation v. Weinstein, 304 P.3d 570 (Colo. App. 2010), reversed by Weinstein, 
302 P.3d at 263. 
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trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh,663 a case 
under the repealed Colorado Corporations Code which provides that a 
director may (in some circumstances) be liable to the corporation for a 
wrongful distribution.664  The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the Court 
of Appeals decision665 holding that since “the LLC Act and the Colorado 
Business Corporation Act are two different statutes with different schemes 
and purposes, and because a corporate shareholder is not equivalent to an 
LLC member, the legislature is free to choose a statutory limitation on an 
LLC’s creditors different from what it chooses for a corporation’s 
creditors.”666  The Court held that, absent express statutory authority, an 
LLC’s creditor may not assert a claim against the members of the LLC for 
unlawful distributions. 
In reaching its decision in Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, Inc., the 
Colorado Supreme Court specifically overruled the Court of Appeals’ 
finding in Sheffield, holding that “[t]o the extent Sheffield holds that an 
LLC’s manager has a fiduciary duty to the LLC’s creditors, it is 
overruled.”667  The Colorado Supreme Court in Weinstein held that “an 
LLC’s creditor may not enforce a claim against the members of the LLC 
for unlawful distribution.”668  It appears that this holding means that the 
operating agreement of a Colorado LLC could reduce or eliminate a 
member’s liability for an unlawful distribution or reduce the period for 
which the member is liable.  The Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (“RULLCA”), on the other hand states that a creditor may 
enforce a member’s obligation to return a contribution,669 but it appears that 
the operating agreement of an LLC that is subject to RULLCA may 
eliminate this obligation.670  The Prototype LLC Act671 does not provide 
that a creditor may enforce a member’s obligation to return a contribution 
but states that an operating agreement may not reduce the two year period 
 
663.  Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 393 (Colo. 1982). 
664.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-5-114(3) (repealed effective July 1, 1994).  This provision was 
similar to that currently found in the Colorado Business Corporation Act at COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-
403.  The court in Ficor, 639 P.2d at 385, found that the provision was intended to be for the benefit of 
the creditor, and the fact that the statute specifies liability to the corporation, not the creditor, was 
irrelevant, at least on the facts in Ficor, where all the creditors were represented in the case. 
665.  Weinstein, 302 P.3d at 263. 
666.  Weinstein, 302 P.3d at 268 (citing CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Del. 2011)) 
(holding that creditors of an LLC did not have the right to bring a lawsuit on the LLC’s behalf even 
though creditors for a corporation did). 
667.  Weinstein, 302 P.3d at 263. 
668.  Id. at 269. 
669.  RULLCA § 403(b). 
670.  RULLCA § 110 does not restrict what an operating agreement may do to §§ 403 and 406. 
671.  The Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act is an ongoing project of the LLCs, 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar 
Association.  The most recent version was published in THE BUSINESS LAWYER (Nov. 2011). 
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during which the member is so obligated.672 
 
D.  LIABILITY FOR UNPAID TAXES 
 
Liability may arise for Federal employment and withheld income 
taxes.  “Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over” 
taxes, who willfully fails to do so, faces liability not only for the amount of 
the tax but a 100% penalty as well.”673 
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 6672(d) states: 
 
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and 
pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to 
collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such 
tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to the 
other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal 
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not 
accounted for and paid over. 
 
The penalty applies only to those funds withheld from employees and 
not to the employer’s portion of the taxes.  The withheld funds are referred 
to as “trust fund” taxes and typically include income tax, social security, 
and Medicare payments withheld from employees.  The penalty is imposed 
on “responsible persons” and is collected from a responsible person only if 
the tax cannot be collected from the employer.674  Potentially responsible 
persons include an officer or employee of a corporation or a member or 
employee of a partnership.675  The question is whether the person possessed 
sufficient control over the entity’s affairs to avoid the nonpayment of the 
trust fund taxes.676  An individual does not have to have day to day control 
of the administration and affairs of the business to be a responsible 
person.677  “Responsibility is a matter of status, duty or authority.”678  If a 
person has sufficient authority to ensure that taxes are paid, that person 
 
672.  RULLCA § 110(c)(9). 
673.  Internal Revenue Code of 1986 §§3102(a) (withheld employment taxes), 3402(a) (liability 
for taxes withheld or collected), 6672(a) (one hundred percent penalty for failure to collect and pay over 
tax; exception for volunteer directors of tax-exempt organizations ((§6672(e))), 7501 (liability for taxes 
withheld or collected). 
674.  Caterino v. United States, 794 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (cert denied 480 U. S. 905 (1987)). 
675.  I.R.C. § 6671(b). 
676.  Harrington v. United States, 504 F.2d 1306, 1311 (1st Cir. 1994). 
677.  Harrington, 504 F.2d at 1315. 
678.  Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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cannot avoid liability by delegation to another.679  Knowledge of non-
payment of taxes, reliance on statements of another who is known to be 
unreliable, failure to investigate after having received notice of non-
payment, and failure to make reasonable inquiry concerning the status of 
trust fund taxes when the business is in financial difficulty all may establish 
willfulness.680 
A person is a responsible for trust fund taxes only while the person is 
a responsible person.  A party who acquires control of an employer with 
delinquent taxes is not responsible for the taxes that were due before the 
acquisition.681 
Employers may achieve some protection by contracting with a third-
party payor.682  Although using a third-party payor does not relieve the 
employer of liability, the cited regulation does give the IRS authority to 
pursue the third-party payor directly. 
In egregious circumstances, failure to pay trust fund taxes may result 
in criminal penalties.683  United States v. Easterday684 determined that 
Easterday could be convicted of a crime even though he may have been 
able to prove that his company didn’t have enough funds to pay the payroll 
taxes. 
Recent amendments to the applicable regulations have made single-
member LLCs the responsible party for employment and withheld taxes on 
employees of the LLC.  The owner is still treated as a self-employed person 
and presumably will be the first target of the IRS if the LLC fails to satisfy 
its withholding and payment obligations with respect to its employees.685 
 
E.  LIABILITY UNDER OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES 
 
Several states have adopted statutes that impose liability on the 
constituent members and managers of an entity when the taxes are not paid 
by the entity.686  As a noted commentator, Allan G. Donn, has explained, 
federal and state statutes impose direct liability on entity owners and 
affiliates under employment laws, liability for wage claims of employees, 
 
679.  Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1993); Kinnie v. United States, 994 
F.2d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 1993). 
680.  Vinick v. United States, 110 F.3d 168, 171–73 (1st Cir. 1997). 
681.  Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 259 (1978); In re Rossiter, 167 B.R. 919 (Bankr. C. 
D. Cal. 1994). 
682.  Treas. Reg. § 31.3504-2 (2014). 
683.  United States v. Brennick, 949 F. Supp. 32 (D. Mass. 1996). 
684.  United States v. Easterday, 564 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). 
685.  I.R.B. 2007-39 at 675 (T.D. 9356).  Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv) (2016). 
686.  Thomas R. Rutledge, “Limited Liability (or Not); Reflections on the Holy Grail,” 51 S.D. L. 
REV. 417, 443 (2006). 
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environmental laws, and pension funding.687 
 
F.  LIABILITY FOR THE OWNER’S OWN ACTIONS AND FOR ACTIONS OF THE 
ENTITY’S EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS 
 
An owner who is active in the entity’s business is responsible for his 
or her own actions, including torts.688  In Sanchez v. Mulvaney689 plaintiffs 
sued Hypersonic Construction, LLC, the general contractor they had 
contracted with to construct a drive-in restaurant and also brought 
negligence and veil-piercing claims against one of the members of the 
LLC.  The court upheld summary judgment for the individual defendant on 
the veil-piercing claim but not on the claim involving allegations of his 
own tortious or fraudulent actions.  If the owner is an agent of the entity 
and commits the tort while acting for the entity, the entity will also be 
liable.690 
In Retropolis, Inc. v. 14th Street Development LLC691 the defendant 
avoided a veil-piercing claim because the plaintiff presented minimal 
evidence of misuse of the LLC, but the court noted that the defendant could 
be held liable to the extent the plaintiff brought tort claims against him 
because “a corporate officer who participates in the commission of a tort 
can be held personally liable even if the participation is for the 
corporation’s benefit.”692 
In 16 Jade Street, LLC v. R. Design Construction Co., LLC,693 in a 
case of first impression, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a 
member of an LLC could be personally liable for torts committed in the 
course of working for the LLC. 
In In re Sanner (Birdwell v. Fort McDowell Sand and Gravel),694 the 
court applied Arizona veil-piercing cases in determining that the founder 
and manager of the defendant LLC was not liable under an alter ego theory.  
The bankruptcy trustee argued that it was unnecessary to pierce the veil of 
the LLC because the individual was a party to a plan to engage in 
conclusive bidding under Section 363(n) of the Bankruptcy Code and was 
directly liable for his own conduct.  The court characterized the trustee’s 
 
687.  Allan G. Donn, Is the Liability of Limited liability Entities Really Limited? RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUS. ORGS. 99, 110–13 (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015) (Robert W. Hillman and Mark J. Loewenstein, eds.). 
688.  Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 364 P.2d 730, 734 (Colo. 1961). 
689.  Sanchez v. Mulvaney, 274 S.W.3d (Tex. App. 2008). 
690.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 7.03(2), 7.03 cmt. b, 7.03(2)(a), 7.07. 
691.  Retropolis, Inc. v. 14th Street Development LLC, 17 A.D.3d 209 (1st Dept. 2005). 
692.  Id. at 211. 
693.  16 Jade Street, LLC v. R. Design Construction Co., LLC, 728 S.E.2d 448 (S.C. 2012). 
694.  In re Sanner (Birdwell v. Fort McDowell Sand & Gravel), 218 B.R. 941 (D. Ariz. 1998). 
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argument as “merely an attempt to make an end run around the protections 
accorded shareholders, directors, and officers by the corporate form and is 
not supported by any credible evidence.”695  Moreover, the agreement 
setting forth the bidding plan was signed on behalf of the LLC by a 
representative of the LLC acting in his representative capacity and not in an 
individual capacity.696 
An owner may also face liability for negligent hiring, supervision, and 
retention of employees, contractors, and other agents.697 
 
G.  OPINION CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Any attorney contemplating rendering an opinion with respect to the 
enforceability of an LLC’s company agreement or of the liability of the 
members of the LLC should carefully consult the Supplemental TriBar 
Opinion Report: Reports on LLC Memberships Interests (“TriBar 
2011”).698  TriBar 2011 notes that purchasers of LLC interests sometimes 
request an opinion that, as members of the LLC, they will have no liability 
to third parties for debts, obligations, and liabilities of the LLC.699  TriBar 
2011 notes that this type of opinion is not normally addressed in corporate 
opinions and expresses the hope that, over time, opinions on the personal 
liability of LLC members to third parties for liabilities of the LLC will 
cease to be requested or given.700  TriBar 2011 then states that, “as matters 
now stand,” an opinion on liability of LLC members to third parties should 
be combined with the TriBar 2011 suggested opinion on liability of LLC 
members for payments and contributions to the LLC.701  TriBar 2011 
suggests the following language for the combined opinion: 
 
Under [name of LLC statute under which LLC was formed] 
(the “Act”), Purchasers have no obligation to make further 
payments for their purchase of LLC Interests or 
contributions to LLC solely by reason of their ownership of 
LLC Interests [or their status as members of LLC] and no 
personal liability for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of 
LLC, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, solely 
by reason of being members of LLC [except in each case as 
 
695.  In re Sanner, 218 B.R. at 947. 
696.  Id. 
697.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§7.03, 7.05. 
698.  See Supplemental TriBar Opinion Report: Reports on LLC Memberships Interests, 66 BUS. 
LAW. 1065 (2011). 
699.  Id. at 1074. 
700.  Id. 
701.  Id. at 1071–74. 
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provided in their Subscription Agreements or the Operating 
Agreement] [and except for their obligation to repay any 
funds wrongfully distributed to them].702 
 
An opinion giver should resist any request to change the suggested 
reference to the LLC statute under which the LLC statute.  For example, if 
an opinion is being given with respect to a Delaware LLC, if the opinion 
began “Under Delaware law” instead of “Under the Delaware LLC Act,” 
the opinion giver might be viewed as giving an opinion that the members 
will not be liable under any theory of Delaware law, including its law on 
veil-piercing and alter ego liability.  Any lawyer who is requested to give 
an opinion along the lines discussed in this Article should include a careful 
consideration of TriBar2100 and the other helpful commentaries on LLC 
opinions.703 
 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The cases discussed in this Article are largely consistent with Macey 
and Mitts’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the many factors discussed or, 
at least, mentioned in many opinions that courts approve veil-piercing for 
one of three reasons.  Macey and Mitts argue that their analysis shows that 
whatever rationale may have been stated in opinions, “the entire universe 
of piercing cases can be explained as judicial efforts to remedy one”704 of 
three problems: 
 
 Courts pierce the corporate veil “to bring corporate 
actors’ behavior into conformity with a particular 
statutory scheme;”705 
 Courts “also pierce to remedy what appears to be 
fraudulent conduct that does not satisfy the strict 
elements of common law fraud;”706 
 The third ground on which courts pierce the corporate 
 
702.  Supra note 698 at 1075.  TriBar 2011 notes that some opinion givers do not include the last 
bracketed language because they do not believe that an obligation to repay a wrongful distribution is 
solely attributable to ownership of LLC interests and that such an obligation is not “solely” by reason of 
being a member because it depends on the recipient’s knowledge that the distribution is unlawful.  Id. at 
1072 and note 42.  TriBar 2011’s view is that “an express exception for the obligation of members to 
repay wrongful distributions is not necessary, but its inclusion is not objectionable.”  Id. 
703.  For an excellent example of such commentary, see Norman M. Powell, Opining on Limited 
Liability Company Series, THE PRACTICAL LAW. (Aug. 2014).  Despite the title, Powell’s article is a 
useful source for any LLC opinion. 
704.  Macey & Mitts supra note 11 at 4–6. 
705.  Id. at 4. 
706.  Id. at 5. 
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veil is “the promotion of what” Macey and Mitts term 
“accepted bankruptcy values.”707 
 
Macey and Mitts further state: 
 
[W]e believe that our taxonomy can produce a coherent 
account of veil-piercing cases, and are thus more optimistic 
than Stephen Bainbridge, who famously called for the 
abolishment of the doctrine.  Unlike Bainbridge, we believe 
that there are strong public policy rationales for retaining 
veil piercing in certain situations.  We hesitate to conclude 
that a century of jurisprudence represents a colossal mistake 
on the part of the courts in all 50 states.  Rather, we suggest 
that three public policy rationales provide a systematic 
justification of veil piercing and that courts regularly decide 
in accordance with these rationales, even if they do not say 
so expressly.708 
 
This Article has also discussed cases that do not appear consistent 
with Macey and Mitts.  These cases include Martin v, Freeman709 and 
Axtmann v. Chillemi,710 which appear to stand for the dubious proposition 
that an entity must have adequate capital at all times sufficient to respond 
to unexpected large liabilities, as well as the opinions that appear to place 
some weight on the tax status of the entity in question.711  This Article has 
also questioned the analysis of Macey and Mitts on occasion.712  One may 
hope that that Martin v. Freeman, Axtmann v. Chillemi, and the cases 
considering tax status will not be followed in the future but that courts will 
apply thoughtful analyses that take into account business realty.  This 
should include careful attention to the arguments made by Macey and 
Mitts.713  Attorneys who are advising clients would also do well to consider 
the arguments of Macy and Mitts as well as the opinions that explain what 
factors are particularly important.  Many of the cases discussed in this 
Article list many factors but often focus in on particular actions of the 
defendants that clearly did or did not harm the plaintiff.  Also, as should be 
obvious without reading any cases is that an advisor should caution a client 
 
707.  Macey & Mitts supra note 11 at 5. 
708.  Macey & Mitts supra note 11 at 22. 
709.  See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text. 
710.  See supra notes 312-29 and accompanying text. 
711.  See supra notes 404-28 and accompanying text. 
712.  See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text and notes 287-91 and accompanying text. 
713.  See supra note 11. 
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who appears to be intending to use an entity to frustrate the reasonable 
expectations of creditors or to skirt a statutory or regulatory scheme.  
Courts have little patience with clear instances of abuse of the LLC form.  
Two representative cases discussed in this Article are Double Constr. Co. 
v. Advanced Home Builders, LLC714 and Tzovolos v. Wiseman.715  In Double 
Constr. Co., the owners of the LLC refused to pay for work the plaintiff 
had clearly done and that had been certified by the municipal engineer.  In 
addition, the owners of the LLC unjustifiably refused to pay for paving 
work done by another contractor.  In Tzovolos, the defendant took action on 
behalf of an LLC without complying with the LLC agreement’s provisions 
for majority member approval and used his dominant position to take 
restaurant equipment that he knew he was not entitled to.  In addition, one 
of the factors the court in Tzovolos cited as showing a lack of separateness 
among the defendant entities was that “each of the entities was represented 
by a single law firm . . . even when they had conflicting interests and when 
at least one . . . was insolvent.”716  Moreover, although LLC statutes often 
provide that failure to follow formalities is not to be considered in piercing 
the veil of an LLC, clients should be cautioned to make sure that third 
parties understand that they are dealing with an LLC, and maintaining 
financial records that clearly differentiate between the LLC’s receipts and 
disbursements and those of the members will often be crucial in 
successfully opposing a veil-piercing claim.  The cases citing tax status and 
filings as a factor in veil-piercing suggest that it is advisable that each 
single-member LLC have its own tax identification number and, if it is to 
be handling receipts and disbursements, a bank account in its own name.717  
An attorney who is advising the owner of a single-member LLC should 
caution the owner that, although the LLC is disregarded for income tax 
purposes,718 the LLC is nevertheless a state law entity.  The attorney should 
advise the owner to be sure to enter into contracts in the name of the LLC 
and to be sure that third parties know that they are dealing with an LLC.  
Moreover, an attorney who is engaged to defend a single-member LLC and 
or its owner against an alter ego claim should be prepared to argue clearly 
to the court that the LLC’s permitted tax status should not be considered.  If 
a client is entering into a commercial contract to be performed by an entity, 
 
714.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
715.  Supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
716.  Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 841. 
717.  See cases discussed supra notes 404-28 and accompanying text. 
718.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1996) (unless the single-member LLC elects to be treated as a 
corporation for tax purposes).  Moreover, a single member unincorporated entity that is disregarded for 
income tax purposes is not disregarded for employment tax purposes and certain excise tax purposes.  
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv) (1996) (employment taxes) & 303.7701-2(c)(2)(v) (1996) (certain 
excise taxes). 
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the client’s attorney should caution the client either to insure that the entity 
has the resources necessary to perform under the contract or to seek 
personal guarantees from the owners.  Otherwise, the cases discussed under 
Section III.C. Tort Liability Versus Contract Liability719 may foreclose a 
later attempt to hold the owners liable under a veil piercing/alter-ego claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
719.  See supra notes 90-139 and accompanying text. 
